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Chandigarh: The latest addition to the ever-expanding catalogue of India-US defence cooperation initiatives – the Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA) programme unveiled during Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to New Delhi last month – joins a long list of military technology collaborations whose ambitions have, over decades, outpaced their implementation.

Focused on jointly tracking submarine activity, protecting critical seabed infrastructure and undersea communications cables and strengthening maritime surveillance across the Indian Ocean, the UDA is intended to address the growing strategic challenge posed by China’s expanding naval presence in the region. In principle, military planners in Delhi believe the initiative is both timely and strategically sound, but its success will ultimately depend on whether it sidesteps the fate of earlier Indo-US defence and military technology collaborations that failed to move beyond intent.

Over the past two decades, such announcements in both Delhi and Washington have frequently outpaced implementation, leaving a growing inventory of projects stalled amid negotiations, regulatory constraints, and technology-transfer disputes. A cross-section of defence industry officials and analysts in Delhi and Bengaluru describe India-US bilateral defence cooperation as “high maintenance, but low deliverability.”

Many maintain that beneath this pattern lies another enduring illusion: that the US is inherently quicker at delivering defence outcomes than India’s other major arms suppliers – Russia, France and Israel. “Historical record in the Indian context suggests otherwise,” said a senior defence industry official previously involved in negotiating with several vendors from the US’s vast military-industrial complex. The reality of India-US defence cooperation, he added, is that despite both governments agreeing on the destination, processes often stretch over years, as proposals wind their way through layers of negotiations, evaluations, approvals and regulatory procedures.

In terms of India’s broader import materiel structure, four countries – France, Israel, Russia and the US – constitute its principal suppliers, though their respective shares vary significantly. Russia still accounts for the largest share at roughly 45-55% of India’s defence equipment imports, reflecting a large quantity of legacy platforms and long-standing supply chains.

France follows with approximately 10-20%, driven largely by Rafale fighter aircraft and submarine-related systems. Israel accounts for around 10-15%, primarily in the form of drones, sensors, precision-guided munitions and air defence systems, while the United States contributes roughly 10-15%, led by transport aircraft, helicopters, maritime surveillance platforms and an expanding portfolio of drones and support systems.

Against this backdrop, online research and interviews with industry officials suggest that Russia, despite recurring concerns over spare parts availability and sanctions-related disruptions, has traditionally been India’s most flexible defence partner. It has routinely concluded major arms deals within one to four years, frequently approving licensed production and local assembly, and, in select cases, deeper co-development frameworks – most notably the BrahMos cruise missile – alongside extensive licensed production of platforms like Sukhoi Su-30MKI combat aircraft and T-90 main battle........

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