Elli Lieberman’s work on deterrence provides a useful framework for assessing the strategic meaning of Israel’s war against Iran. In Reconceptualizing Deterrence, Lieberman moves beyond the traditional conception of deterrence as a relatively static relationship in which one state possesses sufficient military capability to threaten unacceptable costs and thereby prevent an adversary from taking a particular action. Deterrence is instead understood as a dynamic process that develops through repeated interaction between adversaries. Its effectiveness depends not simply on the ability to inflict costs, but on whether the adversary incorporates those expected costs into its strategic decision-making and comes to recognize that previously viable strategies for achieving victory are no longer realistic. The objective is consequently more than temporary behavioral restraint. Deterrence is most effective when the adversary comes to accept that pursuing a particular course of action is no longer worth the expected consequences.

This framework provides a useful way to assess Eado Hecht and Eitan Shamir’s Beyond Victory: How Should Israel’s War Against Iran Be Assessed? Hecht and Shamir argue that Israel’s war against Iran should not be judged simply by the amount of physical destruction inflicted on Iran. The destruction of nuclear facilities, missile systems, command centers, and proxy capabilities represents important operational and strategic achievements, but those achievements do not by themselves establish deterrence. Their broader argument is that Israel’s success should be measured by the extent to which it has disrupted Iran’s strategic architecture and delayed its ability to reconstruct the capabilities necessary to threaten Israel. This emphasis on the adversary’s broader strategy is consistent with Lieberman’s reconceptualization of deterrence. At the same time, Lieberman’s framework adds an important question: whether military degradation is ultimately translated into a change in the adversary’s strategic calculations.

The question becomes particularly important when considering the initial evidence concerning what Iran believes it learned from the war. In “How the Iran War Changed the Middle East,” Dr. Reza Parchizadeh emphasizes the psychological consequences of the conflict and argues that one of its most important effects was a transformation in strategic perceptions. His analysis suggests that Iran’s ability to survive extensive Israeli and American military operations may have reinforced the Iranian leadership’s belief that it can absorb considerable punishment while remaining politically intact and continuing to impose costs on its adversaries. From a deterrence perspective, this matters because perceptions are an essential component of the deterrence relationship. If Iran interprets its survival as evidence that it can withstand future confrontation, the psychological consequences of the war could weaken Israeli deterrence even in the face of overwhelming Israeli military superiority.

Parchizadeh’s argument, however, needs to be considered in relation to the specific objectives Israel sought to achieve. Iran’s survival cannot by itself demonstrate either deterrence success or failure. Had Israel’s objective been regime change, the continued survival of the Iranian regime would represent a strategic failure. If its objectives were instead to delay Iran’s nuclear program, degrade its missile forces, weaken its regional network, or alter particular aspects of Iranian behavior, the survival of the regime would not necessarily indicate that deterrence had failed. Deterrence must always be evaluated against the behavior it is intended to prevent. This point is important to Lieberman’s approach because it prevents very different........

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