North Korea’s Response to the Israel-US Attacks on Iran
Flashpoints | Diplomacy | East Asia
North Korea’s Response to the Israel-US Attacks on Iran
Just a week after North Korea signaled openness to dialogue, the U.S. launched a military operation against Iran with a stated goal of regime change.
When North Korea closed its Ninth Party Congress, it renewed its signal that it would be open for engagement with the United States if its former adversary was willing to accept the country as a sovereign, nuclear-armed state. Two days later, on February 28, U.S. forces executed military strikes against Iran, reportedly as a response to Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, its record of hostile actions against Americans, and its sponsorship of violent proxies.
For Pyongyang, the episode represented not only another example of Washington using force against an adversarial regime, but also an attack on a longstanding diplomatic and military partner. How, then, did the Kim regime respond?
In the nighttime hours of March 1, North Korean state media finally delivered a statement related to the Iran-Israel-U.S. war. It was a pro forma response attributed to an unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesperson, similar in content and tone to North Korea’s response to the U.S. raid in Venezuela. Unlike Venezuela, however, there are different considerations and consequences for North Korea related to the war with Iran: namely, the dynamics vis-a-vis Russia and Pyongyang’s position toward engagement with the United States.
What North Korea Said (and What It Meant)
It took a little more than 24 hours for North Korea to issue a statement on Iran, indicating that the Kim regime took time to assess the situation. The government likely queried Iranian diplomats posted in Pyongyang and North Korean officials abroad, while also observing what Beijing and the Kremlin had to say about the situation before moving too quickly with its own statement.
The statement was attributed to an unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesperson, which constitutes low-level attribution by North Korean standards. This leaves space for the Kim regime to publish follow-on statements at higher levels, if deemed necessary.
The statement was published in both English and Korean on KCNA, the state media wire service, indicating that the audience was meant to be external.
The language, although bombastic to the uninitiated, was tame for the Kim regime. Stripped down to the core talking points, the North Korean government basically delivered five key points:
(1) The Israeli-U.S. attacks on Iran are an illegal form of aggression and the most “despicable form” of violation of sovereignty. (2) Based on U.S. hegemonic posture and activities in the region, this was predictable. (3) North Korea condemns this violation of international law and abuse of military power. (4) Over the past year, the United States has played an increasingly destructive role in destroying global peace and stability. (5) The “relevant and interested” parties in the region should correctly identify the aggressors in this war and fulfill their responsibility of restoring peace and stability in the Middle East.
Of note, the tone and format of the condemnation for the Iran conflict represented an incremental increase in rhetoric from the Kim regime compared to its response to the U.S. raid in Venezuela, but the final point clearly indicated that North Korea has no interest in injecting itself into the ongoing conflict. North Korea could have taken a stronger stance when directly addressing this issue, but in the end, the regime employed a tempered approach.
Strategic Risks and Benefits for Pyongyang
On paper, it may seem like a conflict involving a longtime partner might be problematic for North Korea, but it has indirect risks and potential benefits for the Kim Jong Un regime.
The primary benefit comes from the fact that it disrupts an economic competitor with Russia. Both Iran........
