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While attending the NATO summit last week in Ankara, U.S. President Donald Trump announced his intent to reopen the possibility of selling F-35s to Turkey. But first, to do this, he had to contend with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Turkey was already under CAATSA sanctions for its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system and needed Trump to lift these restrictions if it was to receive the F-35. He decided to do so—and that decision has implications far beyond Turkey.

Passed by the U.S. Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support and signed into law by Trump during his first term in 2017, CAATSA creates what is effectively a secondary sanctions regime. It allows the president to punish foreign governments, companies, banks, and individuals engaging in “significant transactions” with Russia’s defense or intelligence sectors. The U.S. State Department maintains a list of entities in these sectors, including Rosoboronexport, Moscow’s principal state arms exporter. Although the law does not define “significant,” major purchases of Russian missile systems, combat aircraft, and other sophisticated weapons are obvious candidates.

While attending the NATO summit last week in Ankara, U.S. President Donald Trump announced his intent to reopen the possibility of selling F-35s to Turkey. But first, to do this, he had to contend with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Turkey was already under CAATSA sanctions for its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system and needed Trump to lift these restrictions if it was to receive the F-35. He decided to do so—and that decision has implications far beyond Turkey.

Passed by the U.S. Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support and signed into law by Trump during his first term in 2017, CAATSA creates what is effectively a secondary sanctions regime. It allows the president to punish foreign governments, companies, banks, and individuals engaging in “significant transactions” with Russia’s defense or intelligence sectors. The U.S. State Department maintains a list of entities in these sectors, including Rosoboronexport, Moscow’s principal state arms exporter. Although the law does not define “significant,” major purchases of Russian missile systems, combat aircraft, and other sophisticated weapons are obvious candidates.

Once an administration determines that such a transaction has occurred, CAATSA calls for at least five penalties from a menu of........

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