The world’s non-proliferation architecture has never been perfect, but for decades it retained credibility. The basis for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the export control regimes that the NPT has spawned is that the states accept certain constraints in return for assurances. This credibility is now in jeopardy. The 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver for India—a country that has never ratified the NPT, has tested nuclear weapons, and has deceived over civilian nuclear projects—is not just a legal exception in procedure but a structural break in the rules-based approach to nuclear order. Nowhere are the consequences of this shift more acute than in South Asia.

Informal groupings and export control regimes have been created to regulate the export of sensitive technologies and to stop their diversion to weapons programs and non-state entities, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, and the NSG. They have become extremely significant in the post-Cold War era. The exposure of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, the September 11 attacks, and unregulated shipping lines exposed the alarming lack of oversight and added the fear of terrorists/non-state actors obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This led to the creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which focused on intelligence gathering and interdiction rather than binding legal frameworks. Obligations to prevent horizontal proliferation were also further institutionalized through the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.

Despite their limitations, these regimes have accomplished a great deal: they have organized and channelized the global arms trade, established transparency mechanisms, and significantly lowered the chances of non-state actors’ acquisition........

© Paradigm Shift