The global economy is currently experiencing a systemic shock of unusual magnitude. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption and about a quarter of seaborne oil trade normally flows, has disrupted a critical artery of the international energy system. Combined with escalating confrontation with Iran, the disruption has driven prices sharply upward and heightened the risk of a prolonged global downturn. However, this is not a “black swan.” It is the materialization of a “grey rhino”: a high-probability, high-impact threat that policymakers repeatedly identified but failed to address. The central question, therefore, is not why the crisis occurred, but why advanced economies remained structurally unprepared despite clear warning signals. The deeper failure was not simply poor contingency planning. It was a political-economic logic that systematically privileged efficiency over resilience.

Western energy systems were designed to minimize costs in normal times, not to absorb shocks in moments of geopolitical rupture. Deterrence reinforced this bias by making disruption appear unlikely; the energy transition accelerated it by weakening legacy redundancy before alternatives were fully mature; and democratic fiscal and electoral constraints locked it in by making costly preparedness politically difficult to sustain. The crisis, therefore, exposes not three separate failures, but a single mechanism: the chronic underproduction of resilience in systems optimized for short-term efficiency. This imbalance is not simply an economic liability; it is becoming a structural feature of geopolitical competition, as states that can sustain resilience gain increasing leverage over those that cannot.

The immediate effects of the crisis extend well beyond oil markets. Price volatility has propagated through supply chains, affecting agriculture, chemicals, and advanced manufacturing. Growth forecasts have been revised downward, with several major economies now hovering near recessionary thresholds. More importantly, the disruption has triggered a cascading “triple shock”: rising energy prices, food insecurity, and slowing growth. These effects are especially acute in developing economies, where fiscal constraints limit the ability to absorb external shocks. The crisis thus exposes not only the fragility of energy markets but also the tight coupling of global supply chains to a small number of geographic chokepoints. The Strait of Hormuz is not merely a transit route; it is a systemic node linking energy flows to petrochemicals, fertilizer production, shipping insurance, and financial expectations. When such a node fails, the effects ripple across the entire global economy. In such conditions, control over disruption or the capacity to withstand it becomes a source of strategic influence. Energy vulnerability is no longer simply a market risk; it is emerging as a lever of geopolitical power.

Deterrence was the first mechanism through which efficiency displaced resilience. For decades,........

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