Trump’s Venezuela operation sends a message: stay out of America’s sphere of influence
A United States flag flutters behind protesters outside the U.S. embassy, during a protest against the country's military operation in Venezuela, in Pretoria, South Africa, Jan. 8, 2026.Alet Pretorius/Reuters
Shlomo Ben-Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister, is vice-president of the Toledo International Center for Peace and the author of Prophets Without Honor: The 2000 Camp David Summit and the End of the Two-State Solution.
One year into his second presidency, Donald Trump has established himself as the most revolutionary U.S. president in recent history. Whereas “America First” once seemed like an isolationist posture (not least to Mr. Trump’s MAGA base), it is now clear that it embraces a Hobbesian world view, in which the powerful United States extracts whatever it wants from those it deems weak.
In the world this view describes, the U.S. is unlikely to engage in direct military clashes with “peer” powers, such as China, or with nuclear states, such as Russia and North Korea. It will compete with other superpowers over resources and advanced technologies, lest they become more “super” than the U.S. But, for the most part, Mr. Trump will probably limit his involvement in their “spheres of influence” – as long as they stay out of what he considers to be America’s.
But, in Mr. Trump’s view, they are not; China’s presence in Latin America is increasingly seen as a strategic threat. It invested billions in Brazil, brought Colombia into its global Belt and Road Initiative, and invested generously in Argentina’s production of lithium chloride, a key component in battery production. China also replaced American soybean exporters by doubling its purchases from Brazil (up to US$50-billion), from which it also buys iron ore, and has made Peru’s Chancay Port the centrepiece of its physical logistics in the region. Its e-commerce with Latin America also surged by some 50 per cent in 2025, while tying digital infrastructure to China’s goals of data sovereignty, control over cybersecurity, and expansion of its surveillance capacity. If this were not enough, China has also significantly expanded its military presence across the continent through arms sales, training programs, and strategic partnerships, notably with Venezuela.
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