South Korea’s Conservative Party Tanks Amid Warring Factions’ Fight for Legitimacy
The Koreas | Politics | East Asia
South Korea’s Conservative Party Tanks Amid Warring Factions’ Fight for Legitimacy
The PPP ruined its local elections prospects by purging Han Dong-hoon, its former leader.
Then-PPP leader Han Dong-hoon holds an emergency press conference at the National Assembly on Dec. 4, 2024, shortly after then-President Yoon Suk-yeol’s declaration of martial law.
In mid-January, Jang Dong-hyeok, the leader of opposition People Power Party (PPP), staged a fasting sit-in in the National Assembly. He was calling for the ruling Democratic Party (DP), which wields a sizable parliamentary majority, to appoint a special counsel to investigate the DP. This was based on credible evidence that the DP had peddled a party ticket in exchange for cash. There have also been allegations of a cult’s infiltration into the DP.
Haggard and hooked onto a nasal tube, Jang managed to earn sympathy, beginning to chip away at the public support for the DP. By January 26, the PPP’s approval ratings had scaled up to almost 40 percent, a better performance than before its disgraced, imprisoned former President Yoon Suk-yeol unconstitutionally declared martial law in December 2024.
On January 29, Jang presided over the first PPP general meeting since he called off his fasting. His first move since his return to work meant a great deal in terms of how the party could take advantage of the DP’s scandals and internal discord within the liberal camp leading up to the June local elections. All eyes were duly on Jang, especially with regard to his dealing with Han Dong-hoon.
Han led the PPP from December 2023 to April 2024 and then again from July to December 2024. In order to consolidate his control over the party, he mobilized his family in manipulating the party members’ public opinion. They posted barbed posts and comments against Yoon and his wife on the PPP website.
Jang ordered an internal investigation, and the party ethics committee resolved in January 2026 to expel Han. During that general meeting, Jang confirmed the PPP ethics committee’s resolution to expel Han from the party.
The conservative camp convulsed in shock. Of course, what the Hans did was in no way commendable. Still, given his opposition to Yoon and the martial law declaration, Han has come to represent reason within the conservative bloc, with a significant following from the center right and moderate right wing. Closing ranks with Han should have been the PPP’s last-gasp effort to reinstate reason within South Korea’s conservatism. Ousting Han was an act of self-sabotage.
In February, the PPP followed Han’s expulsion with a decision to suspend a pro-Han legislator’s party membership. This purging – which Han characterized as “another martial law” – reinforced the public perception that the PPP would never regain its cool.
While most PPP legislators cowered before Yoon during his presidency, Han openly chafed at Yoon’s incompetence and his wife’s immoderate political meddling. When Yoon declared martial law in December 2024, Han went straight to the National Assembly to direct the few PPP legislators present to vote in favor of lifting martial law. This was before he found out about Yoon’s order to arrest him during the short-lived martial law.
On December 14, when the National Assembly passed the impeachment motion against Yoon on the second try, it was most likely pro-Han PPP legislators who joined the liberal camp to reach the two-thirds majority required for presidential impeachment. The PPP party line opposed impeaching Yoon, and the party threatened to ferret out and retaliate against anyone siding with the DP.
On the other hand, Jang won the PPP chairmanship by pandering to the far- and alt-right elements of the party. Their core stance is that Yoon is God-sent; that the DP, with their parliamentary obstructionism, forced Yoon to resort to martial law; and that U.S. President Donald Trump should help the wrongly-convicted Yoon.
Continuously validating their feelings, Jang has also insisted on Yoon’s innocence. “God had a plan behind this martial law,” he said once. On February 19, the Seoul Central District Court sentenced Yoon to life imprisonment for “undermining democratic norms.” Jang responded by downplaying the verdict – “it’s just the first ruling” – and warning that “severing ties with Yoon only sow seeds of schism.”
The pro-Han faction went up in arms, exhorting the PPP to desert “pro-insurrection” Jang. “We need to cut away Jang for the sake of rebuilding our conservatism,” Han said.
They were right. In late February, in one major national poll, the PPP’s approval rating marked a dismal 17 percentage point. With the June local elections around the corner, this figure rammed some sense into the PPP leadership. Plus, Oh Se-hoon, the incumbent Seoul mayor from the PPP, refused to run for another term on the PPP ticket unless the party opted for the “normalization of its course.”
On March 9, Jang backed down. The party issued a resolution “clearly opposing any claims demanding the political comeback of former President Yoon Suk-yeol.” Yet, Jang made his displeasure palpable. During the general meeting that decided on the resolution, where the legislators voiced the need to welcome Han back into their fold, Jang stayed mum The PPP’s floor leader did all the talking. Jang also snubbed journalists’ questions asking if he agreed with the resolution.
With Yoon’s political return being practically impossible anyway, the PPP resolution hardly brings anything substantial to the table. It just incensed the Han faction further, which is now demanding a complete replacement of the PPP’s pro-Yoon leadership.
In the latest poll conducted after the resolution and published on March 12, the PPP’s approval rating still remained at 17 percent. On March 12, Oh refused yet again to register his name for the PPP ticket for the upcoming Seoul mayoral election, citing “no signs of change within the party.”
From January up to the present, the PPP’s – especially Jang’s – incessant coddling of Yoon and the alt-right base, and the warring factions’ mudslinging have driven the heady plunge in approval ratings.
The only way forward for the PPP is to mend fences with Han. But this sits uncomfortably with the current PPP leadership. They aren’t just at loggerheads with him on political issues; there’s personal hatred of Han here, as well.
Back when they were prosecutors, Yoon and Han kiboshed many conservative big shots’ political careers with their relentless investigations. In the lead-up to the 2022 presidential election, the PPP groomed Yoon as their candidate largely because there were no other viable conservative candidates left to contend against the now President Lee Jae-myung. Many within the PPP circle still smart from Han’s contribution to the paucity of good names on the party roster.
Also, the PPP doesn’t want to trust Han again. Yoon catapulted Han to political fame by making him the youngest justice minister in South Korean history. As the PPP was floundering in its preparation for the 2024 general elections, Yoon orchestrated Han’s rise to the PPP leadership. In a matter of a few months, Yoon turned Han into the most popular conservative politician. But then, Han clashed with Yoon, eventually helping topple him.
Although Han did the right thing, the PPP old guard believes that Han, instead of backstabbing, should have quietly backed out once he soured on his former boss. Additionally, Han dropped many ignominious bombs against his fellow PPP members for personal gain, especially during his campaigns for party leadership elections and the 2025 national convention.
But aside from embracing Han, Jang is heavily limited in his options to reform the party. This is because the PPP under Jang feels that it has no other alternative but to burrow further into its steadfastly hardcore far-right base. The temptation is easy, because these supporters sustain the PPP today — they are the 15 to 18 percent of the populace standing behind the PPP no matter what. This reality has obfuscated the PPP’s conservative identity. It’s hard today to find any bona fide, timeless conservative values in the PPP’s behavior, let alone its supporters’.
The PPP of today was born out of the fallout from former President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment in 2017. Her father was an iron-fisted dictator in the 1970s. When she was impeached for corruption and subsequently jailed, her fans, most of whom also dote on her father’s legacy, erupted in anger. At the time and afterwards, the PPP, rather than refashioning itself, absorbed their sense of victimhood and mania.
In the absence of genuine conservative principles and reasonable platforms, the party became merely reactionary and vindictive. It is still stuck on the outmoded, unfounded narratives of subversive communists running South Korea. Yoon perfectly tapped into and represented this PPP core. To these diehards, Yoon’s bare-faced attempts at insurrection were justified. And now Jang is their standard bearer.
When Jang was fasting in January, Park Geun-hye paid a visit. Gaunt and grim until then, Jang beamed upon seeing her. Park, herself feeble yet concerned, cajoled him to stop for his health and to prepare for a bigger cause. It was a heartwarming yet gut-wrenching mis-en-scène for the PPP stalwarts.
It was Han, by the way, who indicted Park back in 2017, seeking a 30-year prison term and packing her off to jail.
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In mid-January, Jang Dong-hyeok, the leader of opposition People Power Party (PPP), staged a fasting sit-in in the National Assembly. He was calling for the ruling Democratic Party (DP), which wields a sizable parliamentary majority, to appoint a special counsel to investigate the DP. This was based on credible evidence that the DP had peddled a party ticket in exchange for cash. There have also been allegations of a cult’s infiltration into the DP.
Haggard and hooked onto a nasal tube, Jang managed to earn sympathy, beginning to chip away at the public support for the DP. By January 26, the PPP’s approval ratings had scaled up to almost 40 percent, a better performance than before its disgraced, imprisoned former President Yoon Suk-yeol unconstitutionally declared martial law in December 2024.
On January 29, Jang presided over the first PPP general meeting since he called off his fasting. His first move since his return to work meant a great deal in terms of how the party could take advantage of the DP’s scandals and internal discord within the liberal camp leading up to the June local elections. All eyes were duly on Jang, especially with regard to his dealing with Han Dong-hoon.
Han led the PPP from December 2023 to April 2024 and then again from July to December 2024. In order to consolidate his control over the party, he mobilized his family in manipulating the party members’ public opinion. They posted barbed posts and comments against Yoon and his wife on the PPP website.
Jang ordered an internal investigation, and the party ethics committee resolved in January 2026 to expel Han. During that general meeting, Jang confirmed the PPP ethics committee’s resolution to expel Han from the party.
The conservative camp convulsed in shock. Of course, what the Hans did was in no way commendable. Still, given his opposition to Yoon and the martial law declaration, Han has come to represent reason within the conservative bloc, with a significant following from the center right and moderate right wing. Closing ranks with Han should have been the PPP’s last-gasp effort to reinstate reason within South Korea’s conservatism. Ousting Han was an act of self-sabotage.
In February, the PPP followed Han’s expulsion with a decision to suspend a pro-Han legislator’s party membership. This purging – which Han characterized as “another martial law” – reinforced the public perception that the PPP would never regain its cool.
While most PPP legislators cowered before Yoon during his presidency, Han openly chafed at Yoon’s incompetence and his wife’s immoderate political meddling. When Yoon declared martial law in December 2024, Han went straight to the National Assembly to direct the few PPP legislators present to vote in favor of lifting martial law. This was before he found out about Yoon’s order to arrest him during the short-lived martial law.
On December 14, when the National Assembly passed the impeachment motion against Yoon on the second try, it was most likely pro-Han PPP legislators who joined the liberal camp to reach the two-thirds majority required for presidential impeachment. The PPP party line opposed impeaching Yoon, and the party threatened to ferret out and retaliate against anyone siding with the DP.
On the other hand, Jang won the PPP chairmanship by pandering to the far- and alt-right elements of the party. Their core stance is that Yoon is God-sent; that the DP, with their parliamentary obstructionism, forced Yoon to resort to martial law; and that U.S. President Donald Trump should help the wrongly-convicted Yoon.
Continuously validating their feelings, Jang has also insisted on Yoon’s innocence. “God had a plan behind this martial law,” he said once. On February 19, the Seoul Central District Court sentenced Yoon to life imprisonment for “undermining democratic norms.” Jang responded by downplaying the verdict – “it’s just the first ruling” – and warning that “severing ties with Yoon only sow seeds of schism.”
The pro-Han faction went up in arms, exhorting the PPP to desert “pro-insurrection” Jang. “We need to cut away Jang for the sake of rebuilding our conservatism,” Han said.
They were right. In late February, in one major national poll, the PPP’s approval rating marked a dismal 17 percentage point. With the June local elections around the corner, this figure rammed some sense into the PPP leadership. Plus, Oh Se-hoon, the incumbent Seoul mayor from the PPP, refused to run for another term on the PPP ticket unless the party opted for the “normalization of its course.”
On March 9, Jang backed down. The party issued a resolution “clearly opposing any claims demanding the political comeback of former President Yoon Suk-yeol.” Yet, Jang made his displeasure palpable. During the general meeting that decided on the resolution, where the legislators voiced the need to welcome Han back into their fold, Jang stayed mum The PPP’s floor leader did all the talking. Jang also snubbed journalists’ questions asking if he agreed with the resolution.
With Yoon’s political return being practically impossible anyway, the PPP resolution hardly brings anything substantial to the table. It just incensed the Han faction further, which is now demanding a complete replacement of the PPP’s pro-Yoon leadership.
In the latest poll conducted after the resolution and published on March 12, the PPP’s approval rating still remained at 17 percent. On March 12, Oh refused yet again to register his name for the PPP ticket for the upcoming Seoul mayoral election, citing “no signs of change within the party.”
From January up to the present, the PPP’s – especially Jang’s – incessant coddling of Yoon and the alt-right base, and the warring factions’ mudslinging have driven the heady plunge in approval ratings.
The only way forward for the PPP is to mend fences with Han. But this sits uncomfortably with the current PPP leadership. They aren’t just at loggerheads with him on political issues; there’s personal hatred of Han here, as well.
Back when they were prosecutors, Yoon and Han kiboshed many conservative big shots’ political careers with their relentless investigations. In the lead-up to the 2022 presidential election, the PPP groomed Yoon as their candidate largely because there were no other viable conservative candidates left to contend against the now President Lee Jae-myung. Many within the PPP circle still smart from Han’s contribution to the paucity of good names on the party roster.
Also, the PPP doesn’t want to trust Han again. Yoon catapulted Han to political fame by making him the youngest justice minister in South Korean history. As the PPP was floundering in its preparation for the 2024 general elections, Yoon orchestrated Han’s rise to the PPP leadership. In a matter of a few months, Yoon turned Han into the most popular conservative politician. But then, Han clashed with Yoon, eventually helping topple him.
Although Han did the right thing, the PPP old guard believes that Han, instead of backstabbing, should have quietly backed out once he soured on his former boss. Additionally, Han dropped many ignominious bombs against his fellow PPP members for personal gain, especially during his campaigns for party leadership elections and the 2025 national convention.
But aside from embracing Han, Jang is heavily limited in his options to reform the party. This is because the PPP under Jang feels that it has no other alternative but to burrow further into its steadfastly hardcore far-right base. The temptation is easy, because these supporters sustain the PPP today — they are the 15 to 18 percent of the populace standing behind the PPP no matter what. This reality has obfuscated the PPP’s conservative identity. It’s hard today to find any bona fide, timeless conservative values in the PPP’s behavior, let alone its supporters’.
The PPP of today was born out of the fallout from former President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment in 2017. Her father was an iron-fisted dictator in the 1970s. When she was impeached for corruption and subsequently jailed, her fans, most of whom also dote on her father’s legacy, erupted in anger. At the time and afterwards, the PPP, rather than refashioning itself, absorbed their sense of victimhood and mania.
In the absence of genuine conservative principles and reasonable platforms, the party became merely reactionary and vindictive. It is still stuck on the outmoded, unfounded narratives of subversive communists running South Korea. Yoon perfectly tapped into and represented this PPP core. To these diehards, Yoon’s bare-faced attempts at insurrection were justified. And now Jang is their standard bearer.
When Jang was fasting in January, Park Geun-hye paid a visit. Gaunt and grim until then, Jang beamed upon seeing her. Park, herself feeble yet concerned, cajoled him to stop for his health and to prepare for a bigger cause. It was a heartwarming yet gut-wrenching mis-en-scène for the PPP stalwarts.
It was Han, by the way, who indicted Park back in 2017, seeking a 30-year prison term and packing her off to jail.
Eunwoo Lee writes on politics, society, and history of Europe and East Asia.
South Korea conservatives
