Even as their invasion of Ukraine continues, Russian forces are increasingly testing European defenses with drones, manned aircraft, and warships. These are not merely mistakes or simple reconnaissance operations—they’re an attempt to normalize intrusion. And behind each probe sits a retooled and increasingly efficient military-industrial machine: shipyards churning out ice-capable submarines, missile factories running three shifts to stockpile long-range strike weapons, and explosives plants expanding to strategic scale.

A closer look at Moscow’s military procurement decisions highlights why Europe must prepare for a campaign of sustained Russian pressure well beyond Ukraine. Within Russia’s naval and missile sectors, which matter most for the European theater, three alarming trends are visible: rapid growth in production facilities, clear prioritization of strategic platforms, and investments aimed at long-term operational endurance rather than a short wartime surge.

Even as their invasion of Ukraine continues, Russian forces are increasingly testing European defenses with drones, manned aircraft, and warships. These are not merely mistakes or simple reconnaissance operations—they’re an attempt to normalize intrusion. And behind each probe sits a retooled and increasingly efficient military-industrial machine: shipyards churning out ice-capable submarines, missile factories running three shifts to stockpile long-range strike weapons, and explosives plants expanding to strategic scale.

A closer look at Moscow’s military procurement decisions highlights why Europe must prepare for a campaign of sustained Russian pressure well beyond Ukraine. Within Russia’s naval and missile sectors, which matter most for the European theater, three alarming trends are visible: rapid growth in production facilities, clear prioritization of strategic platforms, and investments aimed at long-term operational endurance rather than a short wartime surge.

Unless NATO shifts from reactive responses to a forward-leaning, credible form of deterrence—enforced red lines, offensive reach, and sustained support for Ukraine’s drone innovation—Moscow will continue dictating the terms of confrontation long past the current phase of its war against Kyiv.

Russia’s Black Sea fleet has been badly mauled by Ukraine’s maritime drones and long-range strikes. Furthermore, it cannot easily replace those losses, thanks to the choke point in the Bosporus. Turkey, a NATO ally, has closed the straits to belligerent warships since 2022 under the terms of the Montreux Convention—a state of affairs virtually guaranteed to last until the end of the war.

If Russia were indeed focused exclusively on Ukraine, one might expect to see it deprioritize naval shipbuilding and focus on land systems and aircraft production instead. But instead, despite sanctions and chronic inefficiency, Russia’s........

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