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China’s Military Reforms Since 2015: Is Time on Its Side?

5 0
29.12.2025

After several years of planning and doctrinal experimentation, on the last day of 2015, the Chinese armed forces (the People’s Liberation Army, People’s Armed Police, and militia) began its most sweeping series of reforms since the 1950s when it adopted the Soviet military organization structure

The new reforms sought to better prepare the force for deterrence, warfighting, and non-war military actions both in defense of People’s Republic of China’s territory and at increasing distances beyond its borders. Civilian sector cooperation (military-civil fusion, subsumed under the new concept of “Integrated National Strategic Systems and Capabilities”) is essential to provide the personnel, modern weapons (now nearly all produced domestically), logistics, and political support necessary to conduct integrated joint operations in multiple domains (land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, and information).

These reforms were expected to be accomplished within five years as part of a longer-term “three step strategy” that extends through 2035 and all the way until 2049. While the bulk of structural reforms and personnel reductions were completed by 2020, additional adjustments have continued and more can be expected to keep up with advances in technology and changes in the domestic and international environments.

National and Theater Level Reforms

The initial tranche of reforms was intended to increase the ability of the PLA to conduct joint operations while decreasing the dominating influence of the Army and transforming the force to become technology intensive. This included a reduction of 300,000 personnel, about half of whom were officers, mostly from the Army. That left an active duty force with an end-strength of about 2 million. Concurrently, the number and proportion of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and non-active duty, uniformed civilian staff was expanded.

At the top of the PLA’s chain of command when reforms began, the Central Military Commission (CMC) comprised a chairman, Xi Jinping; an Army general and an Air Force general as vice chairmen, plus five Army generals and the commanders of the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery as members. Reforms expanded the CMC staff, making it a joint organization consisting of 15 departments, offices, and commissions, replacing the former four General Departments to perform national-level military planning and control functions. Separately, the Ministry of National Defense (led by a member of the CMC) was responsible for interactions with foreign militaries and coordination with other elements of China’s government.

The seven Army-centric Military Regions were disbanded and five joint Theater Commands established. Whereas previously the General Departments served as Army headquarters, a new national-level Army headquarters was formed – in effect, a demotion for the Army, which was now at the same protocol level as the Navy, Air Force, and newly designated Rocket Force. Under the command of the CMC, the Theater Commands are “responsible for military operations” while the services focus “on developing capabilities,” such as organizing, training, and equipping their units, and can be tasked to perform single-service operations.

Two nominally joint forces also were created: the Strategic Support Force (SSF, comprised of space, cyber/network, and information elements) and the Joint Logistics Support Force, with one base per Theater Command. The majority of personnel in these two new forces wear Army uniforms but are not counted on the Army’s rolls.

The Chinese government has not officially released the specific personnel numbers for any of the services or the support forces. (Most foreign analyses use figures compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance.) In 2017, the Army was reported to “account for less than half of the armed forces.” The 2019 white paper “China’s National Defense in the New Era” stated the Air Force was “maintained at a steady number,” and the Navy and Rocket Force numbers were “moderately increased.” Over the past decade, Army units and personnel have been transferred to expand the size of the Navy’s Marine Corps, while most of the Navy shore-based aviation and air defense units have been........

© The Diplomat