From Gulf Security To Regional Cooperation: Why The Muscat/Oman Process Matters – OpEd
The Gulf’s stability shapes global energy, trade and investment, yet the region lacks an inclusive mechanism for states with differing security views to communicate regularly and reduce miscalculation.
Drawing on the D-8’s experience of practical cooperation among diverse members, the author endorses a Muscat/Oman Process in which all eight littoral states—including Iran and Iraq—meet as equals, with Oman as facilitator, beginning with maritime safety, crisis communication and infrastructure protection rather than a finished security architecture.
The October 2026 Cambridge address by Oman’s foreign minister, calling for collective responsibility and a longer-term non-aggression pact, reinforces the case for regionally owned dialogue that complements, rather than excludes, external partnerships.
The current U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, as noted in Olga Algayerova’s and Ana Birchall’s recent texts, adds yet another layer of uncertainty to an already fragile regional security environment in West Asia. Such transitions inevitably create openings that different actors may seek to test or exploit. Oman’s Foreign Minister, Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, in his address at Cambridge on 26 October 2026, has likewise underscored the importance of inclusive regional security and collective responsibility among the Gulf’s littoral states.
This is precisely why the Muscat Process—as advocated by the Group of Friends since June 2026—is needed now more than ever: to preserve channels of communication and confidence before security gaps, such as those in Yemen, become new escalations.
The Gulf is often discussed as a security theatre in its own right. Yet its strategic significance extends far beyond the Gulf itself. It is a centre of global energy flows, maritime commerce and investment, while its stability has direct consequences for the wider Middle East, South Asia, Africa and the global economy. For countries of the Global South in particular, developments in the Gulf are not distant geopolitical events. They affect trade, energy security, investment, employment and connectivity. The global ripple effects of the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz since June 2026, and the further escalation of hostilities on the other flank of Arabian Peninsula – that one next to Bab el-Mandeb, is a classic example.
This broader perspective is familiar to those of us who have worked through the D-8 framework. The D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation brings together Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Türkiye (with Azerbaijan joining in March 2025)—meaning that half of its members have direct stakes in the Middle........
