There are times when, once a road has been taken, it becomes necessary to follow it to the end. The conflict with Iran may have reached such a point. The cost of not seeing it through could very possibly outweigh the danger of continuing until the regime capitulates, collapses, or is so badly damaged that it will take years, if not decades, to build back to its prior capabilities.

During the Twelve-Day War, the US struck once, then declared its mission accomplished hoping for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. The US and Israel demonstrated that Iran was all but powerless to stop an air campaign. The immediate strategic fallout from the war was limited. Due to the abrupt ending, Iran did not use its capabilities to interfere with the global oil market or US partner nations other than Israel.

This war is very different. The US and Israel struck with far greater force while some aspects of the US and Israeli messaging implied that regime change in Iran might be, if not the goal of operations, then at the very least the desired outcome. Iran has also escalated the war against Gulf countries and the global economy to put pressure on the US. The level of escalation and rhetoric has created a new dynamic which raises the strategic cost of an abrupt ending like that of the Twelve-Day War.

By escalating the war, Iran has demonstrated that pro-US neutrality in the Middle East is not an option. This puts countries on notice about the potential cost of defying Iran in the future. Iran is amplifying this message globally as it continues to interfere with the global energy supply chain. Its ability to continue to inflict this harm despite US operations is creating a narrative of survival and defiance against a superpower that will resonate in some quarters of the Middle Eastern population.

This challenge is made more serious by the amount of force the US and Israel have employed and the repeated statements that Iran is all but finished. Much of the Middle East perceives this war as one where the US and Israel are seeking to end the Iranian regime. If the war ends short of that, it will appear that despite the US and Israel’s military might, they failed. Iran will undoubtedly spread the narrative that it won a war against Israel and the US. It will likely double down on its aggressive regional strategy and its nuclear program – after all, it will seem that the strategy worked.

This will force Gulf countries into an unenviable choice. In this scenario, American operations against Iran have resulted in pain for the Gulf but failed to bring the results for which the Saudis and others may have hoped. The Gulf states will have to choose a path forward, and while in the short term, they may feel anger towards Iran, in the long term, if the US ends the war without achieving objectives commensurate with the rhetoric and force employed, it will eventually give the Gulf States good reason to adopt a more accommodating posture to Iran.

An early ending may also have consequences for Israel. Since 2023, Israel has, more than anyone in the region, been at the forefront of the conflict with Iran. It fought Iran and its proxies on several fronts, and except for Syria, all these wars have ended inconclusively. In Gaza, it appeared that Israel had achieved victory when the US announced an international force with the mission to disarm and demilitarize the territory, but Hamas still remains in control of almost half of Gaza. In Lebanon, Israel struck a massive blow against Hezbollah and ended operations in favor of a US-sponsored agreement wherein the Lebanese Government would disarm Hezbollah, but now, Israel is under bombardment from Hezbollah.

There has for a long time been a growing chorus in Israel that, rightly or wrongly, blames the US for the inconclusiveness of the last several years and craves a more maximalist use of force as a solution to threats Israel faces. Should the US end the war with Iran without achieving objectives that the Israeli population views as proportionate to the level of hardship they faced, it could reinforce this narrative. This, in turn, could have serious consequences not only for Israel-US relations but for the region as a whole.

There is not just a regional cost to be paid for ending the war early. The initial phase of the US war against Iran put China in a precarious position in the Middle East. In recent years, China has been drawing ever closer to Iran, on whom it relies for a significant proportion of its energy needs. If the current regime in Iran were to fall or become severely weakened, China would lose an important partner.

Ending the war with the Iranian regime intact and uncowed, would continue to give China an increasingly valuable base from which to expand its influence in the region. In a more global sense, not staying the course could risk lending credence to the already existing narrative that the US does not have the strength of commitment to truly follow through on its guarantees and face a major challenger. After all, if a non-near peer like Iran could defy the US and survive the worst the US is willing to throw at it, surely China can.

To avoid the negative outcome of being perceived to end the war early, the US has to achieve consequential outcomes that appear proportionate to both the rhetoric and force employed. The outcomes also have to be worth the price the Gulf countries and Israel paid. Achieving such outcomes is not without risk, and it is certainly not without cost. However, having embarked on this road, the negative strategic impact and long-term consequences of exiting early may far outweigh the short-term challenges and hardship of continuing.

“The views, facts, opinions, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, U.S. Army, U.S. Army War College, or any other government agency. (References to this presentation should include the foregoing statement.)”

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)