The Pulse | Diplomacy | South Asia

Debate in Delhi on Trump, Trust, and Strategic Choices

Are India’s fraying relations with the US transient, or do they represent a fundamental rupture with long-term impacts on US-India relations and India’s growth story?

US President Donald J. Trump and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi at a meeting on the sidelines of the G7 summit in France, June 17, 2026.

Donald Trump’s posture toward India in his second term has shocked and awed New Delhi. There was a noticeable shift even before his inauguration: he surprised Indians by extending an unusually early invitation to Chinese President Xi Jinping to attend the ceremony, while Prime Minister Narendra Modi received no comparable invitation. From then on, the warmth between Washington and New Delhi began to fade.

India’s strategic community is struggling to make sense of the rapidly transforming relationship. The key question animating New Delhi is whether this change is transient or whether it represents a fundamental rupture, triggering long-term and profound impacts not just on U.S.-India relations but also on India’s growth story.

For years, Delhi’s elite and media have celebrated the “personal chemistry” between Trump and Modi. When both leaders won elections in 2024, great expectations followed. New Delhi was sure that the strategic partnership would deepen and progress rapidly, and that Washington would indeed help India become a major global power ahead of schedule. This aspiration has been nurtured by the Indian strategic community for decades, especially since the July 2005 U.S.-India civil nuclear understanding.

The unease deepened after Operation Sindoor.

Washington began leaning more toward Islamabad, while the rhetoric toward India became increasingly insulting and disrespectful. India was also singled out as the only major country to be hit with punitive tariffs for trading with Russia, even though other major buyers of Russian energy — China, Turkey, and European countries — did not face the same India-specific penalty. Trump’s expected visit to India has also slipped from a likely Quad-related trip to a more distant and uncertain schedule. Meanwhile, the changing language in Washington, growing talk of a G2 understanding between the United States and China, and diminished attention to both the Quad and the Indo-Pacific strategy have all added to the disquiet in New Delhi.

India’s official response, at least initially, was to weather the storm. It did not adopt an adversarial posture toward the United States, and it continues to accommodate the eccentricities and unpredictability of Trump’s policies. Officially, New Delhi is still batting defensively, mostly leaving the balls outside the stumps and blocking only those that threaten the wicket.

The wider strategic community, however, has reacted very differently. There is anger, frustration, and disbelief at how quickly America appears to have distanced itself from India while moving closer to Pakistan. This has generated much discussion about whether India’s trust in the United States has been violated — and whether it can ever be rebuilt.

Official channels remain quiet. The media and the opposition criticize both Trump for his perfidy and Modi for his silence. The strategic community, both in Washington and New Delhi, continues to emphasize the importance of the relationship, while warning that without a course correction, this strategic partnership could be damaged, perhaps irreparably.

In Washington, veteran India hands continue to remind the Trump administration of India’s strategic value and urge it to repair the relationship. Think tank after think tank has called on Trump and his administration to take corrective steps before the damage becomes permanent. But in New Delhi, the strategic debate has taken a more interesting turn. Among former diplomats, retired military officers, prominent academics, and think tank analysts, a Track II-style conversation has emerged over whether India should merely respond tactically to the United States or undertake more fundamental changes in its grand strategy.

I spent nearly two weeks in New Delhi a few months ago. I had many interactions with members of the Indian strategic community at the India International Center (IIC), over lunch and tea. The IIC is India’s premier, and probably most important, cultural institution; on any given day, if you walk into its lounge or dining area, you are likely to run into the who’s who of New Delhi: academics, former ministers, current ministers, generals, diplomats,........

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