In constitutional democracies, words are not decorative. They carry structure, authority, and consequences. The term “Cabinet” under the Constitution of Pakistan is not a casual political label. It is a defined constitutional institution with specific composition, responsibility, and limitations. To treat it otherwise is to reduce constitutional governance to optics.

Articles 90, 91, and 92 of the Constitution are not ambiguous. Executive authority of the Federation is exercised by the Federal Government, consisting of the Prime Minister and Federal Ministers. Article 91(4) makes it explicit that “the Cabinet, together with the Prime Minister, shall be collectively responsible to the National Assembly.”

Article 92 provides for the appointment of Federal Ministers and Ministers of State by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. They take an oath under the Third Schedule and are bound by constitutional accountability.

The Cabinet, therefore, is not an advisory club. It is a constitutional body carrying collective responsibility before Parliament. It operates within numerical limits. Its members hold defined offices. They are accountable to the electorate through the National Assembly.

Special Assistants to the Prime Minister (SAPMs), on the other hand, are not constitutional creations. They are appointed under the Rules of Business framed under Article 99. They do not take an oath as Federal Ministers. They are not necessarily members of Parliament. They may be granted protocol status. They may attend meetings if invited. But they are not, by constitutional design, members of the Cabinet unless formally appointed under Article 92.

This distinction is not technical hair-splitting. It goes to the core of constitutional discipline.

When a person not appointed under Article 92 publicly claims to be a “member of the Cabinet,” the issue is not about ego or semantics. It is about constitutional accuracy. The Constitution creates offices in precise language. If constitutional offices can be expanded through press conferences and social media descriptions, then written constitutional limits become optional.

Collective responsibility is not symbolic. It means that Cabinet members stand or fall together before Parliament. It means they share legal and political responsibility for executive decisions. If someone claims Cabinet membership, are they also claiming collective constitutional responsibility? Are they bound by the same oath? Are they subject to the same parliamentary consequences?

If not, then the claim is constitutionally inaccurate.

The danger here is subtle but serious. Constitutional democracies decay not only through dramatic violations but through the gradual dilution of language. When executive convenience begins to override constitutional text, institutional clarity suffers. The Constitution becomes something to be interpreted elastically depending on political need.

In times when the state demands accuracy from citizens, the least it can offer in return is constitutional precision from its own functionaries

In times when the state demands accuracy from citizens, the least it can offer in return is constitutional precision from its own functionaries

Some may argue that this is merely political shorthand. That the public understands the difference. That such terminology is harmless.

But constitutional law does not operate on assumed public tolerance. It operates on defined structures. If the Constitution limits the size and composition of the Cabinet, those limits cannot be indirectly expanded by informal designations. Otherwise, the numerical ceiling imposed by the Constitution becomes meaningless.

There is another dimension to this issue — one that our present legal climate makes impossible to ignore.

In recent years, the state has shown increasing sensitivity towards misinformation in the digital sphere. The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act has been invoked repeatedly in cases involving alleged false or misleading statements circulated online. Citizens, journalists, and political workers have faced scrutiny for information deemed inaccurate or deceptive.

Without entering into the merits of any particular prosecution, one principle remains fundamental: truthfulness in public discourse is treated as a legal and regulatory concern.

If ordinary citizens can face consequences for misrepresenting facts in digital space, should holders of public authority not be held to at least the same standard of constitutional accuracy?

The question is not about criminalisation. It is about consistency.

When a private individual exaggerates credentials, it may be dismissed as boastfulness. When a public office holder misstates constitutional status, it affects institutional clarity. The Constitution is not merely a legal text; it is a public trust. Its offices cannot be casually redefined without consequence to governance.

The problem is deeper than one designation. It reflects a culture where constitutional vocabulary is treated as political branding. “Cabinet member” sounds weighty. It conveys authority. It suggests decision-making power. But constitutional authority does not arise from description. It arises from an appointment in accordance with the Constitution.

Blurred boundaries between institutions already strain our constitutional order. If we begin to blur the boundaries within the executive itself, we risk normalising informality over legality.

In a constitutional democracy, precision is discipline. Titles matter. Oaths matter. Defined offices matter.

This is not a partisan issue. It is a structural one. Governments change. Political actors rotate. But constitutional language must remain stable. If today’s administration stretches terminology for convenience, tomorrow’s may stretch it further.

The remedy is simple: constitutional honesty.

If one is a Special Assistant, say so. If one is a Federal Minister, the Constitution provides the path and the oath. There is dignity in constitutional roles as they are defined. There is no need to embellish them.

The Cabinet is a constitutional body bound by collective responsibility to the National Assembly. It cannot be expanded by a press release. It cannot be enlarged by protocol notification. It cannot be created by public assertion.

A written Constitution survives not merely by judicial enforcement, but by habitual respect. When those in public office use constitutional terminology accurately, they reinforce institutional integrity. When they do not, they erode it — even if unintentionally.

In times when the state demands accuracy from citizens, the least it can offer in return is constitutional precision from its own functionaries.

© The Friday Times