Stop Judging the Iran Campaign Like a Movie
People are using the wrong timetable and the wrong standard, and many of the critics would add the wrong endpoint as well. A limited air-and-sea campaign has to be assessed by the damage it inflicts on key functions, not by the political result it does not deliver within forty days. In Iran’s case the relevant issues are concrete: whether the regime can still repress its own population effectively, replace lost matériel, keep a fractured military and security apparatus working as something close to a coordinated system, and continue projecting force outward through missiles, drones, and proxy networks. Those functions are what made Iran dangerous in the first place. If collapse comes, it follows the breakdown of those functions.
Yet since the first salvos of 28 February, a familiar line has hardened in American commentary: the regime did not fall on cue, so the campaign must be incoherent, overextended, or strategically empty. That is movie thinking. Three acts. A climax. The villain on the floor before the credits roll. Real campaigns are not built that way. Critics keep importing an endpoint the planners never formally claimed, then treating the mismatch as proof of failure.
This argument concerns American commentary on the American campaign. Israel is a separate case. Its doctrine is shaped by geography and by the Begin Doctrine: it does not tolerate the prospect of an existential weapons program within striking range and then wait for Washington’s permission. Iranian exile communities understand that distinction. They do not treat Israeli intent and American intent as one undifferentiated Western impulse. The same separation applies to rhetoric. Anyone treating “obliterated” or “regime change” on Truth Social as a serious guide to policy is reading political noise as strategy. What matters is what has already been moved into theater, the targets that have been hit, and the specific capabilities now being taken down. The critics are easy enough to name. Ali Vaez argues that in trying to deny Iran a weapon of mass destruction, Washington may have handed it a weapon of mass disruption through the Strait of Hormuz. Frank Gardner writes that Iran has broken out of its box. Daniel Levy warns of a slide toward catastrophic ground operations. Tucker Carlson, from a different political corner and a well-known master of manipulation, called this the worst possible moment for American intervention. Disappointing is that both liberals and conservatives eager to attack President Trump use the same medieval argument that Jews are behind every........
