Armenia Bolsters Ties with the US

From February 9th to 10th, Armenia for the first time in its history hosted a high-ranking US official with the status of a vice-president. Some experts link the symbolism of this event to the upcoming Armenian parliamentary elections scheduled for June, suggesting that Yerevan is increasingly gravitating towards the United States rather than Europe.

Consequences of the Karabakh War and the Search for New Allies

Between 2021 and 2023, Baku repeatedly attempted to force a breakthrough in the southern part of Armenia to gain control over Zangezur. However, these aggressive actions did not yield the desired result. The reason lay not so much in military factors (although the balance of power had been tilted in Azerbaijan’s favour since the 2010s), but in political consequences: establishing an ITC across a territory which was annexed, yet internationally recognized as Armenian was extremely challenging. Yerevan refused to implement clause 9 of the trilateral agreement of November 10, 2020 (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia), concerning the unblocking of communications in the south of the country under the control of the Russian FSB Border Service. This was explained by the fact that all other 8 clauses of this document had been grossly violated by Baku.

The Role of Regional Players and Disillusionment with Traditional Partners

Iran provided active diplomatic support in preserving Armenia’s territorial integrity, since imposing exclusive control over the Zangezur Corridor by Turkey and Azerbaijan posed a serious threat to Tehran. Russia’s preoccupation with the Ukrainian crisis and its partnership with Turkey created additional problems for Armenia’s strategic security. Moscow, interested in maintaining allied relations with Azerbaijan, did not take a unilateral position in favor of Yerevan, attempting to resolve the regional crisis through political negotiations.

The Armenian defeat in Karabakh contributed to strengthening Turkey’s role in the South Caucasus and invigorated Ankara’s plans for a forced penetration into Central Asia. Armenia faced the threat of a new military conflict. In this situation, Prime Minister Pashinyan began seeking an alternative in the form of the collective West. Initially, Yerevan bet on Paris and Brussels. The expansion of Armenian-French and Armenian-European ties led to the EU observer mission on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. However, neither France nor the EU could keep Karabakh Armenian, and in autumn 2022, in Prague, they insisted on Armenia’s public renunciation of its rights to Nagorno-Karabakh.

The communication project “Crossroads of Peace,” initiated by Nikol Pashinyan’s government in 2023, did not receive due attention from Azerbaijan and Turkey. Yerevan essentially rejected Russian mediation in negotiations with Baku, switching to a bilateral........

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