Four Days to Humility: Inspecting the Korban Within and More Menachos 48-50
48 — Your Sin is Another’s Mitzvah
Our Gemara discusses a technical piece regarding the Shavuous sacrifice that has interesting moral and halachic implications. However, to fully appreciate them, we must first understand the basic text and legal reasoning. The Gemara states:
“Rabbi Ḥanina Tirata taught a baraisa before Rabbi Yoḥanan: If one slaughtered four sheep for Shavuos, rather than the required two, accompanied by two loaves, he draws two of the sheep out of the four and sprinkles their blood not for the sake of the sheep of Shavuos. He then sprinkles the blood of the other sheep for the sake of the sheep of Shavuos.
As, if you do not say to do this, but rather require him first to sprinkle the blood of two of the sheep for their own sake, then you have caused the loss of the latter two sheep. Since they were previously fit to have their blood sprinkled on the altar for the sake of the sheep of Shavuos, and were disqualified from this status when the blood of the other two sheep was sprinkled for that purpose, they are no longer fit to have their blood sprinkled even for the sake of a different offering.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Ḥanina Tirata: And does the court say to a person: Arise and sin in order that you may gain? Is it proper for the priest to sprinkle the blood of the first pair not for their own sake so that the second pair will remain fit?”
[in other words, at this point the Gemara assumes that it is improper to commit a sin even in order to achieve a higher purpose, such as fulfillment of the overall mitzvah. The Gemara cites a precedent from a different case where the limbs of an olah sacrifice are intermingled with the limbs of a chattas sacrifice. In such a case, we do not offer the entirety of the limbs on the altar, which would treat the limbs of the chattas as if they were wood, even though this would accomplish the overall positive goal of allowing the olah sacrifice to proceed with its full process.]
Rabbi Ḥanina Tirata answered Rabbi Yoḥanan: We indeed do say: Arise and sin with a sin offering in order that you may gain with regard to a sin offering, since it is the same type of offering. Similarly, one may sin with regard to the sheep of Shavuos in order to gain with regard to the other sheep brought for the same offering.
We do not say: Arise and sin with a sin offering in order that you may gain with regard to a burnt offering. Therefore, the Rabbis prohibit burning the limbs of the sin offering on the altar in order to allow for the burning of the limbs of the burnt offering.
The Gemara similarly refines this ruling and states: We do say: Arise and sin on Shabbos in order that you may gain on Shabbos, i.e., in order to allow lambs of the Shavuos offering to be eaten on Shavuos that occurs on Shabbos. We do not say: Arise and sin on Shabbos in order that you may gain on a weekday—any process that would preserve the eimurin (choice inner fats and certain internal organs) which are meant to be burned after Shabbos.”
The essential element of discussion in the Gemara is that, at times, one is permitted to commit a sinful act that will preserve an overall mitzvah. The proviso seems to be that it must be directly connected to the very same mitzvah and not performed to preserve or enact a different one.
Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 102:4) rules that it is forbidden to pass in front of (within four cubits of) a person who is praying Shemoneh Esreh. One of the reasons given is that it disrupts his concentration. It is a dispute among the poskim whether it is permitted to pass on his side while angling toward the front, and it is brought in Mishna Berura (ibid.) that even on the side laterally it is forbidden according to the Zohar. Regardless, it is forbidden to pass directly in front, and this is an important halacha that people tend to ignore because of challenging practical implications when confronted with a crowded shul.
On the website Halacha Yomit from Maran Rav Ovadia Yosef zt”l, he rules (https://halachayomit.co.il/he/default.aspx?HalachaID=1278):
A very common situation occurs when a person arrives at the synagogue and the congregation is already standing in prayer. He wishes to pass in front of those praying in order to pray himself. It is clear that he may not pass before them; rather, he must wait until they finish their prayer, and only then may he pass and go to his place.
However, the question arises whether one may be lenient for the sake of praying with a congregation (tefillah b’tzibbur). That is, when a person knows that in order to pray together with the congregation he must pass in front of others who are praying so that he too can have a place to stand.
In the responsa Yad Eliyahu, this issue is discussed based on the rule “aseh docheh lo ta‘aseh”—a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. Since the prohibition against passing in front of someone praying is a rabbinic negative prohibition, and prayer with a congregation is likewise a rabbinic mitzvah, it would seemingly follow that the person may pass in front of those praying, transgressing a rabbinic prohibition which would be set aside for the sake of fulfilling the rabbinic positive mitzvah of praying with a minyan.
However, in practice he writes that one should not be lenient. The rule that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition applies only when, at the very moment one violates the prohibition, he simultaneously fulfills the positive commandment. In this case, the person first violates the prohibition by passing in front of those praying and only afterward stands to pray with the congregation. Thus, at the time of the violation, no positive commandment is yet being fulfilled. Therefore, there is no basis for leniency.
In the work Halacha Berurah, the proposed leniency is rejected for an additional reason: it is not at all clear that prayer with a minyan is formally classified as a rabbinic positive commandment. Consequently, this mitzvah certainly cannot override the prohibition against passing in front of those praying.
Thus far is from the writings of Rav Ovadia Yosef zt”l. However, one may raise a question based on our Gemara’s sugya. Until this point, the discussion concerns the rule of aseh docheh lo ta‘aseh. Yet according to our Gemara, which states, “Sin in order that you may merit that mitzvah”—and so rules the Rambam (Pesulei HaMukdashin 6:20, and this also appears implied in the Rama O.C. 276:2 based on the responsa Kesav Sofer, O.C. 10)—perhaps it would be permitted to pass before someone praying so that he himself may pray.
Nevertheless, this would not constitute permission to pass before someone praying for the sake of a different necessary mitzvah, as we also saw in our Gemara.
It is therefore puzzling to me why Rav Ovadia Yosef and Yad Eliyahu did not compare this case to that ruling. Possibly they held that permission to incur wrongdoing applies only when it concerns one’s own mitzvah, but not where doing so harms another person’s mitzvah (even if it is the same mitzvah) by disturbing his concentration. For, to paraphrase the Gemara (Sanhedrin 74a), mi yemar dim’acha sumak tefei—who says your tears of prayer are more important than your peer?
49 — Four Days to Humility: Inspecting the Korban Within
Our Gemara on Amud Beis discusses the rule that the daily offering requires inspection four days prior to its slaughter, which is derived from the requirement of the Paschal offering, which also requires four days of inspection. As the verse states: “On the tenth day of this month they shall take for them every man a lamb…and you shall keep it until the fourteenth day of this month” (Shemos 12:3–6).
Even if this rule applies to the daily sacrifice, the fact that the source verse comes from the Paschal sacrifice indicates that it must have a particular meaning. What is the significance of these four days by the Paschal offering?
Noam Elimelech (Shemos Bo 12:1) explains these verses allegorically:
“Speak to the whole community of Israel and say that on the tenth of this month each family shall take for itself a lamb, a lamb to a house.”
The lamb is a small animal and stands for humility. The double phrase “each family” and “a lamb to a house” represents two dimensions in which one must be careful regarding humility. Sometimes a person becomes arrogant and forgets where he comes from. This is why he must be reminded that he comes from a particular family and a particular place. This is the “lamb for each family.” However, sometimes a person is challenged by his internal state. He possesses many gifts and sees himself as great, which can lead to arrogance. This is what is hinted at in the phrase “a lamb to a house.” The house represents the private, inner space that he must watch carefully and cultivate with humility.
“But if the household is too small for a lamb, let it share one with a neighbor who dwells nearby, in proportion to the number of persons: you shall contribute for the lamb according to what each household will eat.”
These next verses speak to the person who is still struggling with humility. “The household is too small for a lamb,” meaning that he has not yet achieved the level he is meant to reach. He requires help from his “neighbor,” which represents his positive tendencies and character traits. He must recruit them and involve them in properly balancing his internal states and drives. This is represented by the phrases “neighbor” and “according to what each household will eat.” (I will add that the positive tendencies are a close neighbor as the verse states (Devarim 30:14) “It is a very close thing in your mouth and heart.”
“Your lamb shall be without blemish, a yearling male; you may take it from the sheep or from the goats.”
These verses warn of false humility, where a person manifests the external behavior and expectations of humility while internally lacking it. That is why it must be a “male lamb without blemish.” In kabbalistic terms, the masculine force represents stability and rooted strength. The feminine force is influenced and affected by the masculine force. Biologically speaking, the male fertilizes the female, who then carries the child. Therefore, the verse hints that humility must be intrinsic and deeply rooted, not merely reactive or externally shaped.
“You shall keep watch over it until the fourteenth day of this month; and all the assembled congregation of the Israelites shall slaughter it at twilight.”
This final verse refers to the ultimate messianic ideal. The fourteenth day of the month at twilight is when the moon reaches fullness. The waxing and waning of the moon represent the compromises and losses of the physical world, and when it reaches completion it symbolizes final redemption. If the process of humility is followed properly, the individual—and ultimately the nation—can achieve inner and national redemption.
Article 50 — What was the Gra so Incensed About?
Our Gemara on Amud Aleph discusses the famous principle that one who brings the incense receives a special benefit of becoming wealthy via supernatural means.
Because it was associated with the benefit of wealth, the custom was to allow each cohen to perform this service only once in a lifetime (Yoma 26a).
There is a tradition that serving as a sandek (the one who holds the baby) during the Bris is considered as if he is offering the incense. Based on this, Rama (YD 265:11) quotes poskim who hold that one should not give the honor of sandek twice within the same family, meaning that one should not serve as sandek for two siblings. This ruling is hotly debated (commentaries ibid), as it is not mentioned in the Gemara, and there is also a logical difficulty: if we take the comparison fully seriously, then not only should one not serve as a sandek twice for one family, but perhaps not even twice in a lifetime. In the end, it appears to be a mystically derived concern with only oblique references and supports. I will not enter into the full debate, except to focus on a particular comment that the Gra (ibid) made in his dissenting opinion: “We have never seen a sandek become wealthy,” meaning that if it is being thoroughly compared to the incense, then the exact same benefit should follow, especially since that was the purported reason it was not repeated.
There are many, many segulos in our tradition that promise wealth, obviously some with a higher degree of provenance than others. First, we have cases where Scripture itself promises long life, such as honoring one’s parents and fulfilling the requirement of sending away the mother bird (Devarim 5:16 and 22:6–7). Tehilim (34:13–15) famously promises long life to one who guards his tongue. The Gemara (Megilla 27b) discusses many segulos for longevity, ranging from toileting and hygiene practices to refraining from assigning a derogatory nickname to a friend. Regardless, I think most of us would say that we do not necessarily expect segulos to come true in a literal or guaranteed fashion. We tend to view them more like vitamins—that is, they can certainly be helpful, but they are no guarantee. If so, how do we understand the Gra’s objection? This is not someone who would use his words lightly, especially when making an assertion that, in a certain sense, casts doubt on the validity of such promises.
I believe there is a simple answer, rooted in his exact wording. He did not say, “We do not often see a sandek becoming wealthy.” Rather, the Gra’s precise statement was: “We have never seen a sandek become wealthy.” This supports our position. We do not expect segulos to work consistently. The Gra’s objection was that he had never observed, to a meaningful degree, any wealth benefit resulting from serving as a sandek. Seeing that it never—or virtually never—produced such an outcome was his reason to question the attribution of supernatural qualities in this case.
