In December 2010, when South Africa was formally incorporated into BRICS, the country’s foreign ministry said it was in line with its commitment to South-South cooperation, noting also the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) prediction that BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) will constitute 61 percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) within three years (that is by 2013). For South Africa, it viewed BRICS as another vehicle promoting the interests of the Global South alongside other structures such as the African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), the India Brazil South Africa Dialogue Forum, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the G-77 which constitutes the largest grouping of developing countries seeking to promote their collective economic interests. Through its BRICS membership, South Africa also hoped to amplify and support the African Agenda, and the continent’s presence in multilateral institutions (South African Government 2011).

The South African government was undoubtedly right to stress the importance of BRICS. By July 2025, BRICS expansions resulted in it having 11 member countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In addition, BRICS also has 10 partner countries which are Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. These countries collectively make up 44 percent of global GDP when measured by purchasing power parity, and 56 percent of global population (Norton 2025).

South African Foreign Policy: Caught in an Ideological Trap

The ruling African National Congress (ANC), which has been in power since South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, has a particular view of the world emanating from being banned within the country and in exile for 30 years – between 1960 and 1990. These three decades shaped much of the worldview of the ANC. Whilst much of the West criticized the ANC’s decision to opt for an armed struggle against white minority rule with leaders like US President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher labeling them ‘terrorists’, they did receive some support from Nordic countries which provided the ANC with financial resources. These financial resources, however, were not to be used for the prosecution of the armed struggle. The strongest support the ANC received was from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Cuba, Algeria, Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya, and to a more limited extent, China and Iran (Ellis 2012).

The ANC’s transition from an exiled liberation movement to a government did not fundamentally alter the worldview which it developed whilst in exile. It saw the world in black and white terms, with the Global North helping to underdevelop and exploit the Global South. Whilst the West could not be trusted, South-South solidarity needed to be strengthened with an emphasis on those countries that supported the ANC whilst in exile (Mandela 1993). Pretoria’s White Paper setting out its foreign policy and entitled Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu represents this ideological perspective as opposed to any conception of national interest (South African Government 2011).

The White Paper notes, “In terms of South Africa’s liberation history, its evolving engagement is based on two central tenets, namely: Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity” (South African Government 2011, 3). On the issue of Pan-Africanism, suffice to say that the other African BRICS members – Egypt and Ethiopia do not subscribe to it, given their attempts at undermining South Africa. The White Paper further goes on to argue that its view of South-South cooperation is that of the 1955 Bandung Conference which brought into being the Non-Aligned Movement. The document is clearly problematic since it attempts to develop a foreign policy which does not consider current realities, future geo-strategic projections or the needs of South Africa’s citizens, but is entirely focused on the ANC’s own past struggle against apartheid.

Talk of a Global South solidarity suggests that all countries in the South are on the same page seeking to emancipate themselves from the hegemonic control of the Global North. This, however, is patently untrue. China has the distinction of having the world’s second-largest GDP in nominal terms (Silver 2026). India meanwhile is the third-largest economy globally from a purchasing power parity perspective (Solomon 2025, 35-37). These Asian countries may well describe themselves as being in the Global South and may well continue with the narrative of the exploitation of the Global North. However, China and India see themselves as superpowers that could well dethrone the US from its top position. Whilst ostensibly being in the Global South, China and Chad or India and Ivory Coast have little in common. Apart from points on a compass, there is little that North and South represent in the world of international relations. Some states in the Global South rival those in the Global North whilst exploiting others in the Global South. The material power of some in the Global South dwarfs others in the Global South and all states operate along national interest principles.

In both Western countries and what was traditionally referred to as the Third World, opulence and poverty co-exist. These BRICS countries have huge socio-economic divides within their own borders. An important........

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