History is changing its course in Iran. Once again, Iranian masses—including exiles and members of the diaspora—women and men chanting “Marg bar mullah” (death to the mullahs), ‘Zan, Zindagi,  Azadi’ (‘woman, life, freedom’) singing and dancing, have taken to the streets of major Western capitals. At the same time, Iranians in big and small cities and towns inside the country, including Tehran, have also taken to the streets.

While  Iran is volcanic with uprise, its tremors are being felt across neighboring  Pakistan. It has sent waves of shock, awe, and even festivity across the Baloch population and their pockets in Pakistan, specifically in its southern province, which Baloch separatists call “Occupied Balochistan.” by Pakistan. Meanwhile, pro-Pakistani establishment pundits, analysts, and commentators claim that the situation increases their heartbeats regarding Pakistani Balochistan, given the present war scenario. However, for their claimed palpitations, the Baloch people are not responsible. Rather, it is the Pakistani state and its apparatuses that have been in a state of full-fledged war against their fellow countrymen and women for decades. Thankfully for them, in scenarios similar to the one currently unfolding in Iran—something they dread—the capital of Pakistan is Islamabad, not Karachi, Tehran, Manila, Bogotá, or Istanbul.

Balochistan itself bifurcates the Baloch population: Eastern Balochistan lies in Pakistan, while Western Balochistan—also called Iranian Sistan—lies in Iran.

The Baloch are often described as cousins of the Kurds. Ethnically, racially, and culturally, Kurds and Baloch share many similarities. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, they are related peoples. Just as the Kurds stretch across Iran, the Straits of Hormuz, Iraq, Turkey, Cyprus, and up toward the Alps, the Baloch extend from Bolan, Kharan, and the Makran coast to Chabahar and Zahedan in Iran, and even toward Muscat, Bahrain, and parts of Iraq. Some accounts trace their origins to regions around Halab (Aleppo) in Syria. Even their fate appears similar: their persecutors differ little in their oppression and, at times, genocidal tactics against them. “No friends but the mountains,” the Kurds famously say.

But the question remains: where does Iranian—or Western—Balochistan stand in the current volcanic situation in Iran?

Unlike neighboring Pakistani (Eastern) Balochistan—where secular, separatist nationalist politics and armed movements claiming to fight for the national liberation of the Baloch dominate the scene—in Iranian or Western Balochistan, religious parties hold far greater sway over politics and society. As a Europe-based Baloch nationalist friend with social and political ties in Iranian Balochistan once said, “To be realistic, in Iranian Balochistan—also called Iranian Sistan—Pakistan is strong.” According to him, Pakistan enjoys such immense influence that India’s alleged spy Kulbhushan Jadhav was arrested from Iranian Balochistan and brought to Pakistan—something he claims would have been impossible without the support of religious parties active in the region. Because of such support, Baloch nationalists in Eastern (Pakistani) Balochistan refer to these groups as “Pakistani sleeper cells in Iran.”

In cities like Chabahar, Zahedan, Khash, and Iranshahr in Western or Iranian Balochistan, religious parties are far stronger than Baloch nationalists. They maintain strong links with religious forces in Pakistan.

Molvi Abdul Hamid Ismailzai, also known as Shah Bakhsh, commands enormous influence among religious circles. He is called Shah Bakhsh because his militant tribe once fought a war of resistance against the Shah of Iran. A truce was later struck between the Shah and the Ismailzai tribe, and the Shah granted them amnesty. Since then, the tribe has been known as “Shah Bakhsh,” literally meaning “forgiven by the Shah.”

In Iranian Balochistan, the Narwai tribe is considered one of the most militant, concentrated mainly in Zahedan and Nusratabad. Other tribes include the Gorgej, Barakzai, Reki, Shehli Bar, Salazi, Rind, Lashar, Mubarki, and Buledi. One Amanullah Mubarki, a dissident militant who fled Iran and took refuge in Karachi, was reportedly killed in a police encounter in Karachi’s Gulshan-e-Iqbal neighborhood during the early years of Khomeini’s rule.

Molvi Abdul Hamid Ismailzai completed his religious education in a Deobandi madrassa run by Maulana Abdullah Darkhwasti of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) Darkhwasti group in Rahim Yar Khan, Punjab, Pakistan. He also maintains close ties with the JUI-F faction led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman in Pakistan, a group often described as pro-Taliban. In the past, the JUI-F reportedly received Saudi, Libyan, and other Gulf funding for running madrassas. The party has also wielded influence within Pakistan’s parliament, coalition governments, madrassa networks, and, at times, militant groups that fought in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

Many new mosques and madrassas have been built in Iranian Balochistan in addition to historic Jamia mosques. Large Friday prayer congregations take place in cities like Chabahar, Khash, and Zahedan, where Molvi Abdul Hamid commands significant respect and influence. His influence could be compared to that once held by Altaf Hussain in Karachi—where a single call could shut down entire cities. In Iranian Balochistan’s Sunni clerical hierarchy, the imam who leads the Friday prayer occupies the highest position. Most Friday prayer leaders in the region follow Molvi Abdul Hamid. In the event of unrest or civil war, he would likely have the ability to exert significant control, and knowledgeable observers say there would be no leadership vacuum in Iranian Balochistan.

In comparison to the Sunni clerics in Iranian Balochistan, secular Baloch nationalists carry far less influence there, even though they maintain social and familial ties across the border.

Many Baloch sarmachars—fighters engaged in conflict with Pakistan’s military—have reportedly taken refuge in Iranian Balochistan. Unconfirmed reports suggest that even Allah Nazar Baloch and his family have taken shelter there. Allah Nazar Baloch has headed the militant group Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which has launched numerous attacks against military and civilian infrastructure in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. Leadership of the BLA is now said to be in the hands of Bashir Zeb, a former Baloch student leader, who replaced Aslam Baloch after he was killed in an explosion near his home in Kandahar, Afghanistan, allegedly by Pakistani security agents on December 25, 2018.

However, Baloch nationalists and militants from Eastern (Pakistani) Balochistan maintain social, familial, and tribal bonds in Western (Iranian) Balochistan. Some sources among Baloch nationalist circles claim that the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), led by Hyrbyair Marri, has also sought refuge in Iranian Balochistan. Wahid Qambar, one of the founders of the BLF, was reportedly living in Kerman when he was captured and taken away. Pakistani intelligence agencies are suspected  of orchestrating his disappearance, similar to the case of Kulbhushan Jadhav. Many BLF members have relatives in Iranian Balochistan, and some have reportedly taken refuge there.

There have also been killings of non-Baloch laborers in Iranian Balochistan, for which the BLF has been blamed. However, BLF sympathizers claim that Pakistani intelligence agencies may have been behind these killings in order to discredit the group. They deny that the BLF is active in Western Balochistan. Some knowledgeable Baloch nationalists with connections in Iranian Balochistan also dismiss the idea of significant BLF influence there. They say Hyrbyair Marri is not a widely recognized figure in the region. According to them, Sunni Hanafi Deobandi clerics—who maintain links with Pakistani intelligence agencies across the border—exercise far deeper influence in Iranian Balochistan.

Nevertheless, Pakistani intelligence often cites the case of Kulbhushan Jadhav when accusing India of fomenting unrest in Pakistani Balochistan, presenting the case internationally, including at The Hague. The sections of Pakistani media and state have hallucinated for a mew hand invisible, ‘The Israel’ behind Baloch uprise in Pakistan. ‘ You can’t walk by yourself but you curse  your knees,’ they say in Sindhi language.

Another group, Jaish al-Adl, has also been active in the province of Western Balochistan. It was once believed to have received support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In the Shia-Sunni tensions within Iran, Sunni networks and drug trafficking groups have at times not obstructed Jaish al-Adl’s activities in the region. Observers say there has been a degree of cooperation between drug lords and certain Sunni militant groups, and that these networks could halt such activities if they wished.

Thus, the Shia Iranian state, Sunni Iranian Balochistan, and Sunni Kurdistan remain in intense tension with one another. Unlike the Baloch in Eastern Balochistan (in present-day Pakistan), whose conflict with the Pakistani state is primarily nationalist, the conflict between Baloch in Western Balochistan and the Iranian state often takes on a religious dimension.

Consequently, in Iranian Balochistan the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), through its relationships with local clerics, is believed by some observers to wield greater influence than Baloch nationalist militant groups. Due to internet restrictions, people remain largely unaware of what is actually happening inside Iran. Even those disenchanted with the mullah regime appear reluctant to come out openly against it, adopting a “wait-and-see” attitude. Some say they do not trust that President Trump would support them if events escalated.

While Iran’s regime may have suffered damage to its arsenal and military capacity, it still possesses enough arms and ammunition to suppress dissent. In addition, some sources claim that fighters from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq have been brought into Iran to help crush any potential mass uprising alongside the Pasdaran-e Inqilab (Revolutionary Guards). These armed groups, according to such sources, have been authorized to kill anyone who speaks against the regime.

For now, many people say they are waiting to see what decisions President Trump might make regarding the conflict. Meanwhile, unconfirmed reports have occasionally suggested that Jundullah militants have attempted to move into Shia-dominated Iran from Sunni areas of Iranian Balochistan.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)