STUDENTS of late-20th-century politics and history might recall that the term ‘Lost Decade’ is used to describe the 1980s in both Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. Though of qualitatively different consequences, economic crises induced by an inability to service foreign debt eroded incomes and crashed growth rates in these two regions.

In Africa, poverty rates went up and poor countries faced stark consequences of disease and malnutrition. In Latin America, the expected transition to upper middle- and high-income status never transpired. Deindustrialisation and stagnant incomes became the norm, leading to what economists now call the ‘middle income trap’. It is of some note that this decade also coincided with entrenched authoritarianism (of the military dictatorship variant) and heightened state repression in both regions, much of it in service of US imperial interests.

While Pakistan’s economy is no stranger to boom-bust cycles, a prolonged period without adequate real income growth has been a rarity. It is true that since the early 2000s, Pakistan’s economy has failed to grow at the same pace as comparator economies. It is also true that much of this lag is tied to domestic political economy dysfunction, given how others in the region appear to be doing better. But the general crisis has been of comparatively sluggish growth (ie, averaged out spurts and troughs), rather than none at all, especially in labour incomes.

That is until this preceding decade (2015-2025). Analysis of recently

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