The distinction between the “perceptual self” and “narrative self” points the way for future research on consciousness and the brain.
The central puzzle regarding consciousness and the brain is: How can something physical generate an experience of any kind? By experience, we mean basic consciousness—awareness of an object before one, of ringing in the ears, of pain, or of a childhood memory. These are experiences. Sometimes, these experiences are called “phenomenal states,” “sentience,” or “qualia.”
As far as we know, doorknobs and chairs do not have any experiences, and, presumably, computers don’t either. These experiences are achievements of the brain. The brain does something that allows for these experiences to occur. They do not come from nothing and don’t arise from just any circumstance, much as rainbows, televisions, and audio recordings do not. These experiences are somehow the achievement of neurons. There is overwhelming evidence that these experiences (i.e., basic consciousness) stem from the activities of the brain.
Basic consciousness is often contrasted with processes that are not associated with consciousness (e.g., the control of peristalsis or of the pupillary reflex). The empirical questions then become: What is special about the brain circuitry that leads to conscious states? Why does the circuitry for peristalsis and the pupillary reflex not cause these states?
Apart from basic consciousness, theorists sometimes speak of other forms of consciousness, such as the narrative self: “The identity that can be associated with a name, a history, and a future… For personal identity to exist, there has to be a personalized prior history, a thread of autobiographical memories, and a remembered past and a projected future” (Seth, 2021, p. 159). When one ruminates or comes up with a story about one’s life story, or is otherwise talking in one’s head, this is usually one’s narrative self. The verbal thoughts of the narrative self are often associated with that little voice inside one’s head, which is just one of many kinds of conscious thoughts. Some thoughts are not verbal but are, for example, visual.
It is important to note that the narrative self involves higher-order cognitive processes beyond that of basic consciousness. Basic consciousness would persist in the absence of the narrative self, as might occur, for example, during anesthetization of the left hemisphere in the Wada task. This remaining, basic consciousness might be the “perceptual self” without the involvement of the “narrative self.”
Moreover, “attentional” phenomena attributed to the self (e.g., purposely paying attention to something) would still arise in the absence of, say, the narrative self (Seth, 2021) or the associated “left-hemisphere interpreter” (Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978), which comes up with coherent explanations, whether correct or incorrect, for what transpires. A conscious “you,” with a sense of agency and volition, would still exist without the narrative self. There would still be a conscious field replete with perceptual experiences, urges, desires, attentional phenomena, and many kinds of conscious content. One is more than just the little voice within one’s head.
With the foregoing in mind, it is important to note that the mystery of basic consciousness (that is, how neural activity can give rise to an experience of any kind) would apply to conscious states lacking the sophisticated features or components (e.g., the narrative self) that are often part of conscious states. In other words, to explain basic consciousness, it is not necessary to explain how higher-order cognitions, such as those associated with the narrative self, arise. The challenge is simply to explain how an experience of any kind could arise from neural activities. The experience need not be a sophisticated one. It need not possess reasoning capability, involve sophisticated knowledge structures, have a long duration, be organized, or even have spatial extension (as occurs to some extent in olfaction).
Perhaps future insights and discoveries will reveal that one or more of these features is actually necessary, as a critical ingredient, for there to be any form of basic consciousness. However, at present, as far as we know, it seems that basic consciousness could still exist in some form and be equally mysterious when these higher-level features are absent. The distinction between the “perceptual self” and “narrative self” points the way for future research on consciousness and the brain. To figure out how the brain works, research should focus on the most basic of conscious experiences. A good analogy is that it is easier to “reverse engineer” and figure out how a car works by looking at an old Volkswagen Bug than by looking at a modern car, which has so many computerized components.
References
Gazzaniga, M. S., & LeDoux, J. E. (1978). The integrated mind. New York: Plenum Press.
Seth, A. (2021). Being you: A new science of consciousness. New York, NY: Dutton.
Consciousness Is More Than That Little Voice in Your Head
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10.05.2024
The distinction between the “perceptual self” and “narrative self” points the way for future research on consciousness and the brain.
The central puzzle regarding consciousness and the brain is: How can something physical generate an experience of any kind? By experience, we mean basic consciousness—awareness of an object before one, of ringing in the ears, of pain, or of a childhood memory. These are experiences. Sometimes, these experiences are called “phenomenal states,” “sentience,” or “qualia.”
As far as we know, doorknobs and chairs do not have any experiences, and, presumably, computers don’t either. These experiences are achievements of the brain. The brain does something that allows for these experiences to occur. They do not come from nothing and don’t arise from just any circumstance, much as rainbows, televisions, and audio recordings do not. These experiences are somehow the achievement of neurons. There is overwhelming evidence that these experiences (i.e., basic consciousness) stem from the activities of the brain.
Basic consciousness is often contrasted with processes that are not associated with consciousness (e.g., the control of peristalsis or of the pupillary reflex). The empirical........
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