Features | Politics | South Asia

Kashmir’s Endless Wait for Statehood – and Hope

Instead of working with locally elected officials in Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi is drafting legislation to forcibly remove opposition figures from office.

Earlier in March, India’s key human rights groups received an invitation from a Joint Parliamentary Committee for broad-based discussions over a proposed constitutional amendment, with a separate mention of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act of 2019, The Diplomat has exclusively learned.  One of the invitees, who spoke with this reporter, shared the initial upbeat mood among them. The human rights groups had hoped that the unexpected call for consultation was aimed at minimizing fissures with civil society leaders – hostility toward activists and NGOs has been the remorseless legacy of Narendra Modi’s government thus far. The meeting request seemed to hint that the government was returning to a consensus-based policy framing that acknowledges critical insights and information shared by a wide array of stakeholders. The People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), and Center for Law and Policy Research (CLPR) are among those invited to the meeting on March 19, earlier scheduled for March 10, sources told The Diplomat.

But soon the delegates were appalled to learn that the draft legislations in question, including the one on Jammu and Kashmir, merely related to what has been New Delhi’s fixation for some time: the invention of a constitutionally justifiable course to expel elected adversaries – dressed as a resolve to check endemic corruption. 

“A minister, who for any period of 30 consecutive days during holding the office as such, is arrested and detained in custody, on allegation of committing an offense under any law for the time being in force, which is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to be five years or more, shall be removed from his office…” the draft amendment, dated August 19, 2025, reads. The Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) behind the draft is headed by Aparajita Sarangi. It comprises 11 members from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party and four from the opposition. A source in the PUCL, who requested anonymity, said that the provision to terminate an accused minister without waiting for conviction by a competent court “smacks of a design to facilitate political coup in opposition-ruled states.” In Kashmir, where New Delhi has evolved a dual power structure by summarily expanding the role of the lieutenant governor, it will be an instrument to further scupper the public mandate by purging the elected government at will.

Despite assurances made to India’s Supreme Court and Parliament, New Delhi has not restored Jammu and Kashmir’s statehood, maintaining that a decision will be made at “an apt time.” On August 5, 2019, the Modi government ended J&K’s semi-autonomous status. It bifurcated and downgraded the region into two union territories: J&K and Ladakh. Despite National Conference leader Omar Abdullah storming to power in October 2024, New Delhi is loath to handover key executive powers to him.

Abdullah’s emissaries are pursuing back-channel negotiations with India’s Ministry of Home Affairs for restoration of statehood. A source close to Abdullah told The Diplomat that the talks “have been fruitful, and that there is 90 percent agreement on amendment of business rules,” which would transfer several important ministries from the purview of the New Delhi-nominated lieutenant governor – currently Manoj Sinha – to the chief minister.

But senior journalist Anuradha Bhasin is skeptical. “Is there even any credible indication of any such negotiations? If you look at the broader design of the BJP and [its ideological parent] the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh to establish a Hindu nation, they will want a less and less empowered Muslim-majority region,” Bhasin told The Diplomat. 

She added, “To be fair to Omar Abdullah, he operates with very little power and leverage, but he raised the hopes high when he campaigned. I wonder if he was naive then, or gullible now, or just timid.”

With the Modi government spearheading legislations to make elected representatives easily dispensable, one doubts it would soften its terms of engagement with Kashmir. 

Tensions are already riding high. Modi recently attracted a degree of public opprobrium for lending credence to the Israeli-U.S. military offensive – he traveled to Tel Aviv barely 48 hours before Iran was bombed. The reactions were marked in Kashmir, which observed a complete shutdown – a first since 2020 – to mourn the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The U.S. dictation of terms of India’s oil purchases further embarrassed Modi. These dynamics might keep New Delhi from offering a political compromise to Abdullah’s government, lest it should be seen as a step back in duress.

At any rate, Kashmir’s aspirations cannot be described merely in terms of securing statehood. That framing undersells the suppressed population’s pervasive anxieties, their internalized responses in the face of exclusion and targeted attacks, and their inability to express vulnerability and seek support within a system that criminalizes dissent even in its passive form. Kashmir needs guarantees of dignity, safeguard from physical harm, and restoration of not just statehood but also democratic platforms to express disagreements with the state, the absence of which has led to annihilation of people’s collective hope.

As Hindutva burgeons, there have been a spate of attacks on Kashmiris across India. In January, 17-year-old Tabish Ahmed, a shawl trader in Uttarakhand, was the latest to be targeted. The purpose of these attacks is to not merely inflict bodily injury. It is an assault on the psyche. It relays the demands of a majoritarian society from those it categorizes as the “other”: The acceptance of subordination. The acceptance of scrutiny. The acceptance of a social and political order where their right to life with dignity is contingent on the above condition, not guaranteed.

The state’s indifferent response to suck attacks generates impunity in the mind of the mob. The March 11 assassination attempt on former Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah by a Hindu attacker from point-blank range illustrated the scale of the problem. National Conference spokesperson Imran Dar described the attack as “culmination of decade-old hatred towards India’s prominent Kashmiri Muslim voice.”

Nasir Wani, a political adviser to the chief minister, said there must be accountability from the lieutenant government for the grave security lapse. Speaking with The Diplomat, Wani said the development underlined “why it is important to have law and order under the purview of the chief minister, which had been the case always.”

Sinha currently heads the police and bureaucracy. 

To be fair to Sinha, his administration oversaw the installation of efficient transportation networks, which have facilitated better access to services and tourism. Some businessmen who spoke with this reporter privately credited him for “eliminating separatist infrastructure,” which has “allowed businesses to thrive.”

But he has also attracted criticism for trying to usurp the elected government’s prerogatives. In April 2025, Sinha’s office transferred 48 officials of J&K administrative service without reference to Abdullah, who termed it “illegal.” 

Sinha’s band of bureaucrats have frequently terminated government employees over charges of abetting terrorism, which critics aver is part of the central government’s agenda to enforce self-censorship. Around 85 government employees have been terminated since 2020, often without opportunity to defend themselves. 

Overall, Abdullah has opted to repair ties with New Delhi and focus on areas of agreement. Given India’s steady slide into an “electoral autocracy,” marked by erosion of institutional autonomy and mainstream media’s relentless campaigns against opposition leaders, a head-on collision with New Delhi would not be helpful.

Abdullah’s critics, especially some elements from within his party, have decried his pragmatism as infirmity of purpose. They have expanded their own appeal to anxious crowds by everyday deployment of moral grandstanding. That is easy to effect. A crowd needing healing does not dissect politics in its layered context; it needs only an expression of combative rhetoric on its behalf. 

But combative rhetoric without enunciation of a well-chalked out strategy to address challenges is not very dissimilar to self-aggrandizing politics. The one making combative rhetoric earns a halo; his applauding audiences walk away with nothing.

Eminent scholar Siddiq Wahid underlined the futility of ill-timed combat way back in 2019, when Kashmir reeled under state-imposed curfew. “When there is an avalanche, don’t be a hero,” Wahid had famously quipped. But speaking with The Diplomat now, he warned: “There is also the danger of internalizing – and rationalizing – self-censorship if one were to permanently adhere to this philosophy.”

The path ahead for Kashmir’s cross-section of politicians is arduous. If they are serious about Kashmir’s future, they must jettison pugnacious power-plays, regroup, and leverage one another’s political strengths and advantages. But Waheed Parra, a senior leader of Peoples Democratic Party, said it is too late to unite. 

“It is a missed bus. The chief minister’s ‘I, me, myself’ fixation has normalized New Delhi’s restructuring of Kashmir’s polity. He has frittered the public mandate which was to fight back New Delhi,” Parra told The Diplomat. 

Bhasin added that a “unite to resist” campaign runs the risk of “perishing together” because you have a “very intolerant BJP which wants a submissive Jammu and Kashmir.”

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Earlier in March, India’s key human rights groups received an invitation from a Joint Parliamentary Committee for broad-based discussions over a proposed constitutional amendment, with a separate mention of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act of 2019, The Diplomat has exclusively learned.  One of the invitees, who spoke with this reporter, shared the initial upbeat mood among them. The human rights groups had hoped that the unexpected call for consultation was aimed at minimizing fissures with civil society leaders – hostility toward activists and NGOs has been the remorseless legacy of Narendra Modi’s government thus far. The meeting request seemed to hint that the government was returning to a consensus-based policy framing that acknowledges critical insights and information shared by a wide array of stakeholders. The People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), and Center for Law and Policy Research (CLPR) are among those invited to the meeting on March 19, earlier scheduled for March 10, sources told The Diplomat.

But soon the delegates were appalled to learn that the draft legislations in question, including the one on Jammu and Kashmir, merely related to what has been New Delhi’s fixation for some time: the invention of a constitutionally justifiable course to expel elected adversaries – dressed as a resolve to check endemic corruption. 

“A minister, who for any period of 30 consecutive days during holding the office as such, is arrested and detained in custody, on allegation of committing an offense under any law for the time being in force, which is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to be five years or more, shall be removed from his office…” the draft amendment, dated August 19, 2025, reads. The Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) behind the draft is headed by Aparajita Sarangi. It comprises 11 members from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party and four from the opposition. A source in the PUCL, who requested anonymity, said that the provision to terminate an accused minister without waiting for conviction by a competent court “smacks of a design to facilitate political coup in opposition-ruled states.” In Kashmir, where New Delhi has evolved a dual power structure by summarily expanding the role of the lieutenant governor, it will be an instrument to further scupper the public mandate by purging the elected government at will.

Despite assurances made to India’s Supreme Court and Parliament, New Delhi has not restored Jammu and Kashmir’s statehood, maintaining that a decision will be made at “an apt time.” On August 5, 2019, the Modi government ended J&K’s semi-autonomous status. It bifurcated and downgraded the region into two union territories: J&K and Ladakh. Despite National Conference leader Omar Abdullah storming to power in October 2024, New Delhi is loath to handover key executive powers to him.

Abdullah’s emissaries are pursuing back-channel negotiations with India’s Ministry of Home Affairs for restoration of statehood. A source close to Abdullah told The Diplomat that the talks “have been fruitful, and that there is 90 percent agreement on amendment of business rules,” which would transfer several important ministries from the purview of the New Delhi-nominated lieutenant governor – currently Manoj Sinha – to the chief minister.

But senior journalist Anuradha Bhasin is skeptical. “Is there even any credible indication of any such negotiations? If you look at the broader design of the BJP and [its ideological parent] the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh to establish a Hindu nation, they will want a less and less empowered Muslim-majority region,” Bhasin told The Diplomat. 

She added, “To be fair to Omar Abdullah, he operates with very little power and leverage, but he raised the hopes high when he campaigned. I wonder if he was naive then, or gullible now, or just timid.”

With the Modi government spearheading legislations to make elected representatives easily dispensable, one doubts it would soften its terms of engagement with Kashmir. 

Tensions are already riding high. Modi recently attracted a degree of public opprobrium for lending credence to the Israeli-U.S. military offensive – he traveled to Tel Aviv barely 48 hours before Iran was bombed. The reactions were marked in Kashmir, which observed a complete shutdown – a first since 2020 – to mourn the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The U.S. dictation of terms of India’s oil purchases further embarrassed Modi. These dynamics might keep New Delhi from offering a political compromise to Abdullah’s government, lest it should be seen as a step back in duress.

At any rate, Kashmir’s aspirations cannot be described merely in terms of securing statehood. That framing undersells the suppressed population’s pervasive anxieties, their internalized responses in the face of exclusion and targeted attacks, and their inability to express vulnerability and seek support within a system that criminalizes dissent even in its passive form. Kashmir needs guarantees of dignity, safeguard from physical harm, and restoration of not just statehood but also democratic platforms to express disagreements with the state, the absence of which has led to annihilation of people’s collective hope.

As Hindutva burgeons, there have been a spate of attacks on Kashmiris across India. In January, 17-year-old Tabish Ahmed, a shawl trader in Uttarakhand, was the latest to be targeted. The purpose of these attacks is to not merely inflict bodily injury. It is an assault on the psyche. It relays the demands of a majoritarian society from those it categorizes as the “other”: The acceptance of subordination. The acceptance of scrutiny. The acceptance of a social and political order where their right to life with dignity is contingent on the above condition, not guaranteed.

The state’s indifferent response to suck attacks generates impunity in the mind of the mob. The March 11 assassination attempt on former Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah by a Hindu attacker from point-blank range illustrated the scale of the problem. National Conference spokesperson Imran Dar described the attack as “culmination of decade-old hatred towards India’s prominent Kashmiri Muslim voice.”

Nasir Wani, a political adviser to the chief minister, said there must be accountability from the lieutenant government for the grave security lapse. Speaking with The Diplomat, Wani said the development underlined “why it is important to have law and order under the purview of the chief minister, which had been the case always.”

Sinha currently heads the police and bureaucracy. 

To be fair to Sinha, his administration oversaw the installation of efficient transportation networks, which have facilitated better access to services and tourism. Some businessmen who spoke with this reporter privately credited him for “eliminating separatist infrastructure,” which has “allowed businesses to thrive.”

But he has also attracted criticism for trying to usurp the elected government’s prerogatives. In April 2025, Sinha’s office transferred 48 officials of J&K administrative service without reference to Abdullah, who termed it “illegal.” 

Sinha’s band of bureaucrats have frequently terminated government employees over charges of abetting terrorism, which critics aver is part of the central government’s agenda to enforce self-censorship. Around 85 government employees have been terminated since 2020, often without opportunity to defend themselves. 

Overall, Abdullah has opted to repair ties with New Delhi and focus on areas of agreement. Given India’s steady slide into an “electoral autocracy,” marked by erosion of institutional autonomy and mainstream media’s relentless campaigns against opposition leaders, a head-on collision with New Delhi would not be helpful.

Abdullah’s critics, especially some elements from within his party, have decried his pragmatism as infirmity of purpose. They have expanded their own appeal to anxious crowds by everyday deployment of moral grandstanding. That is easy to effect. A crowd needing healing does not dissect politics in its layered context; it needs only an expression of combative rhetoric on its behalf. 

But combative rhetoric without enunciation of a well-chalked out strategy to address challenges is not very dissimilar to self-aggrandizing politics. The one making combative rhetoric earns a halo; his applauding audiences walk away with nothing.

Eminent scholar Siddiq Wahid underlined the futility of ill-timed combat way back in 2019, when Kashmir reeled under state-imposed curfew. “When there is an avalanche, don’t be a hero,” Wahid had famously quipped. But speaking with The Diplomat now, he warned: “There is also the danger of internalizing – and rationalizing – self-censorship if one were to permanently adhere to this philosophy.”

The path ahead for Kashmir’s cross-section of politicians is arduous. If they are serious about Kashmir’s future, they must jettison pugnacious power-plays, regroup, and leverage one another’s political strengths and advantages. But Waheed Parra, a senior leader of Peoples Democratic Party, said it is too late to unite. 

“It is a missed bus. The chief minister’s ‘I, me, myself’ fixation has normalized New Delhi’s restructuring of Kashmir’s polity. He has frittered the public mandate which was to fight back New Delhi,” Parra told The Diplomat. 

Bhasin added that a “unite to resist” campaign runs the risk of “perishing together” because you have a “very intolerant BJP which wants a submissive Jammu and Kashmir.”

Anando Bhakto is a senior journalist and columnist reporting on Kashmir and India’s national politics. He is based in New Delhi.

2024 Jammu and Kashmir assembly election

Jammu and Kashmir statehood

Omar Abdullah Jammu and Kashmir

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