For decades, China anchored its official approach to North Korea on the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The phrase appeared in defense white papers, joint statements, and diplomacy, serving as Beijing’s rhetorical proof that it opposed Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions.

But late last November, China released its latest white paper on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation—and for the first time in years, the document excluded any explicit reference to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. In its place were vague calls for “peace,” “stability,” and a resolution through “political means” as well as a reiteration of China’s “impartial stance” on the issue.

For decades, China anchored its official approach to North Korea on the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The phrase appeared in defense white papers, joint statements, and diplomacy, serving as Beijing’s rhetorical proof that it opposed Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions.

But late last November, China released its latest white paper on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation—and for the first time in years, the document excluded any explicit reference to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. In its place were vague calls for “peace,” “stability,” and a resolution through “political means” as well as a reiteration of China’s “impartial stance” on the issue.

This pattern has held throughout Beijing’s recent diplomatic exchanges. Even after Pyongyang fired at least two missiles into the sea separating the Koreas and Japan on Jan. 4, official readouts from this week’s summit in Beijing between Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung downplayed the issue. Although Lee reportedly requested his Chinese counterpart to assume a mediating role on the Korean Peninsula, this was clearly not the meeting’s focus, as evident by the request’s absence from the post-summit briefings from both sides. Tellingly, the summit produced no official joint statement.

These omissions mark a meaningful shift: Beijing is deprioritizing a goal it increasingly views as unrealistic and strategically inconvenient. This quiet divorce from its long-held denuclearization aim reflects new calculations regarding regional instability, regime collapse, and the potential loss of strategic ground to the United States. In retreating from denuclearization, however, China may be setting the stage for the exact outcomes it most seeks to avoid.

The language of Chinese foreign-policy documents is rarely accidental, and omissions are often as revealing as new additions. Previous arms control and security statements, including Beijing’s posture during the 2005 Six-Party Talks, explicitly articulated China’s commitment to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. That commitment was reaffirmed in the 2017 Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation and emphasized in China-Korea-Japan trilateral summit joint statements in 2015, 2018, and 2019. Xi consistently framed denuclearization as a shared objective in summit meetings and phone calls with South Korean leaders as recently as 2021. Even in July 2023, Chinese officials asserted their commitment to North Korean denuclearization in diplomatic gatherings, including at the United Nations.

The November 2025 white paper changes tact, emphasizing stability over disarmament, dialogue over pressure, and balance over enforcement. While these priorities are not new,........

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