December 16, 1971—little said is better. It represents a cumulative failure of political, bu-reaucratic and military leadership.

Given the quantum of forces in East Pakistan and the po-larized political fabric that developed from 1947 to 1971, the outcome was inevitable. The question remains: why did it happen? I witnessed the storm building up in Pakistan in 1969–70, the onset of civil war and the subsequent Indian aggression. Lt Gen Kamal Matin de-scribes it as a monumental error of judgment. Political infighting and conspiracies by politi-cians, soon after Quaid’s death, to remain in power in collaboration with the bureaucracy opened the door to martial law.

The Agartala Conspiracy Case was genuine, not fabricated as often claimed by Bangladeshi and Indian authors (RAW papers, now re-released, indicate it was a legitimate charge). Evi-dence was held with Pakistani intelligence agencies. As ADC to Commander 2 Corps and later G3, I was privy to the events. Unfortunately, West Pakistani politicians pressured the government into releasing Mujib through a roundtable conference. After his release, Mujib became a hero in the eyes of the Bengali population.

Between 1967–69, Indira Gandhi decided to create subversion in East Pakistan after Mujib’s release. RAW, established in 1968, assigned its first head, K.A.O., a special task. Bengali media was infiltrated with support from Hindu elements in East Pakistan. University students, fully funded, became the vanguard. Combined with the media, they shaped public perception. Economic and linguistic fault lines were fully exploited. Pakistan Television in East Pakistan broadcast national songs glorifying Bengali nationalism without oversight, while the West Pakistani public remained unaware of these........

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