Asia Defense | Security | East Asia

The Iran-Israel-US War Is Exposing China’s Alliance Problem

The conflict in the Middle East accentuates a structural weakness in China’s global strategy: the absence of capable allies that can act as a force multiplier.

The multinational attendees in the Freedom Shield 2026 military exercises, led by South Korea and the United States, participate in an orientation session at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys, South Korea, Mar. 3, 2026.

During a press briefing on the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth declared, “Fighting shoulder to shoulder with such a capable ally is a true force multiplier and a breath of fresh air.” The remark was directed squarely at Israel for its “unmatched skill and iron determination.”

U.S. partners in the Gulf – United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia – which had stood resilient and performed remarkably well against Iranian retaliatory missile and drone attacks, have received far less attention and praise. While Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged that various partners and allies in the Gulf are defending alongside the United States, the full strategic aspect of the partners’ contribution appears to be overlooked. 

Granted, these states are defending their sovereignty against Iranian retaliatory attacks. Moreover, fearing entrapping themselves further in the conflict, the Gulf states avoided direct participation in offensive operations. However, their contribution toward the ongoing U.S. military operations cannot be discounted. From providing critical information from early warning systems to facilitating the interception of Iranian missiles and drones, to having permitted the U.S. to house bases and sustain a forward presence for operations, to finally providing the necessary geographic strategic depth, Gulf partners have indirectly helped enable and sustain U.S. military operations against Iran.

Be it an offensive-oriented participation of the war, as demonstrated by the Israelis, or an indirect and restrained type of participation by the Gulf states, both dimensions are testament that U.S. power is tremendously aggregated by its vast alliance network. Indeed, an alliance can render both offensive and defensive assistance, and in both cases would function as a great force multiplier. 

This lesson on alliance and its force multiplier effect is unlikely to be lost on military strategists in China. From Beijing’s view, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East accentuates a structural weakness in China’s strategic calculation: the absence of capable allies that can act as a force multiplier. 

Unlike the United States, which enjoys an extensive global network of allies and security partners, China has only one formal ally: North Korea, via the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Although China boasts strategic partnerships with countries such as Pakistan, Russia, and Iran, these partnerships remain far looser than a traditional alliance, and have proven to be less effective than an alliance in times of contingencies. Indeed, despite being in a strategic partnership with Iran, China has so far remained restrained in its action, only verbally condemning the U.S. for the killing of Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Beijing’s lack of effort on the part of its strategic partner has even resulted in it being criticized by some as a “fair weather friend.” 

On the other hand, China remains cautious of formal alliances, for historical experiences informed by the Sino-Soviet split that reminds Chinese leaders of strategic constraints imposed by formal alliances. Consequently, China has often reiterated its preference for flexible partnerships. Beijing views the alliance systems of the United States as a relic of the Cold War that contributes to global instability. 

Yet, the proper functioning of U.S. alliance in the ongoing Iran-Israel-U.S. War would surely prompt Beijing to draw comparisons to the case of East Asia should a conflict over Taiwan breaks out, particularly when Chinese President Xi Jinping has often complained that the United States is surrounding China with its allies in a policy of “all around containment, encirclement, and suppression.”

Indeed, much like it does in the Middle East, the U.S. enjoys a dense alliance network across the Indo-Pacific region. Traditional U.S. allies like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines host various American troops and assets, while additional partners like Singapore, Thailand, and New Zealand offer rotational access to facilities, maintenance, and logistical support for U.S. operations. From Beijing’s view, this network surrounds China with potential advance staging points for U.S. military operations.

More than that, these alliances contribute to intelligence sharing, logistical support, and reduction of vulnerability by dispersing U.S. assets throughout Asia to sustain and enhance U.S military operational effectiveness. Most importantly, as the ongoing Iranian conflict highlighted, the United States would likely fight alongside partners or receive, at the very least, defensive assistance from them in any major conflict, while China might find itself isolated and fighting alone. This presents a major consideration for China. 

The disparity becomes more acute when considering a potential crisis involving Taiwan, which has been considered as the likeliest flashpoint between the United States and China. Should a conflict erupt in the Taiwan Straits, the U.S. would leverage on its forward bases in allied territory and almost certainly rely on its regional allies for support. 

Japan has indicated that an attack on Taiwan could trigger a military response, with Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae suggesting that a Taiwan contingency might constitute a “survival threatening situation” that could justify the use of force. This was followed by the deployment of missile systems on its southwestern islands near Taiwan. 

The Philippines, another key American ally, has stated that they would “inevitably” get involved if Taiwan is invaded, while South Korea, home to around 30,000 American troops, could possibly assist the United States by providing vital intelligence, logistical, and rear-area support. While the extent of help by each country is unclear, these contributions would nonetheless generate an operational network that is capable of sustaining prolonged effective military operations in the Taiwan Strait or the Western Pacific. 

This strategic environment stands in steep contrast to the one faced by China. Surrounded by U.S. allies and with only North Korea as a formal treaty ally – itself a highly unpredictable actor whose involvement would carry tremendous escalatory risks – Beijing would have to largely manage the conflict on its own. In other words, while the United States would fight a coalition war, China would highly likely fight a solitary one. Considering such circumstances, Beijing’s insistence on flexible partnerships and a corresponding lack of dependable allies can be seen as a major strategic liability. 

The ongoing Iran-Israel-U.S. war may thus carry an uncomfortable lesson for China. Developments in the Middle East are demonstrating how alliances can aggregate military capabilities, distribute and reduce vulnerability and operational burdens, and sustain military operations. These factors make having an alliance a major instrument of modern military power. Thus, as China seeks to compete with and defeat a “strong enemy,” it would eventually need to consider whether its longstanding aversion to formal alliances remains strategically viable in an era where coalitions and alliances are highly valuable and impactful. 

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During a press briefing on the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth declared, “Fighting shoulder to shoulder with such a capable ally is a true force multiplier and a breath of fresh air.” The remark was directed squarely at Israel for its “unmatched skill and iron determination.”

U.S. partners in the Gulf – United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia – which had stood resilient and performed remarkably well against Iranian retaliatory missile and drone attacks, have received far less attention and praise. While Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged that various partners and allies in the Gulf are defending alongside the United States, the full strategic aspect of the partners’ contribution appears to be overlooked. 

Granted, these states are defending their sovereignty against Iranian retaliatory attacks. Moreover, fearing entrapping themselves further in the conflict, the Gulf states avoided direct participation in offensive operations. However, their contribution toward the ongoing U.S. military operations cannot be discounted. From providing critical information from early warning systems to facilitating the interception of Iranian missiles and drones, to having permitted the U.S. to house bases and sustain a forward presence for operations, to finally providing the necessary geographic strategic depth, Gulf partners have indirectly helped enable and sustain U.S. military operations against Iran.

Be it an offensive-oriented participation of the war, as demonstrated by the Israelis, or an indirect and restrained type of participation by the Gulf states, both dimensions are testament that U.S. power is tremendously aggregated by its vast alliance network. Indeed, an alliance can render both offensive and defensive assistance, and in both cases would function as a great force multiplier. 

This lesson on alliance and its force multiplier effect is unlikely to be lost on military strategists in China. From Beijing’s view, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East accentuates a structural weakness in China’s strategic calculation: the absence of capable allies that can act as a force multiplier. 

Unlike the United States, which enjoys an extensive global network of allies and security partners, China has only one formal ally: North Korea, via the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Although China boasts strategic partnerships with countries such as Pakistan, Russia, and Iran, these partnerships remain far looser than a traditional alliance, and have proven to be less effective than an alliance in times of contingencies. Indeed, despite being in a strategic partnership with Iran, China has so far remained restrained in its action, only verbally condemning the U.S. for the killing of Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Beijing’s lack of effort on the part of its strategic partner has even resulted in it being criticized by some as a “fair weather friend.” 

On the other hand, China remains cautious of formal alliances, for historical experiences informed by the Sino-Soviet split that reminds Chinese leaders of strategic constraints imposed by formal alliances. Consequently, China has often reiterated its preference for flexible partnerships. Beijing views the alliance systems of the United States as a relic of the Cold War that contributes to global instability. 

Yet, the proper functioning of U.S. alliance in the ongoing Iran-Israel-U.S. War would surely prompt Beijing to draw comparisons to the case of East Asia should a conflict over Taiwan breaks out, particularly when Chinese President Xi Jinping has often complained that the United States is surrounding China with its allies in a policy of “all around containment, encirclement, and suppression.”

Indeed, much like it does in the Middle East, the U.S. enjoys a dense alliance network across the Indo-Pacific region. Traditional U.S. allies like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines host various American troops and assets, while additional partners like Singapore, Thailand, and New Zealand offer rotational access to facilities, maintenance, and logistical support for U.S. operations. From Beijing’s view, this network surrounds China with potential advance staging points for U.S. military operations.

More than that, these alliances contribute to intelligence sharing, logistical support, and reduction of vulnerability by dispersing U.S. assets throughout Asia to sustain and enhance U.S military operational effectiveness. Most importantly, as the ongoing Iranian conflict highlighted, the United States would likely fight alongside partners or receive, at the very least, defensive assistance from them in any major conflict, while China might find itself isolated and fighting alone. This presents a major consideration for China. 

The disparity becomes more acute when considering a potential crisis involving Taiwan, which has been considered as the likeliest flashpoint between the United States and China. Should a conflict erupt in the Taiwan Straits, the U.S. would leverage on its forward bases in allied territory and almost certainly rely on its regional allies for support. 

Japan has indicated that an attack on Taiwan could trigger a military response, with Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae suggesting that a Taiwan contingency might constitute a “survival threatening situation” that could justify the use of force. This was followed by the deployment of missile systems on its southwestern islands near Taiwan. 

The Philippines, another key American ally, has stated that they would “inevitably” get involved if Taiwan is invaded, while South Korea, home to around 30,000 American troops, could possibly assist the United States by providing vital intelligence, logistical, and rear-area support. While the extent of help by each country is unclear, these contributions would nonetheless generate an operational network that is capable of sustaining prolonged effective military operations in the Taiwan Strait or the Western Pacific. 

This strategic environment stands in steep contrast to the one faced by China. Surrounded by U.S. allies and with only North Korea as a formal treaty ally – itself a highly unpredictable actor whose involvement would carry tremendous escalatory risks – Beijing would have to largely manage the conflict on its own. In other words, while the United States would fight a coalition war, China would highly likely fight a solitary one. Considering such circumstances, Beijing’s insistence on flexible partnerships and a corresponding lack of dependable allies can be seen as a major strategic liability. 

The ongoing Iran-Israel-U.S. war may thus carry an uncomfortable lesson for China. Developments in the Middle East are demonstrating how alliances can aggregate military capabilities, distribute and reduce vulnerability and operational burdens, and sustain military operations. These factors make having an alliance a major instrument of modern military power. Thus, as China seeks to compete with and defeat a “strong enemy,” it would eventually need to consider whether its longstanding aversion to formal alliances remains strategically viable in an era where coalitions and alliances are highly valuable and impactful. 

Mathew Jie Sheng Yeo is a researcher at the Taejae Future Consensus Institute, where he focuses on fostering cooperative relations between the U.S. and China. He also serves as the assistant director of the Center for Strategic Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Mathew is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific

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