For many Americans, war with Iran is still explained through a dangerously simple story: foreign pressure turns the people against their government, bombs open the road to “freedom” and, sooner or later, Iranian streets rise up to applaud Washington and Tel Aviv. This is not analysis. It is geopolitical fantasy.

What the past two years have shown, from the 12-day war of June 2025 to the current US-Israeli confrontation with Iran in 2026, is far more complex. Foreign attack does not automatically widen the gap between state and society in favour of the attacker. More often, it strengthens national sentiment, deepens the sense of siege and pushes even many critics of the government into a defensive posture.

This does not mean that Iranians are satisfied with all of their government’s policies. Reuters field reporting has described anger at decision-makers, exhaustion from sanctions and war, and deep economic strain. Yet the same reporting recorded a more important fact: after Israel’s attacks in June 2025, there was no sign of widespread street protest against the Islamic Republic. Some government critics even said foreign attack had pushed them towards a stronger sense of national solidarity in the face of external aggression.

That distinction matters. Domestic dissatisfaction is not the same as welcoming foreign bombardment.

That distinction matters. Domestic dissatisfaction is not the same as welcoming foreign bombardment.

The same pattern appears in the current war. On 3 April, 2026, Reuters reported that Iranian officials were present among street gatherings and night-time rallies. These gatherings did not prove national consensus, but they did undermine the claim that Iran’s domestic legitimacy would collapse immediately under attack. Some participants were loyal supporters of the state. Some simply opposed the bombing of their country. Others were connected to official structures. Iran’s streets were not a........

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