Analysts of Russia differ about many things, but the most important difference concerns their interpretation of the roots of Russia’s ongoing aggression. One side argues that Russian history and political culture are to blame — or, to put it more simply, uniquely Russian characteristics are the cause of Russian aggression. The other side argues that the causes are not uniquely Russian, but typical of the behavior of certain kinds of states, regimes, societies and leaders.
Unsurprisingly, historians of Russia and Ukraine tend to fall into the first camp, while political scientists with a comparative bent tend to fall into the second camp. Equally unsurprisingly, the first camp sees no easy solutions to Russia’s current behavior, precisely because it’s just a continuation of an age-old pattern of Russian behavior inspired by the inalterable Russian soul.
After all, nations and cultures can’t just escape the all-embracing chains of their history and culture simply because it would be to their advantage to do so, especially if they truly believe in their spiritual uniqueness.
In contrast, social scientists are often somewhat more bullish about Russia’s prospects of change. Other countries have abandoned centuries of authoritarianism, so why not Russia? It may not be easy, but it’s surely possible, with the right array of policies and under the appropriate conditions.
Wilhelmine Germany became Weimar Germany, which became Nazi Germany, which ultimately morphed into democratic Germany. Why shouldn’t the Russians, who think of themselves as unique, just as Germans used to, abandon their obsessions and become a run-of-the-mill nation?
So, who’s right? Alas, both perspectives are, and that’s why there is no easy answer to the problem of Russian imperialism.
Consider the following two counterfactuals. First, imagine that Putin and his regime disappear tomorrow. Would the Russian urge to expand automatically cease? No. Would that urge automatically result in imperialist policies? Probably not, but the danger would always be there as long as Russian political culture remained imperialist.
Second, imagine that the imperialist political culture disappears tomorrow but everything else stays the same. Would Putin withdraw his troops from Ukraine and abjure imperialism? Of course not. Would he continue with his genocidal war and possibly take it to the Baltic states, Moldova and Poland? Very likely, yes, though perhaps not immediately.
Russia thus suffers from two mutually reinforcing syndromes: an imperialist political culture that promotes imperialism and an imperialist neo-Nazi regime that promotes an imperialist political culture by means of coercion and propaganda.
How can this vicious circle be broken? Since Russian history is the history of imperialism and imperial political culture, breaking that circle won’t be easy. Ideally, Russia would experience a humiliating total defeat in its war against Ukraine. Defeat would discredit the regime and its policies and begin to chip away at the culture that made war possible. The example of Nazi Germany comes to mind: Total defeat destroyed the Nazi regime, but not the political culture, which took another three decades to change.
Short of total defeat, a partial defeat might help, though the regime and many Russians would likely claim that their survival is testimony to the duplicity of the West, the Russophobia of Ukraine, the temporary failings of Russian policymakers and the ultimate necessity of an imperial mindset and an imperialist policy.
Most of Russia’s immediate neighbors understand that Russia’s imperialist inclinations won’t go away anytime soon. They, and the world, will have to live with a neighbor that covets territory and endeavors to acquire it. The likelihood of imperialism persisting in Russian minds and politics therefore means that, unless the West is willing to pursue total victory, it will have to settle for second best: containment.
Russia’s neighbors — the former Soviet non-Russian republics — would have to be armed militarily and supported economically to serve as an effective cordon sanitaire. The solution is simple to imagine, but, given the West’s reluctance to expend resources on foreign policy entanglements, it will have to prioritize and devote its efforts to the countries that matter most to its own security and survival: Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, which will have to be weaned off Russia after its authoritarian president, Alexander Lukashenko, leaves politics. In the final analysis, all three will have to either join the European Union and NATO or be sufficiently strengthened to be able to deter a Russian attack.
But there may be a glimmer of hope in an otherwise depressing picture. Perhaps taking his cue from Leonid Brezhnev’s mismanagement of the Soviet Union, Putin is rapidly transforming Russia into an unviable state, society and economy, thereby undermining its capacity to expand and win wars. That may be the most stable solution to the Russian imperialist drive: Mother Russia’s self-transformation into a loud-mouthed banana republic with delusions of grandeur.
Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as “Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires” and “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.”
Is the problem Putin’s Russia or Mother Russia?
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28.03.2024
Analysts of Russia differ about many things, but the most important difference concerns their interpretation of the roots of Russia’s ongoing aggression. One side argues that Russian history and political culture are to blame — or, to put it more simply, uniquely Russian characteristics are the cause of Russian aggression. The other side argues that the causes are not uniquely Russian, but typical of the behavior of certain kinds of states, regimes, societies and leaders.
Unsurprisingly, historians of Russia and Ukraine tend to fall into the first camp, while political scientists with a comparative bent tend to fall into the second camp. Equally unsurprisingly, the first camp sees no easy solutions to Russia’s current behavior, precisely because it’s just a continuation of an age-old pattern of Russian behavior inspired by the inalterable Russian soul.
After all, nations and cultures can’t just escape the all-embracing chains of their history and culture simply because it would be to their advantage to do so, especially if they truly believe in their spiritual uniqueness.
In contrast, social scientists are often somewhat more bullish about Russia’s prospects of change. Other countries have abandoned centuries of authoritarianism, so why not Russia? It may not be easy, but it’s surely possible, with the right array of policies and under the appropriate conditions.
........
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