By Yun Byung-se
Yun Byung-se
Fierce debates are under way in the United States and South Korea about North Korea’s latest moves and bluster. It is neither about missiles nor nuclear weapons, nor is it about the timing of the seventh nuclear test.
Rather, it is about Kim Jong-un’s redefinition of the inter-Korean relationship as “two belligerent states at war,” in a big departure from the decades-long principle of unity of the same Korean nation.
Defining South Korea as “enemy number one,” Kim announced that North Korea “will accelerate preparations for a major upheaval to secure the entire territory of the South by mobilizing all physical means and capabilities including nuclear forces." Various follow-up measures are now pacing on military, diplomatic and inter-Korean fronts to materialize his new declaration.
Such a turn of events triggered a diverse range of opinions within the academic and policy communities about possible scenarios and corresponding responses going forward.
A school of thought first held by a handful of former American policymakers equated Kim’s statements with “a strategic decision to go to war with South Korea” and a move towards Russia. One even warned that “nuclear war could break out in Northeast Asia in 2024.” They tend to lean towards the normalization of the North Korea-U.S. relations or compromising on nuclear issues.
The second school of thought, mostly held by conservative experts in the U.S. and South Korea, posits that while 2024 will be a year of living very dangerously, the prospect of a full-fledged war waged by Pyongyang is an overstatement. They point out that such a move will spell the end of the regime, given the unprecedentedly robust deterrence posture of the U.S. and South Korea.
The third school of thought, entertained by both conservative and progressive experts in Washington and Seoul, warns of high-intensity or hybrid provocations short of war. Some even anticipate a scenario beyond the level of torpedoing the ROK Navy ship Cheonan or the bombardment of Yeonpyeong island in 2010.
Last month, President Yoon Suk Yeol also warned of North Korea's "numerous provocations" such as “armed actions near the border, drone intrusions, cyber-attacks or spreading fake news to interfere in April's general elections.”
What is reassuring is that the ROK–U.S. authorities and their partners are continuously updating their assessment of various scenarios and gearing up integrated deterrence as well as intensive diplomatic and intelligence efforts.
Alongside such reassessments, Kim’s new game demands thorough and cool-headed analyses of the key factors that motivate and embolden the North Korean leader at this particular juncture.
First and foremost, the latest move represents his shrewd game plan to exploit ongoing polycrises around the world. The prolonged Ukraine-Russian War, intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition and forthcoming elections in South Korea and the U.S. are a few examples.
It is no wonder that Kim joined the chorus of calls that the current international order is a “New Cold War” because this is the most favorable external environment since he took power in 2012. In an increasingly fragmenting world, he is in high demand from Russia and China who see more value in North Korea vis-a-vis their confrontations with the U.S.
China changed its distancing policy in 2018 when it was caught off guard by the announcement of the first U.S.-DPRK summit. Beijing rushed to invite Kim over and it became Pyongyang’s quiet patron ever since.
Now, Russia took over the baton regarding major patronage in a suspicious deal with North Korea during Kim’s visit to Russia last September. Moscow’s need for North Korea’s surplus munitions for use on the Ukraine front and Pyongyang’s desire for Russian economic and military technology assistance are the key drivers. In this sense, some regard the Russo-North Korean relationship as transactional or marriage of convenience, rather than a strategic partnership or alliance.
However, caution is in order here. It may go beyond our imagination. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made it clear in Pyongyang last October that their bilateral relationship has “reached a qualitatively new and strategic level.” President Putin’s impending visit to Pyongyang will be a crowning moment in upgrading their relations to unprecedented heights. As Kim dubbed this relationship as a foremost one, Putin’s visit is likely to not only expand the scope of their agenda but also institutionalize such bonds perhaps in strategic and other dimensions as Lavrov already hinted at.
Such an evolving relationship, combined with the no limit Russo-Chinese strategic partnership, also has reverberating geopolitical implications in the region. The formation of a trilateral strategic partnership among these three countries in any form could give North Korea ample maneuvering room. Kim will no longer need to bother about sanctions, tech high-jacking, or even food and energy emergencies, which are available from its cohorts. As a matter of fact, the U.N. Security Council has been paralyzed in the face of North Korea’s blatant violations concerning its resolutions since 2018.
For him, the U.S. presidential election could be another opportunity to tilt the balance to his advantage and deal with the U.S. directly. Regardless of who wins, Kim will try to close out South Korea and seek nuclear weapon state status using its nuclear and missile capabilities as bargaining chips. A nuclear arms reduction deal will be a good deal for him. No deal or no negotiation will not matter to him either, as long as he can continue to bulk up his nuclear arsenal and rely on renewed solidarity with two big saviors to counter ROK-U.S.-Japan security ties.
Last, but not least, since a bipartisan top priority of the U.S. in the coming decade will remain the Sino-American strategic competition, Kim will keep this precious wild card to pull in China and play the U.S. against its allies and partners. His eyes will also be focused on how conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, the Red Sea, and the Taiwan Strait will divert attention and resources away from the Korean Peninsula.
As described above, there will be “known unknowns’ and “unknown unknowns” in our reading of Kim’s calculus. Nevertheless, we will surely be able to outsmart and outmaneuver North Korea. The year 2023 was a historic year for the ROK-U.S. alliance and the trilateral security partnership between the ROK, the U.S. and Japan. We should further solidify such achievements in a coherent and irreversible way to navigate the troubled waters to a secure future.
The latest announcement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Cuba, North Korea's cherished brother country, augurs well.
Yun Byung-se, a former foreign minister of South Korea (2013-17), is now Chairman of Seoul International Law Academy (SILA), a board member of the Korea Peace Foundation and a member of several ex-global leaders' forums and task forces, including the Astana Forum and its Consultative Council.
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