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On the eve of the launch of the war against the Iranian regime by Israel and the United States – which is spreading throughout the region – Pakistan and Afghanistan exchanged missile fire.

Shortly after the first strikes of Operation Epic Fury, US President Donald Trump called on Iranian minorities to rise up against the regime – notably the Baloch, a people also present in Pakistan and Afghanistan and driven by strong irredentism.

In Iran, the spearhead of this Baloch irredentist is Jaysh al-Adl, a Sunni group with jihadist leanings that since the early 2010s has been stepping up attacks against the Iranian authorities, using Pakistan and Afghanistan as rear bases. 

While Tehran has long accused Islamabad of not cracking down hard enough on these terrorists, in 2024 Iran bombed some of their training camps in Pakistan. In response, Pakistan attacked certain Baloch positions in Iran in a large-scale operation.

These operations reflect the concern that Baloch separatism is causing in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, where the Pakistani army headquarters is located. For more than 20 years, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), despite fierce repression, has acquired a great striking power. 

In January 2026, it was behind a series of attacks in Pakistan, targeting police stations, military personnel, and prisons. Following these attacks, Pakistan accused foreign powers of supporting the BLP. 

While Afghanistan and Iran were the primary targets, Islamabad also claimed that India had infiltrated secret agents into Pakistan with the aim of encouraging separatism.

These various episodes reveal a game of influence: India is seeking to use Iran to put Pakistan in a pincer movement, as it is trying to do with Afghanistan. Recent developments thus show that the Central Asian (Afghan-Pakistani), South Asian (Indo-Pakistani), and Middle Eastern theaters, while retaining a regional logic, can interact with each other. 

In this new configuration, two coalitions are emerging. One includes the United States, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, India, and even Afghanistan. The other includes Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, and China.

This perspective, like the ongoing conflicts in other parts of the world, requires observers to combine a detailed knowledge of the societies in question with an analysis of their foreign and defense policies. The new situation at the crossroads Middle of the East (Iran), Central Asia (Afghanistan), and South Asia (Pakistan and India) could thus result from both Baloch separatism and India’s strategy in the region.

Pakistan-Afghanistan: The historical roots of a war

Today’s open conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan is of unprecedented intensity: never before have the two countries been at war with each other in this way.

Local residents stand next to a damaged car at the site of a cross-border Pakistani army strike in the Behsud district of Nangarhar province in Afghanistan on February 22, 2026. Photo: AP/PTI.

However, the roots of this antagonism are long-standing, for at least three reasons.

First, the issue of borders remains a bone of contention for both the countries. This is crystallised around the fate of the Pashtun ethnic group, which each side seeks to incorporate within its own borders.

Second, Kabul and Islamabad’s views on Islamism are increasingly incompatible. To counter Afghan-Pashtun ethno-nationalism, Pakistan supported the early Afghan Islamists, whom it then armed during the first war in Afghanistan. After the defeat of the Soviet Union, it also helped the Taliban seize power.

After September 11, Pakistan played a double game due to American pressure, which alienated some of the most radical groups. Even though Pakistan continued to rely on the Taliban, their return to power after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan did not lead them to bring the organisations that had become hostile to Islamabad into line. 

This antagonism can be explained in part by the Taliban’s desire – already apparent in the years 1996-2001 – to free themselves from the tutelage of their neighbour.

Third, Pakistan fears being caught in a pincer movement between Afghanistan and India. This fear remains a factor in Islamabad’s attitude towards Kabul and largely explains the strikes in Afghanistan in recent months. 

These strikes may have surprised observers who had not been following regional developments closely: Islamabad had in fact welcomed the withdrawal of US troops ordered by Biden in 2021 and the subsequent return of the Taliban.

These three reasons for conflict are only independent in appearance: in reality, they are interrelated. In seeking to curb Pashtun irredentism since the country’s creation, Pakistan has helped to strengthen those who would become its enemies.

Drawing borders: the importance of Pashtun nationalism

One of the most significant disagreements between Afghans and Pakistanis concerns ethnic and territorial issues. While Kabul........

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