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Chandigarh: India’s quest for military airpower dominance continues to be undermined by its most enduring weakness – fighter engines. Both the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Navy (IN) face critical constraints in powering their planned indigenous fighter programmes, a situation shaped by complete reliance on imported engines. This complete dependence on foreign powerplants – the most vital component of any combat aircraft –  has debilitatingly undermined production timelines, force levels, and strategic autonomy in equal measure.

The two services presently confront mounting delays and uncertainties over the availability and localisation of the USA’s General Electric F404-IN20 and F414-INS6 afterburning turbofan engines, intended to power a range of current and planned domestically designed fighters, turning what was once touted as steady indigenisation into a familiar, recurring cycle of chronic import dependence.

At the centre of this ongoing crisis is the delayed delivery of F404-IN20 engines, which has significantly slowed Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s (HAL’s) production of the Tejas advanced Mk1A variant. In 2021, HAL had ordered 99 of these engines for around $716 million to power 83 Mk1As for the IAF, with deliveries scheduled to begin in early 2024. However, the first engine arrived 14 months late, in March 2025, followed by just five more, resulting in a total of six units delivered.

These slippages have been severe enough for HAL to recently impose liquidated damages on GE Aerospace, signalling both the scale of the disruption and a growing erosion of contractual confidence, even as completed Tejas airframes sit idle awaiting engines. A follow-on order for 113 additional F404 engines, signed in November 2025 for around $1 billion, has only deepened HAL’s exposure to GE, taking its total commitment to 212 similar power plants – despite an increasingly questionable delivery record.

And though in response, GE has recently pledged to accelerate F404 engine supplies – assuring delivery of some 20 additional units by year-end – the backlog has already disrupted Tejas production timelines and significantly amplified the structural risks of India’s dependence on external power plants.

According to senior IAF officers, these setbacks were not merely technical or logistical, but carried tangible consequences for operational readiness. Most notably, the IAF’s combat fleet has declined from a sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons to just 29-30, including six squadrons of ageing SEPECAT Jaguar aircraft inducted in the late 1970s and long overdue for retirement. Nowhere are these deferments more apparent than in the Tejas programme, which was intended to halt the decline in fighter strength, but has itself been slowed by persistent engine and production setbacks.

Former Ministry of Defence (MoD) acquisitions advisor Amit Cowshish cautioned that HAL’s decision to impose liquidated damages – usually a measure of last resort following prolonged attempts to resolve supply-side issues by extending delivery deadlines – amounts to an acknowledgement that the contract may be in........

© The Wire