In contemporary international relations, security is not just something countries seek for themselves. It is also a concept they use to justify controlling, constraining, and directing others’ behavior. When political scientists speak of “securitization,” they refer to a process through which a particular issue is portrayed as an existential threat justifying extraordinary measures instead of something that governments can address through normal politics.

The Islamic Republic of Iran serves as a perfect illustration. Over the last two decades, Israel and the United States have tried to persuade the world to stop treating Iran as a normal country and to instead treat it like the international system’s leading danger. The result has been constant denunciations, crushing sanctions, threats of military action, and, most recently, military operations against its territory—carried out during diplomatic negotiations between Tehran and Washington. Iran, in response, has been forced to devote more resources and attention to defense. It also increased uranium enrichment in defiance, to show that it would not be pressured into submission. The external securitization of Iran has fed into a parallel dynamic at home, as the state adopted a stricter approach in dealing with domestic social challenges, responding to these challenges with tighter restrictions.

The result is a securitization cycle: a vicious spiral in which Iran and its adversaries feel compelled to adopt more hostile policies in response to each other’s behavior. This phenomenon is somewhat like the security dilemma, in which one government’s decision to bolster its capabilities prompts others to do the same. But with the security dilemma, each side is reacting to material increases in the other’s capacity. This cycle begins with rhetoric. The target country is portrayed as a threat, and then is treated as a threat. And in response, it turns to activities—such as bolstering its missile capabilities or increasing enrichment—that can be used to corroborate the initial allegation. The cycle, in other words, produces a self-fulfilling prophecy. The securitized country gradually distances itself from independent agency and becomes trapped in a series of reactive behaviors.

Breaking this cycle will not be easy, and it will require that foreign powers respect Iran’s rights and dignity and stop constantly defaming, threatening, and coercing a millennia-old civilization-state. But there are steps that Tehran can take to help in breaking the vicious securitization cycle. It can start by shoring up domestic support through economic reforms, bolstering its hand in international negotiations. After all, Iranian people have proved to be Iran’s greatest asset in resisting and deterring foreign aggression. Tehran can also recalibrate its emphasis on material defensive power—an emphasis that often amplifies threat perceptions—and instead prioritize cooperation and coordination, particularly at the regional level. It can establish a frank dialogue with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to address mutual concerns and find a way to resume cooperation. And it can engage with the United States to manage their differences, starting with the nuclear issue and sanctions.

Over the past two decades, Iran has been the target of intense securitization by Israel and the United States. Together, the two have constructed and disseminated a narrative that portrays Iran as an existential threat not just to its region but also to the entire globe. Benjamin Netanyahu, who called Iranian government “a messianic apocalyptic cult,” alleged in a speech before the Knesset in 1992 that “Iran is three to five years from being able to produce a nuclear weapon.” U.S. President Donald Trump, among his many insults, has called Iran “a very evil place.” The manifest absurdity of these claims hasn’t stopped either of the two from continuing to advance them and engage in increasingly belligerent behavior. The United States has implemented extraordinary economic sanctions against Iran. Israel, aided by Washington, has bombed Iran’s infrastructure and killed its military leaders, scientists, and ordinary civilians.

As a result, Iran has been forced to react with defiant policies instead of pursuing its initial goal-oriented plans. In response to growing U.S. and Israeli pressure, it increased its uranium enrichment level to 60 percent and reduced its cooperation with the IAEA. Following the unprovoked joint U.S.-Israeli attacks, ordinary Iranians began debating whether Iran’s defense doctrine should change to include nuclear weapons. Calls for blocking the Strait of Hormuz have gained momentum. Had it not been for such aggression, Iran would have continued its unprecedented cooperation with the IAEA under the 2015 nuclear deal. It would have focused on regional cooperation, which it has championed since 1985.

Iran’s securitization has created a siege mentality, which often leads to the imposition of tighter social controls. These include restrictions on the Internet and social media and surveillance measures intended to root out spies and saboteurs. Such measures are certainly ineffective at addressing the sources of domestic discontent: economic hardship, the erosion of social capital, and a widening gap between the state and society. But they are........

© Foreign Affairs