The central biological-security challenge is the speed of advances in synthetic biology, genetic engineering, AI and laboratory automation, which expand both legitimate benefits and potential for misuse; unlike conventional terrorism, a biological attack may initially appear natural, delaying attribution and response.

Historical cases illustrate the difficulties and the stakes: Aum Shinrikyo’s failed anthrax and botulinum efforts showed that knowledge and material do not automatically yield effective weapons, while the 2001 U.S. anthrax letter attacks demonstrated how a limited incident can trigger outsized public-health, political and psychological consequences.

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention remains the core prohibition, yet it was designed for a slower, more concentrated research environment; uneven Confidence-Building Measure reporting and the distributed nature of modern biotechnology require stronger transparency, national contact points, scientific input, capacity-building in weaker states and closer links between disarmament and public-health preparedness so that prohibition is translated into prevention.

The most difficult biological-security problem today is not simply the existence of biological weapons. It is the speed at which biotechnology is changing while international security institutions struggle to keep pace. Advances in synthetic biology, genetic engineering, artificial intelligence and laboratory automation are creating enormous benefits for medicine, agriculture and public health. At the same time, they are expanding the range of technologies that could potentially be misused.

This is where bioterrorism presents a particularly difficult challenge. Unlike conventional terrorism, a biological attack may not be immediately recognised as an attack at all. An outbreak could initially appear to be a natural disease event, delaying attribution and response. The consequences could extend beyond casualties to public fear, economic disruption and pressure on already-stretched health systems.

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), opened for signature in 1972 and entering into force in 1975, remains the central international legal instrument prohibiting biological and toxin weapons. It prohibits States Parties from developing, producing, acquiring, transferring or........

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