The recurring declaration at the Munich Security Conference that the “rules-based international order” is in terminal decline reveals something more consequential than institutional fatigue. What is eroding is not merely a framework of rules, but the political compact that rendered hierarchy tolerable. The post-Cold War order functioned because American primacy was embedded in institutions that moderated its asymmetry and reassured allies that power would be exercised within predictable bounds. Rules did not eliminate hierarchy; they softened it. Legitimacy rested on a combination of material dominance, alliance reassurance, and procedural multilateralism. When reassurance weakens, hierarchy becomes more visible, and when hierarchy becomes visible, consent begins to fray because asymmetry is no longer buffered by trust. 

This structural anxiety was expressed with unusual clarity by Friedrich Merz at Munich, where he warned that the rules-based world order “no longer exists” and that “our freedom is not guaranteed” in an era of renewed great power politics. His admission that “a deep divide has opened between Europe and the United States” reflects not merely diplomatic disagreement but a shift in strategic self-understanding. Europe’s security architecture was premised on dependable American stewardship. If that stewardship becomes conditional or transactional, the equilibrium that depended upon it cannot simply persist by inertia. It must either be renegotiated or redistributed. 

Under Donald Trump, American foreign policy has foregrounded leverage over reassurance, and bargaining over institutional continuity. The result is not only policy divergence but psychological dislocation among allies whose strategic identities were built around alliance stability. Dependence, once rational and efficient, now appears vulnerable to political contingency. When the guarantor of order treats commitments as negotiable instruments, secondary powers are compelled to reconsider how much insulation they require from their protector. 

It is within this atmosphere of recalibration that middle-power rhetoric has intensified. In his Davos speech, Mark Carney argued that the multilateral institutions on which middle powers relied are under threat and that the architecture of collective problem-solving is fraying. Countries, he suggested, are concluding that they must develop strategic autonomy across energy, food, critical minerals, finance, and supply chains. His formulation that middle powers must choose between building “higher walls” or pursuing something “more ambitious” captures a deeper structural dilemma. Autonomy pursued defensively can accelerate fragmentation, while autonomy pursued cooperatively........

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