*Originally published in 2025 and preserved as part of our archive project.Get E-International Relations delivered to your inbox, free of charge. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber to support our work.

Theories of international relations often thrive on their ability to explain broad patterns of state behavior. Neorealism, in particular, has long been regarded as one of the most enduring and influential lenses for analyzing states’ actions within the field of international relations. The core works of Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, representing defensive and offensive neorealism respectively, aim to explain state behavior through the lens of power, security, and a common anarchic international system. Yet, when applied to different global regions, such as the case studies of the Arctic and the South China Sea, their theoretical coherence and applicability start to fracture. Both scholars provide compelling but broad insights into why states act the way they do, but neither framework fully accounts for the nuance and differences between different regions. This is particularly clear given the involvement of the same great powers – the United States and China. This article explores that inconsistency, arguing that Waltz nor Mearsheimer's models falter when tested against these contrasting geopolitical environments.

The Arctic and the South China Sea present two vastly different theaters of geopolitical competition, yet involve the same principal actors – the United States and China. If neorealism, as a school of thought, is to claim universal validity then it must explain not only why states behave as they do in one region but also why those same behaviors are different elsewhere. The inability of either theory to achieve this exposes a core weakness in their otherwise robust frameworks: a regional blind spot that undermines both branches individually and neorealism overall.

Kenneth Waltz’s defensive realism, outlined in Theory of International Politics, suggests that states seek security rather than power for its own sake. According to Waltz, states actions are primarily driven by the need to maintain their survival within a naturally anarchic international system. This leads to a balancing behavior, for example through internal measures such as military buildup or external alliances, to prevent any single state from becoming overly powerful and threatening the others’ stability. This assumption helps explain the Arctic’s more cooperative tendencies, where great powers like the U.S., Russia, and even China engage in diplomatic mechanisms through institutions like the Arctic Council. Competition here is primarily through scientific advancements and economic means such as resource management. The harsh environment, economic barriers, and lack of widespread militarization validate Waltz’s emphasis on balance and restraint.

Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, by contrast, assumes that states pursue as much power as possible, not just to survive but to achieve maximum power within their region, as this will ultimately secure their safety. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer argues that because states can never be sure of others’ intentions, the safest path is to dominate the region in which they exist to prevent rival powers from emerging elsewhere. This framework neatly explains........

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