Asia Defense | Economy | Security | East Asia

China’s Revised Defense Mobilization Law Touches Nearly Every Sector

The circumstances under which mobilization can be declared are wider than ever, and a large number of entities – including private firms – are legally obligated to the state during wartime.

The revised version of China’s National Defense Mobilization Law came into effect on October 1. It’s the first major overhaul since the statute came into existence in 2010. On its face, the law governs how China can convert civilian economic capacity into military capability during wartime, facilitating a rapid transition for national defense. However, a closer reading of the law indicates that it involves many critical stakeholders and has bearing on many aspects of the economy.

The law, in its original conception in 2010, was construed as Taiwan-centric. It helped build an underlying legal and military architecture to respond if Taiwan were to declare independence. Thus, it had a very clear purpose: war preparation in relation to the longstanding mission of national unification.  

However, the recent revision goes beyond the war preparation narrative and Taiwan contingency. Now, the circumstances under which mobilization can be declared are widened, and the law encompasses a large number of entities that are legally obligated to the state during wartime, including private organizations that are required to assist in mobilization. It also mandates that anything required for mobilization can be levied or expropriated by the state. These revisions make the law relevant for a wide variety of stakeholders, including foreign governments and firms, in scenarios beyond Taiwan – and even in peaceful conditions.

The revision defines defense mobilization as steps taken by the state in response to threats to national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, security, and, interestingly, “development interests.”

“Development interests” can’t be read in the same breath as the former categories. Sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, and security can be broadly defined with strict bounds, but the definition of “development interests” can be as loose as officials want it to be.  

The Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson mentioned that the law need not be overinterpreted and is line with similar legislation in place in other countries. In general, the mention of “development interests” in Chinese national discourse acts as a central legitimizing framework, linking the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) authority with continuous economic growth and modernization. 

However, with the phrase’s invocation in the operative definition of the defense mobilization statute, “development interests” has acquired a new extension. A blockade on the Strait of Malacca would not be an attack on territory or sovereignty but might hamper China’s development interests. The long-standing maritime dispute in the South China Sea may also be counted as jeopardizing China’s development interests. 

This raises the question of what would qualify as a development interest – and thus authorize the conversion of civilian resources into military resources. The law delineates no threshold test. The revision has an expansive breadth with abysmally low precision, and it has been designed this way. An elastic law allows authorities to potentially co-opt private resources across a........

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