When it comes to American politics and its impact on India, here are four seemingly contradictory features that are simultaneously true.
One, the Joe Biden administration has done a competent, responsible and methodical job in the Indo-Pacific to constrain China. Yes, both Ukraine and Gaza have come in the way of what would otherwise have been a sharper focus on China. But Biden was smart in carrying forward the one important rupture from the Trump years of viewing China as an adversary and waking up to the limits of engagement.
Under Biden, Quad assumed momentum; Japan began its military modernisation; the United States (US), Japan and South Korea struck a trilateral security pact; the US, Japan and the Philippines are about to have a trilateral summit; American presence in the Philippines increased; AUKUS was announced; the US woke up to the importance of South Pacific islands; White House hosted all ASEAN leaders in DC; a sensitive election in Taiwan was managed; American ties with Vietnam deepened; and the US instituted the strongest set of tech restrictions on China. Yes, it kept talking to Beijing to prevent conflict, but while the engagement is tactical, the competition appears instinctive, strategic, systemic and fundamental.
India fits into this wider frame in four ways. Biden’s team recognised Delhi was a valuable stakeholder in global conversations, supported its G20 presidency, and made India a key pillar in various mechanisms — IMEC, I2U2, Quad, IPEF, Mineral Security Partnership, and Artemis Accords. It recognised that no global issue, from energy and food security to the climate crisis and pandemic management to sustainable development goals to supply chain diversification, could have a global solution without India on board. It recognised that building Indian capabilities, a desirable goal to help share the burden on security in the region and beyond and deter China, required creating trusted tech ecosystems (think Micron), co-production and co-development in defence (think GE) and American majors investing in manufacturing (think Apple). And Biden’s team saw that India, because of its sheer size, neighbourhood, history, and self-identification as a civilisational State, will always have a unique set of interests — which may align with the US, but won’t be identical and sometimes may even diverge. And that was fine, for a friendly but relatively autonomous Delhi with credibility in the Global South was still better than Beijing.
Two, the Democrats aren’t comfortable with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This is for three reasons. One, the Democratic Party has turned more diverse in recent years. This has been good for Indian Americans; it isn’t a coincidence that all five desis in the US Congress are Democrats. But it also means that Democrats became the natural home of those who share the same convictions about the need for identity-based representation of minorities and inclusion and dislike majoritarianism and ethnic nationalism. The BJP is now widely seen on the other side of these values. Two, the influence of American Muslims — and this includes Indian-American Muslims — has increased in the Democratic fold, as Biden’s troubles over Gaza in a swing state such as Michigan show. Three, the politics of Democrats against Trump rests on how he is a threat to democracy; this leads the party to be receptive to those who speak the language of human rights, a constituency that frames the BJP in the same category as other conservative extremists.
The recent spat over the American comments on the Citizenship (Amendment) Act or elections is a product of this strand. But Biden’s team has found a way around it. Which is to raise these issues privately; occasionally comment in public if asked, but ambiguously, as a signal of solidarity to those lobbies within the US worried about India and the non-BJP spectrum in India; ensure that top decision makers separate the noise from the substance. The American commentary may be gratuitous and counterproductive but to see it as some deep state conspiracy to destabilise Indian politics is a complete misreading.
Three, Donald Trump’s areas of interest are narrow — and they obviously don’t include the state of religious minorities or the robustness of an electoral system, fidelity to liberal constitutionalism, the nature of a democracy or the absence of checks on executive authority in any other country. Neither does Trump believe in investing American capital in shaping other societies. All of this means that India will be spared even the limited political attention Democratic leadership pays to internal democracy — except, perhaps on Christian rights, where Trump will be susceptible to evangelicals or when Trump wants to extract something from India on another front.
Four, this doesn’t mean Trump — who retains an edge in the polls — will be good for Indian strategic interests. To be sure, India was less affected than other countries during his erratic first term and not being a treaty ally helps since Delhi isn’t dependent on the whims of the occupant of the White House. Trump’s break with China helped India and Trump’s administration offered support both during the crisis with Pakistan after Pulwama and with China after Galwan.
But term two will see an even more transactional, more unpredictable, and more isolationist Trump. The optics of a weaker and divided America in political chaos that lets down allies (aka Europe and Ukraine) itself empowers adversaries. It isn’t surprising that each of the US’s rivals, and some of its friends who don’t like the Democrats, want Trump to win.
Take one example. Beijing is already re-cultivating American business and is allegedly pushing out a misinformation campaign to influence the elections to help Trump; don’t rule out a Chinese offer on trade and investment to Trump in return for strategic accommodation of its interests. Trump’s recent U-turn on ownership of TikTok, against his own earlier order, due to the influence of a donor-lobbyist, is a pointer. In any case, an America that sees its global obligations as an irritant suits Beijing just fine, for who else is best positioned to fill the ensuing vacuum in much of the world. Trump may or may not reverse course on China — after all his signature foreign policy move was taking on Beijing. But his sheer unpredictability on the China question, penchant for fighting with allies both in Asia and Europe, hawkishness on trade and economy, and the promised war on American institutions, indicate that Trump 2.0 will leave the world even more turbulent and will demand far more from Indian diplomacy, a prospect that should worry Delhi.
The views expressed are personal
India must heed these four American truths
3
0
03.04.2024
When it comes to American politics and its impact on India, here are four seemingly contradictory features that are simultaneously true.
One, the Joe Biden administration has done a competent, responsible and methodical job in the Indo-Pacific to constrain China. Yes, both Ukraine and Gaza have come in the way of what would otherwise have been a sharper focus on China. But Biden was smart in carrying forward the one important rupture from the Trump years of viewing China as an adversary and waking up to the limits of engagement.
Under Biden, Quad assumed momentum; Japan began its military modernisation; the United States (US), Japan and South Korea struck a trilateral security pact; the US, Japan and the Philippines are about to have a trilateral summit; American presence in the Philippines increased; AUKUS was announced; the US woke up to the importance of South Pacific islands; White House hosted all ASEAN leaders in DC; a sensitive election in Taiwan was managed; American ties with Vietnam deepened; and the US instituted the strongest set of tech restrictions on China. Yes, it kept talking to Beijing to prevent conflict, but while the engagement is tactical, the competition appears instinctive, strategic, systemic and fundamental.
India fits into this wider frame in four ways. Biden’s team recognised Delhi was a valuable stakeholder in global conversations, supported its G20 presidency, and made India a key pillar in various mechanisms — IMEC, I2U2, Quad, IPEF, Mineral Security Partnership, and Artemis Accords. It recognised that no global issue, from energy and food security to the climate crisis and pandemic management to sustainable development goals to........
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