Today marks the sixth anniversary of the historic 2018 Singapore Summit between former U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. It is worth reflecting on that momentous event, both as a reminder of how much geopolitics has changed since then and to recall what diplomacy with North Korea may look like when Pyongyang eventually signals a willingness to restart discussions with Washington and Seoul.
To begin with, we should remember that the diplomacy of Singapore was born of crisis, notably North Korea’s 2017 nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests, as well as Trump’s “fire and fury” rhetoric. The Singapore Summit was also laden with risk, both of a bad deal and a return to crisis in the absence of a deal. In short, Singapore was not the halcyon days. All parties and most observers were skeptical that the summit would produce progress in U.S.-North Korea relations, and on Pyongyang’s denuclearization in specific. But there was at least a spark of hope, and that is worth something. Indeed, surprisingly — or perhaps due to shared low expectations — the Trump-Kim meeting went well enough to keep hope alive, resulting in a February 2019 follow-up in Hanoi.
The Hanoi Summit, however, revealed the irreconcilable positions held by the United States and North Korea regarding the latter’s nuclear weapons, and the summit ended in failure that still casts a shadow on Washington’s and Seoul’s efforts at diplomatic outreach to Pyongyang. Following sporadic efforts at working-level talks, North Korea eventually refused further negotiation with the U.S. and South Korea, instead hardening its posture internally and externally, accelerating its weapons program and doubling down on sanctions evasion and cyber theft to keep its economy afloat.
Rather than the modest hope of Singapore, North Korea’s relations with the U.S. and South Korea now feature trash balloons and rising tensions along the Demilitarized Zone and the Northern Limit Line. The absence of hotline contact and an abrogated inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement mean risk reduction measures are not operational. Pyongyang now possesses a functional and growing nuclear weapons arsenal and has rhetorically, institutionally, and politically eliminated denuclearization as a negotiation item.
Worse still, geopolitical conditions have recently favored North Korea, which is less isolated than it has been in years. Sino-U.S. rivalry and the war in Ukraine have incentivized Beijing and Moscow to increase support for Pyongyang, including aiding international sanctions evasion and providing diplomatic cover. China at least pretends to want to play a constructive role with respect to North Korea, but Russia has not only abandoned the pretense of sanctions enforcement but has actively engaged in arms transfers with North Korea, receiving millions of artillery shells and dozens of short-range missiles in (likely) exchange for food, fuel, money, and/or military technology assistance for Pyongyang. For good measure, Russia killed the United Nations Panel of Experts monitoring North Korea’s illicit activities in service of its weapons programs. Vladimir Putin has hosted Kim Jong-un in the Russian Far East and may soon make a visit to North Korea.
The war in Gaza, supported by Iran, both demands diplomatic attention that reduces already limited bandwidth to deal with North Korea’s malfeasance and underscores the malign cooperation between Teheran and Pyongyang. To top things off, the Yoon administration is weakened after a beating in April National Assembly elections, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is embroiled in scandal, the U.S. faces uncertainty heading toward a November election with two historically awful candidates, and elections worldwide in 2024 mean states are focused on domestic politics.
This is not a context in which Kim Jong-un is inclined to engage Washington or Seoul. In that sense, Singapore is a distant memory, as is whatever small hope there might have been for denuclearization and sustainably improved relations between Pyongyang, Washington and Seoul.
Nonetheless, fickle Fortuna’s Wheel will keep spinning, the situation will evolve, and North Korea will eventually indicate interest in renewed diplomatic negotiation. Distant Singapore still holds lessons for that eventuality. The first lesson is to keep expectations extremely low. The number of things that can derail progress is extensive. Second, history rhymes — not repeats — and so denuclearization is highly unlikely to be on the agenda of future North Korean diplomacy. Washington and Seoul will have to figure out how to handle that, notably weighing the risks of working toward a deal short of denuclearization versus the risks of continuing to press for it such that North Korea refuses to engage and instead ratchets up tensions.
Lastly, the cliché is true: let us hope for the best, but prepare for the worst.
Mason Richey is professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, president of the Korea International Studies Association, and editor-in-chief of the Journal of East Asian Affairs.
US-NK Singapore Summit, 6 years on
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11.06.2024
Today marks the sixth anniversary of the historic 2018 Singapore Summit between former U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. It is worth reflecting on that momentous event, both as a reminder of how much geopolitics has changed since then and to recall what diplomacy with North Korea may look like when Pyongyang eventually signals a willingness to restart discussions with Washington and Seoul.
To begin with, we should remember that the diplomacy of Singapore was born of crisis, notably North Korea’s 2017 nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests, as well as Trump’s “fire and fury” rhetoric. The Singapore Summit was also laden with risk, both of a bad deal and a return to crisis in the absence of a deal. In short, Singapore was not the halcyon days. All parties and most observers were skeptical that the summit would produce progress in U.S.-North Korea relations, and on Pyongyang’s denuclearization in specific. But there was at least a spark of hope, and that is worth something. Indeed, surprisingly — or perhaps due to shared low expectations — the Trump-Kim meeting went well enough to keep hope alive, resulting in a February 2019 follow-up in Hanoi.
The Hanoi Summit, however, revealed the irreconcilable positions held by the........
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