The only thing shocking about the political firestorm that erupted after ASIO boss Mike Burgess described a years-old case of an unnamed politician turned traitor is that anyone in Canberra was actually shocked.

A more sensible debate may have focused on why Burgess didn’t use last month’s annual national security threat assessment to describe more recent cases of attempted political infiltration or identify the agency most often responsible, China’s Ministry of State Security.

ASIO director-general of security Mike Burgess said he had exposed the foreign spy unit as part of “a real-world, real-time disruption” operation.Credit: Alex Ellinghausen

Burgess was restricted by the need to keep his agency’s more recent secrets secret and, quite possibly, the standing government policy of avoiding public spats with Beijing by calling out its malign covert activities.

This policy, spoken and unspoken, is either craven and misguided or reasoned and sensible, depending on who you ask. Whatever you think, not calling out China undermines the quality of debate we can have about whether our political system and laws are working to deal with the source of our most serious security threat.

But stoking a debate about the MSS and China wasn’t Burgess’ direct aim. He wanted to promote awareness about the growing threat of foreign interference and espionage and why it matters more than ever given the battle between a still rising China and a US many view in retreat (especially if Trump is re-elected), not to mention Russia’s aggression and other perilous world events.

Whatever you think of his speech and the fallout, Burgess achieved his aim. Suddenly, everyone was talking about spying.

But should have we been surprised that there was a traitor within the country’s political ranks?

Seasoned politicians and journalists, or indeed anyone who can use Google, should be well aware of the plethora of open-source cases involving former Australian political figures being openly cultivated by Chinese government agents of influence.