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Will German Rearmament Save Europe?

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13.11.2026

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During NATO’s formative years, the U.S. military commitment to the old continent was a tenuous thing. Dwight Eisenhower, appointed the first supreme allied commander of Europe in 1950, argued—amid a vicious debate in Washington over committing additional divisions to Europe—that American forces should only act as a bridge until Europe stepped up to defend itself. If the United States still had troops in Europe 10 years hence, he said in 1951, then the trans-Atlantic project would be a failure.

Ike’s forecast, it seems, was wrong on both counts. Seventy-five years on, roughly 80,000 U.S. troops remain on the continent. Yet few would regard the alliance as a failure. The U.S. military commitment succeeded in guaranteeing Europe’s freedom and keeping the Soviets at bay. But Europe never fully shouldered the burden of its own defense.

During NATO’s formative years, the U.S. military commitment to the old continent was a tenuous thing. Dwight Eisenhower, appointed the first supreme allied commander of Europe in 1950, argued—amid a vicious debate in Washington over committing additional divisions to Europe—that American forces should only act as a bridge until Europe stepped up to defend itself. If the United States still had troops in Europe 10 years hence, he said in 1951, then the trans-Atlantic project would be a failure.

Germany Rearmed: The Return of War and the End of Illusions, Liana Fix, Oxford University Press, 216 pp., $34.99, November 2026

Ike’s forecast, it seems, was wrong on both counts. Seventy-five years on, roughly 80,000 U.S. troops remain on the continent. Yet few would regard the alliance as a failure. The U.S. military commitment succeeded in guaranteeing Europe’s freedom and keeping the Soviets at bay. But Europe never fully shouldered the burden of its own defense.

Old assumptions, however, are finally changing. Squeezed by both a volatile Washington and voracious Moscow, Europe has finally awoken to its security dilemma: Its defense spending has nearly doubled in six years in real terms, from 242 billion euros in 2020 to 454 billion euros in 2026. If by 2035 Europe fully meets its NATO military expenditure target—spending 3.5 percent of GDP on defense (compared to the little more than 2 percent that it spends today)—then the surge in annual spending will rival the scale of the Marshall Plan relative to Europe’s GDP.

As Council on Foreign Relations scholar Liana Fix argues in her incisive new book, Germany Rearmed, the central protagonist in this story is Berlin. Germany has doubled defense spending since 2021 and accounts for more than a quarter of the European Union’s increase over that period. Based on its current budget, by 2029, Germany will spend more on its military than France and the U.K. today spend combined.

But is a rearmed Germany, in fact, a good thing for Europe and the world? Fix makes a compelling case that Berlin shedding its “myth of pacifism” is in the best interest of both Europe and the United States. But risks abound. A militarily empowered Germany has centrifugal potential, threatening friction with prickly France and anxious neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe if the rearmament is not executed within a broader European framework. And if the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party eventually takes the reins of what will be one of the world’s most powerful militaries, it would reawaken historical nightmares.

Germany Rearmed gives proper airing to the consequences and challenges of German rearmament, often left unanalyzed amid general backslapping about surging European defense spending. The U.S. commitment to Europe is ultimately unsustainable at current levels as Washington focuses on growing threats in the........

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