This week, Indonesia and the United States signed the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. Most of the negotiation debate focused on tariffs and market access. Far less attention went to Article 5.1 and its geopolitical impact.

That clause requires Indonesia to reflect US trade restrictions on third countries tied to American national security concerns. In practice, Jakarta could face sustained pressure to align with US sanctions. This creates friction with Indonesia’s long held free and active doctrine, which prioritises independence and active engagement across blocs.

Article 5.1 complicates that balance in concrete ways. It introduces the possibility that Indonesia’s trade posture toward the Middle East and North Africa could shift in response to decisions made in Washington rather than Jakarta.

Start with Iraq. Indonesia and Iraq have maintained diplomatic ties since 1950, when Jakarta opened its embassy in Baghdad. In recent years, officials from both sides have kept contacts active. They agreed on visa exemptions for diplomatic and service passport holders and discussed trade and investment channels, even if volumes remain limited. These steps preserve long term access and political goodwill. If Indonesia mirrors future US restrictions on Iraqi entities, even selectively, it risks narrowing that access and raising doubts in Baghdad about Jakarta’s policy autonomy.

Iran presents a more sensitive case. Indonesia and Iran marked seventy five years of diplomatic relations in 2025. Both countries are members of BRICS, and Tehran has signaled interest in deeper cooperation in science, technology, and health. Indonesian officials have previously framed engagement with Iran as a gateway to wider Middle Eastern markets. US sanctions on Iran remain broad and dynamic. If Washington expands them and expects compliance through Article 5.1, Jakarta could find itself restricting sectors it once sought to develop. That would weaken Indonesia’s credibility as a diversified partner and signal to other emerging economies that its room for maneuver has limits.

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Yemen tests Indonesia’s diplomatic positioning. Yemen was among the first Arab states to recognize Indonesian independence, giving the relationship symbolic weight. Indonesia has supported humanitarian approaches in Yemen’s prolonged conflict and has sought to maintain a neutral profile. That neutrality underpins its credibility with different Yemeni stakeholders. If Indonesia aligns automatically with US restrictions targeting specific actors or sectors in Yemen, it risks eroding that credibility. You cannot sustain a balanced role if one side sees your policy as externally driven.

Libya highlights the economic dimension. After years of limited engagement, Indonesia and Libya revitalized ties in late 2025 through the Second Indonesia Libya Joint Committee Meeting. They identified cooperation in trade, education, health, and infrastructure and signed a visa free arrangement for diplomatic and service passport holders. Indonesian firms have explored opportunities in Libya’s reconstruction process. Reconstruction environments are fluid and politically sensitive. If U.S. policy shifts toward certain Libyan entities and Indonesia must follow suit, the latter’s companies could lose contracts and long term positioning to competitors from less constrained states.

These cases sit within a broader regional pattern. Indonesia has deepened strategic cooperation with the United Arab Emirates and expanded outreach to Gulf Cooperation Council members. Many MENA governments now pursue multi vector foreign policies. They balance relations with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and other centers of power. They value partners who demonstrate similar flexibility and independence.

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If Indonesia appears structurally tied to US sanction frameworks, perceptions will change. Partners may question whether agreements signed in Jakarta can withstand policy shifts in Washington. Over time, that uncertainty affects investment decisions, diplomatic trust, and Indonesia’s standing within the Global South.

Economic cooperation with the United States brings tangible benefits. Access to a large consumer market supports growth, and investment and technology flows remain important for national development. Yet trade agreements that bind your commercial regime to another state’s security determinations narrow diplomatic space. They blur the boundary between economic integration and geopolitical alignment.

Indonesia has spent decades building a reputation as an independent actor across the region. That reputation translates into access, dialogue, and opportunity. Preserving those gains requires clear limits on how Article 5.1 will operate and transparent communication with MENA partners. Without that clarity, a deal designed to expand economic opportunity could instead constrain Indonesia’s strategic reach in the Middle East and North Africa.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

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