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The United States spent decades condemning spheres of influence as archaic relics of a darker age. Now it’s claiming one.

The Trump administration has announced it will “run” Venezuela after capturing President Nicolás Maduro, following up on its pledge to add a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Unencumbered by international responses that are heavy on rhetoric and light on substance, Washington thus joins the very rivals it once lectured in claiming exclusivity in its own neighborhood. An international order based on spheres of influence may soon sit alongside or, according to some, replace the liberal “rules-based” one.

The United States spent decades condemning spheres of influence as archaic relics of a darker age. Now it’s claiming one.

The Trump administration has announced it will “run” Venezuela after capturing President Nicolás Maduro, following up on its pledge to add a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Unencumbered by international responses that are heavy on rhetoric and light on substance, Washington thus joins the very rivals it once lectured in claiming exclusivity in its own neighborhood. An international order based on spheres of influence may soon sit alongside or, according to some, replace the liberal “rules-based” one.

Some commentators have suggested that as unsavory as this whole business might be, embracing spheres of influence is a pragmatic way to reduce the dangers of great-power competition. But this conflates the stability provided by a spheres-of-influence system with the violence that attends competing spheres-of-influence claims.

Spheres of influence can indeed stabilize great-power relations—but only when they are mutually recognized. Without broad great-power buy-in, spheres instead become flash points for competing powers. What’s more, spheres of influence are widely

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