Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan is well known for keeping up appearances with interesting counterparts. He has maintained cordial ties with the likes of Russian president Vladimir Putin, Chinese president Xi Jinping, and Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei—leaders who prop up Nicolas Maduro’s criminal regime in Venezuela. 

Since 2016, Turkish relations with Venezuela have rapidly become a pillar of support for the Caracas government. Initially founded on a semblance of solidarity between Erdogan and Maduro, commercial ties skyrocketed in 2018, reaching over $1.1 billion in trade volume, compared to less than $200 million in 2017. The outlook is even more ambitious—in 2023, representatives of the Turkey Exporters Assembly expressed a goal of raising annual trade volumes to $5 billion “in the medium term.”

At first glance, Turkey seems like an obvious outlier when lined up next to Maduro’s other advocates abroad. Next to Russia, Iran, China, and Cuba, Turkey—as a NATO member and an erstwhile democracy—raises eyebrows as a member of Maduro’s “fabulous five.” This begs the question: why is Turkey so committed to investing in the Maduro government? 

Turkey’s strategic vision on Venezuela is one in service of Erdogan’s quest for a Turkish great power. While much of Ankara’s geopolitical reach remains focused on the Middle East and Africa as of late, Venezuela serves as a foothold for expanding Turkish influence into the Western Hemisphere. In his oft-expressed disdain for world powers such as the United States, Russia, and China, Erdogan seeks to exploit similar sentiments in the international community and to fill a surrogate role. Erdogan is far more important to Maduro than vice versa. As the Venezuelan regime grows increasingly isolated by global sanctions, appalling human rights abuses, and repeated policy failures, partner states have become lifelines. 

Accordingly, the nexus of Turkey-Venezuela relations is steeped in transnational crime and sanctions evasion. Beneath a visible dislike for the United States and for democracy at large, Turkey offers Maduro the profits of activities that harm civilians in Venezuela and abroad. These activities range from sanctions-busting gold exports that shore up Venezuela’s depleted foreign currency reserves to providing Venezuelan narcotraffickers with a transit hub for cocaine.

Erdogan’s calculus in backing Venezuela is that he can shore up a place for Turkey in Latin America, a region largely beyond Ankara’s power-projection limits. Of course, there is a sense of affinity—Erdogan’s distaste for the Western world and for his own democratic obligations matches well with the Maduro regime.

Turkey-Venezuela ties were rather muted until just under a decade ago. In the aftermath of the 2016 Turkish coup plot, Maduro became one of the first world leaders to declare support for Erdogan. According to Venezuela’s then-Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza, the move set in motion what he deemed the new “peak” of bilateral relations. Maduro would, only a few months later, reference Erdogan’s post-coup crackdown to threaten dissidents with violence should the Venezuelan people attempt to contest his rule.

Three years later, well into the Ankara-Caracas trade boom and a

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