Andrey Kortunov: “For the Conflict to End, the Sides Need to Negotiate Some Compromises”

We present to you an exclusive interview with Soviet and Russian political scientist and public figure, candidate of historical sciences, and expert of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Andrei Vadimovich Kortunov, for New Eastern Outlook.

– Andrey Vadimovich, the bombing of Iran by American and Israeli forces has now been going on for more than two weeks. Tehran is launching retaliatory strikes, including against American bases in Middle Eastern countries. The death toll is already in the hundreds, and the level of escalation is only increasing. Is it possible that the conflict could expand with the addition of US allies to the military operation? And who has a better chance of winning?

– I think that at this point we can state that both sides are moving along the path of both vertical and horizontal escalation of the conflict. In particular, if we talk about the tactics chosen by the Islamic Republic of Iran, it involves striking not only directly at the nearest military installations of the United States or Israel, not only at the US naval forces stationed near the Iranian coast, but also at more distant American bases in the territory of the Gulf countries, at the energy and transport infrastructure of these countries, and also at commercial American facilities located there, for example, branches of American banks and offices of large American companies. Of course, all this leads to the Arab countries that have allied relations with the United States becoming, one way or another, involved in this conflict. Significant damage has already been inflicted on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, etc.

On the other hand, if you look at the American strategy, we see that Trump is trying to actively involve not only his regional allies in the conflict, but also his partners in Europe. In particular, Trump considers it necessary for the European members of NATO to take part in the operation to clear the Strait of Hormuz, apparently proceeding from the assumption that Europe, more than anyone else, is interested in ensuring that both Saudi oil and Qatari gas flow uninterrupted to European markets. So far, we see that the Europeans are ready to participate only in the defensive dimension of the military conflict; that is, they are ready to provide assistance in protecting American and Israeli installations in the Gulf countries from attacks by Iranian ballistic missiles and drones. But they are not yet ready to participate in offensive operations, that is, in striking Iran itself.

Furthermore, as far as one can tell at the moment, the idea that Europeans, as well as the Japanese or South Koreans, would take some feasible part in patrolling the Strait of Hormuz is not generating much enthusiasm. Some countries seem in principle willing to discuss this idea, but in most cases Trump has encountered a clear reluctance on the part of his partners to engage with this issue, even though these partners possess some naval capabilities. Therefore, escalation is certainly happening, but this escalation has its limits.

– What should we expect in the near future – negotiations or an even greater escalation? How do you assess the position of the Arab monarchies? Will they really turn away from the U.S.?

– It seems to me that the potential for escalation will be limited not only by the positions of the countries that the Americans are currently trying to drag into this conflict, but also by certain physical constraints. For instance, the United States, and Iran as well, could deplete their stockpiles of the most actively used weapons. This applies to missiles and drones. Missile defense systems could also reach the limit of their capabilities. In that case, the conflict would likely begin to run out of steam. This doesn’t mean an official truce will be reached, let alone any kind of agreement for a final settlement of the conflict, but it could mean that the intensity of strikes from both sides will gradually decrease while the current situation remains, meaning while a state of war continues to exist between Iran and the established anti-Iranian coalition.

As for the Arab monarchies, I don’t think they’ll be able to turn away from the United States, because the United States, at this moment and probably for the foreseeable future, remains the main, and in many cases, the sole external guarantor of these monarchies’ security. Yes, of course, from time to time, the Gulf countries attempt to somehow diversify their security ties. For example, last September, Saudi Arabia signed a security agreement with Pakistan. But at this point, you can’t really talk about any reliable replacement for the United States. So the Arabs will be forced to continue their engagement with the United States, purchase weapons, station American troops on their territory, and support the diverse infrastructure of such cooperation.

However, it is certainly necessary to take into account that what is happening today ultimately undermines the reliability of U.S. security guarantees to the Gulf states. Undoubtedly, everyone notices that the United States was unable to prevent strikes on the territory of these countries. And strikes on these countries, in turn, mean that the Gulf states are ceasing to be exemplary islands of stability in the stormy sea of the Middle East. This, of course, has a very strong impact on the investment climate, international tourism, air travel, and other sectors of the local economy.

Moreover, in the Gulf countries, the question naturally keeps arising: who is more important to the United States as an ally? Them or Israel? And the conclusion is often drawn that the Americans are far more concerned with ensuring the security of the Jewish state than with the security of their Arab partners in the Gulf zone. This also undermines confidence that U.S. security guarantees will remain reliable in the future.

So, to answer your question, I’d say that in the immediate future, of course, the Arab monarchies won’t turn away from the United States, but doubts about America as an indispensable partner will grow, and certainly, the Arabs will look for ways to diversify their security ties.

– If the nuclear threat was truly neutralized in 2025, then why is Washington unleashing a new war against Tehran today? Perhaps the answer lies not in the goal of non-proliferation, but in a broader strategic objective to ensure that Iran can never challenge Israel’s military and geopolitical dominance in the Middle East?

– Indeed, after the 12-day war last June, triumphant statements came from the U.S. leadership and from Israel that Iran’s nuclear program had been set back by many years, maybe even decades, that all the goals of the military operation had been successfully achieved, and that the Iranian threat was now off the agenda for a while. That was all just a few months ago. Now, the recent actions by Washington and Tel Aviv show that, in reality, things probably aren’t exactly as they were portrayed last summer.

It should be noted here that, possibly under pressure from Israel, or possibly for other reasons, the United States has apparently radically expanded the scope of its objectives regarding Iran. And if last year the main focus was on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, particularly the goal of preventing uranium enrichment work, and strikes were indeed carried out on the production centers for this enriched uranium, now, judging by both the geography of the strikes being carried out and the political declarations of President Trump, the United States is setting much broader goals. These goals include not only inflicting maximum damage on Iran’s nuclear program, not only damaging Iran’s ballistic missile program, which has also always raised concerns in Israel and the U.S., and not even just limiting Tehran’s ability to conduct an active policy in the Middle East region, which was considered and continues to be considered unacceptable by Israel and the U.S. Today, the talk is about regime change in the country.

We know that regime change plans in the Islamic Republic have been in the works in Israel for quite some time, but for Washington, this is somewhat of a new development. This is because Donald Trump, it was previously believed, differed from President Joe Biden precisely in that issues of political regimes and human rights in foreign states were never a priority for him. He always advocated, or at least always stated his readiness to work with any political regime, as long as that regime didn’t undermine the interests of the United States. Now we see that, at least regarding Iran, this position has shifted, and the Trump administration has essentially aligned itself with Israel in its quest to eliminate the current political regime, which is perceived as fundamentally anti-Israel and one with which the Jewish state finds coexistence, in principle, impossible.

Of course, it’s not a given at all that such a maximalist objective won’t be reconsidered at some point, because currently there is no indication that a change of political regime in Iran is possible in the near future. But for now, we see Trump insisting that he gets to determine who exactly will govern the Islamic Republic in the future. This intention is, of course, significantly different from the more limited objectives that were set back in June 2025.

– Iran’s oil facilities have not been destroyed yet. Could this indicate that Washington sees them as potential targets for capture?

– If we assume that the initial plan for this operation was supposed to resemble the operation to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro—that is, the idea was to eliminate one or several individuals from the top political leadership and then begin negotiations with those who would replace the eliminated leaders—then the desire to preserve Iran’s energy infrastructure as much as possible looks quite logical and natural. After all, in Venezuela, during the U.S. operation, no damage was done to the oil infrastructure.

But now, since it’s already obvious that the operation against Iran has taken a completely different path, that it’s not the Venezuela model, and that the conflict could potentially be prolonged, it’s not entirely clear how realistic plans to seize Iran’s oil and energy infrastructure actually are. To capture that infrastructure, one would essentially have to carry out a very large-scale ground operation, occupying, if not all, then a significant portion of the Islamic Republic. Iran is a large country with a population of 90 million people. It’s a country with complex terrain. And, of course, such an operation would require a massive deployment of forces and would inevitably involve significant casualties. Therefore, seizing Iran’s oil infrastructure is a colossal undertaking that would be extremely, extremely difficult to pull off.

If we’re talking about seizing certain individual elements of the oil infrastructure, say, the part located on islands in the Persian Gulf, that’s probably more realistic. Military experts most often mention the islands of Qeshm, Hormuz, and Kharg. These islands are of strategic importance due to their location in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, as well as the presence of infrastructure crucial for Iran and the global energy sector. Although even such a limited operation would likely entail substantial losses. But to bring Iranian energy under your control, you would probably need to occupy Iran entirely and for a long time. I don’t think even Trump should have any hope of succeeding in such an occupation.

– Currently, combat operations are in full swing, and they will continue until all objectives are met. That’s according to a statement from the American leader. What can we expect from the White House in the near future, and how can this war be stopped?

– We, of course, don’t know exactly what tactics President Trump will use going forward or whether he has enough resources to continue military operations at the pace they’ve been going for almost three weeks now. But it’s possible we may face a situation where the intensity of the fighting starts to decrease due to material constraints and potentially rising casualties, yet without a definitive end to the conflict. In other words, the conflict would continue, but perhaps with somewhat less intensity and greater selectivity in strikes from both sides. In that case, it can’t be ruled out that the conflict could become long-term. That is, it might last not just weeks, but months, with possible cycles of escalation and subsequent de-escalation.

As for how to stop this war… To stop the war, both sides need to step back somewhat from their maximalist expectations for the war’s outcome. That means the United States must ultimately abandon the idea of changing the political regime of the Islamic Republic, because regime change essentially implies the prospect of the disintegration of Iranian statehood. Naturally, no one in Tehran is prepared to go along with that, including even the majority of opposition political forces. Iran, for its part, must also abandon its maximalist demands, which at this point entail not just a cessation of hostilities by the United States and Israel, but also the withdrawal of all U.S. armed forces from the Middle East region, the payment of reparations to the Islamic Republic, the complete lifting of Western sanctions against Iran, and so on.

So it’s clear that neither the American maximalist goals nor the Iranian ones can be achieved in the near future. Therefore, for the conflict to end, it will apparently be necessary to negotiate some sort of compromise. Although, given what has happened in recent weeks, any negotiations on this topic, whenever they might begin, will inevitably be very difficult and, in all likelihood, not very quick.

P.S. Is the strike on Iran actually a strike on China? What are the risks for China and its projects, and does it have any leverage over the current situation in the region? Read about this in the second part of our exclusive interview with Valdai Club expert Andrei Vadimovich Kortunov.

Interviewed by Yulia NOVITSKAYA, writer, journalist, and correspondent for New Eastern Outlook

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