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The Makkah Defence Agreement: Opportunity, Obligation or Strategic Ambiguity?

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19.08.2026

“The US-led Middle East order is over. The Makkah Agreement proves it.” Council on Foreign Relations

“The US-led Middle East order is over. The Makkah Agreement proves it.”

Let me begin this piece by acknowledging that the appropriate time for public critique of a government decision is normally before that decision is made, while the matter remains under contemplation and consideration. At that stage, public discussion can usefully contribute towards strengthening the government’s intent, identifying weaknesses and offering alternatives.

Once a decision has been made, however, the responsibility changes. It becomes incumbent upon citizens to support the national decision and, more importantly, to contribute towards ensuring its success.

The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye was signed in Makkah on 7 August 2026. Its central principle is that an armed attack against any one of the three signatories will be regarded as an attack against all three. The agreement is described by the signatories as defensive and not directed against any particular country.

The difficulty is that, at present, the public has not been provided with the complete text of the Agreement. Consequently, much of what we know concerns its political intent rather than its detailed legal, operational and military architecture. Türkiye has subsequently indicated that mechanisms for strategic political and military coordination, joint exercises, defence-industry cooperation, technology transfer and other areas of cooperation are envisaged. A ministerial committee and secretariat are also to be established.

This leaves an important space for public discussion. The agreement has been signed; it must therefore succeed. But its success will depend not upon the declaration itself but upon how its institutions, procedures, command relationships, operational parameters and strategic objectives are subsequently developed.

Why Was This Agreement Necessary Now?

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have enjoyed close relations for decades. Their military relationships are not new. Pakistan and Türkiye, for example, already possess an extensive institutionalised defence relationship, including the High Level Military Dialogue Group, which held its 20th round in April 2026 and discussed defence cooperation, training, defence industry, capacity-building and strategic partnership.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia likewise formalised a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in 2025, which Pakistan’s Foreign Office described as defensive in nature and not directed against any third country.

So the obvious question is: what suddenly necessitated a trilateral commitment on paper, particularly now? There was no obvious trust deficit between these countries. Their expectations of mutual support have existed for decades. Why, therefore, was it considered necessary to formalise a commitment that an attack on one would be regarded as an attack on all?

The answer may lie less in the bilateral relationships between the three countries and more in the transformation of the regional security environment.

The Strategic Environment

The Middle East and its surrounding strategic geography are passing through a period of extraordinary fluidity.

First, the traditional American security architecture in the Gulf has been seriously tested. This does not mean that the United States has withdrawn from the region, nor that an American withdrawal is inevitable – though some feel that the situation is heading in that direction. Washington continues to reaffirm its commitment to Gulf security. But the events of 2026 have demonstrated the vulnerability of Gulf states even under the existing US security umbrella and have encouraged regional states to reconsider the extent to which their security can depend upon an external power.

Secondly, the regional order increasingly displays characteristics of a more plural and multipolar system. The United States remains the dominant external military power, but China, Russia, Iran, Türkiye, India and the major Gulf states are acquiring greater strategic room for manoeuvre. 

China’s expanding diplomatic role is particularly significant. Beijing has sought to position itself as a participant in Gulf diplomacy rather than merely an economic actor, while its relationships with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan give it a strategic presence across the region.

Thirdly, Iran has emerged as one of the region’s most consequential strategic powers. I would hesitate to describe Iran simply as the dominant regional power, for the moment, because it has considerable military and economic vulnerabilities to resolve. Nevertheless, its geographical position, missile capability, asymmetric capacity and ability to influence the Strait of Hormuz give it extraordinary strategic leverage.

The present disruption of Hormuz demonstrates the point. Shipping through the strait has fallen dramatically, with the waterway historically carrying roughly one-fifth of global oil and LNG shipments. The Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are therefore not merely regional waterways. They constitute strategic chokepoints whose disruption can affect global energy supplies, shipping, insurance, inflation and supply chains.

Hydrocarbons remain a critical component of the global economy. If disruption of Gulf energy exports and maritime traffic becomes prolonged, the consequences will extend well beyond the region and could affect global economic growth.

The United States and the Search for Burden-sharing

The United States now faces a difficult strategic dilemma. It cannot easily abandon the Gulf without significant political and strategic consequences. Equally, an indefinite commitment to defend every element of the regional order carries increasing military and financial costs, which for now, more and more, appear to be beyond American capacity.

The likely American objective, therefore, may not be a simple withdrawal. It may instead be a transition from direct security provision towards burden-sharing, in which regional powers assume greater responsibility while the United........

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