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The Azerbaijani regime: a family affair

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ISTANBUL (Medyascope) – Medyascope correspondent Emir Berke Yaşar spoke with political scientist Altay Göyüşov on the current state of the Aliyev regime in Azerbaijan.

By Emir Berke Yaşar • Medyascope

Medyascope: Who are the oligarchs in Azerbaijan, and how do they acquire their economic power? How do the relationships between major corporations, state tenders, energy revenues, high-ranking bureaucrats, and the Aliyev family function?

Medyascope: What is the actual weight of institutions such as the parliament, courts, prosecutor’s office, security agencies, and local governments within this system?

Medyascope: You note that ensuring the regime’s continuity is one of the fundamental elements shaping Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. How is the link established between foreign policy and the domestic authoritarian system?

Medyascope: Does the prominent nationalist and “brotherhood” rhetoric characterizing relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan prevent the Turkish public from fully perceiving the authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan, the state of the political opposition, and human rights issues?

Medyascope: What forms the basis of the current regime in Azerbaijan?

The Aliyev has its roots in the country’s Soviet era, when Haydar Aliyev, father of current leader Ilham Aliyev, was appointed to lead the Azerbaijan SSR in 1969.

Many of modern Azerbaijan’s pervasive features– deep-rooted corruption, regionalism, and power of family ties in money and politics– have their roots in this era.

While Haydar Aliyev’s 1993 takeover of the independent Azerbaijani state brought stability to the post-Soviet republic, it also entrenched said features, according to Göyüşov. 

While the country is a republic on paper, Göyüşov characterizes the country as a family-run affair. The rise of Ilham Aliyev to power in 2003 following his father’s death, as well as the 2017 appointment of his wife as vice president have cemented the family’s dynastic grip on power.

The family’s dynastic power also extends to business realms, says Göyüşov, who notes that it is virtually impossible to run a successful business in the country without significant ties to the ruling family. 

Additionally, the rise in petrol prices during Ilham Aliyev’s tenure have led to soaring revenues and enabled the president to maintain a broader patronage network than was possible during his father’s era.

Wealth in the Caucasian petrostate, however, is not shared equally, says Göyüşov. With most wealth concentrated in and around the Aliyev family, Azerbaijan is home to one of the region’s poorest societies where squalor living conditions abound.

Medyascope: Who are the oligarchs in Azerbaijan, and how do they acquire their economic power? How do the relationships between major corporations, state tenders, energy revenues, high-ranking bureaucrats, and the Aliyev family function?

Göyüşov: In Azerbaijan, it is virtually impossible to conduct significant economic activity or achieve significant economic success outside the control of the ruling family.

For this reason, it is not entirely accurate to speak of an “oligarchic system” in Azerbaijan in the classical sense. This is because actors who might possess vast wealth and economic power independently of the ruling family are not permitted to emerge. When an individual in Azerbaijan begins to achieve major—or even medium-scale—economic success through their own initiative, they can quickly be eliminated by the system or have their operations obstructed.

To protect its economic monopoly, the family often prevents even large, well-known foreign companies from freely entering the Azerbaijani market. The presence of major international corporations in sectors such as banking, retail, automotive, and mobile telecommunications is extremely limited. Even when foreign chains are permitted in the service sector—such as in hotel and restaurant management—they are generally required to operate through a local partner who is close to or connected with the ruling family.

Consequently, political and economic success in Azerbaijan depends largely on the patronage of the ruling family and on clientelist relationships. However, even being part of the system does not guarantee the inviolability of one’s property, as ultimate decision-making authority is concentrated in a single family. Through a political decision, one can lose assets, companies, or economic opportunities and be driven to bankruptcy in a short time. In Azerbaijan, the law is effectively reduced to the will of a single family.

The situation in Azerbaijan differs significantly from the classical oligarch model seen in Russia or Ukraine. In those countries, there is indeed a class of oligarchs that emerged independently of the direct control of political power; these classes were shaped primarily by economic activities and the accumulation of private capital. In Azerbaijan, however, almost all those labeled “oligarchs” are representatives of the political leadership—ministers or other high-ranking state officials. No independent class of businesspeople has emerged that grew wealthy solely through its own economic activities.

The individuals in Azerbaijan referred to as “oligarchs” accumulated wealth after assuming office and transferred a significant portion of it abroad. Russia, Turkey, the US, European countries, and Dubai were among the primary destinations, with the UK being the most significant hub; this was because they knew their wealth could be confiscated should they lose their political positions. Indeed, when a high-ranking official is removed from office, their political and economic clout usually evaporates, and it subsequently comes to light that they had amassed substantial wealth overseas.

In recent years, however, as economic rents and wealth have become more directly centralized around the ruling family, current officials are not afforded the same opportunities to amass vast fortunes as in the past. Nevertheless, state officials still view their positions as a means to acquire wealth and attempt to move their assets abroad.

In the classic oligarchic system, individuals first become wealthy and then seek to exert influence over political power. In Azerbaijan, the reverse is true: people do not come to power because they are wealthy; rather, they come to power in order to become wealthy.

Medyascope: What is the actual weight of institutions such as the parliament, courts, prosecutor’s office, security agencies, and local governments within this system?

Göyüşov: In Azerbaijan, institutions like the parliament, courts, and the prosecutor’s office are not truly independent. While they exist in form, in practice everything depends on the will of the executive branch; the parliament and courts essentially carry out the executive’s directives.

The executive branch, in this constellation, consists of a single individual and the close family circle surrounding him; this structure operates much like a family council. It is impossible to speak of politically significant decisions being made by independent institutions. Decisions are made at the center of the system, and other institutions implement them.

There are no genuinely elected local governments in Azerbaijan either. Regions are governed by local executive heads appointed by the president. Baku is one of the exceptional cases among regional capitals where the executive head—who functions as the mayor—is not elected by the public, not even nominally; the president appoints this person directly.

There are no genuine elections in Azerbaijan, either. The president effectively determines the members of parliament, while elections serve merely as a procedure to formally legitimize their appointment. Real political competition is not permitted.

Although a small number of opposition parties are nominally present in parliament, they do not constitute a genuine opposition; often, they support the president’s policies even more vigorously than the ruling party does. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that they are allowed to enter parliament under the label of “opposition.”

It is also difficult to speak of a ruling party in the classical sense in Azerbaijan. The New Azerbaijan Party exists in tandem with the regime; should the regime cease to exist, the party would likely disappear as well. For it lacks an independent ideology; its ideology is essentially that of the Aliyevs—and that is all there is to it.

Elections continue to be held because the Constitution of Azerbaijan mandates that state power be established through the electoral process. The ruling power maintains this electoral procedure to lend a veneer of legality to its governance and to preserve the appearance of constitutional legitimacy.

For decades, the Azerbaijani government has employed systematic methods reminiscent of Stalin-era repression to prevent the emergence of political competition within the country. These repressive measures do not target only a specific ideological circle; nationalists, representatives of religious movements, and leftists are equally affected by these policies. The ruling power seeks to neutralize—using state mechanisms of repression—any individuals or groups it perceives as threats, regardless of their ideological affiliation.

However, the ruling power does not rely solely on repression; it also co-opts certain individuals and groups through financial incentives, privileges, and patronage networks. Over the past two decades, Azerbaijan’s authoritarian system has consolidated its power by combining repression with co-optation, while the opposition has been significantly weakened.

Genuine opposition within the ruling establishment is strictly prohibited. Nevertheless, a genuine opposition continues to exist, albeit under severe repression. This opposition encompasses nationalist groups, religious-political movements, and representatives of relatively new, influential, and progressive........

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