The Pulse | Environment | South Asia

India, China, and How Not to Save the Brahmaputra

Instead of pursuing a diplomatic solution to manage shared waters, India is following a dam-for-dam policy.

The Yarlung Tsangpo river in Medog County, Tibet Autonomous Region, China.

For over a decade, the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River has been framed as the next great theater of conflict between India and China. China, as the “upper riparian hegemon,” is building hydraulic dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo, including the staggering 60 GW Great Bend project, which is often portrayed as a direct threat to India’s national security in the Brahmaputra basin. Yet, India’s hydro-diplomacy remains remarkably passive and reluctant to secure the mighty river. Instead of building stronger regional institutions or persuading China to join basin-wide multilateral negotiations to manage shared waters and resolve disputes, New Delhi has turned inward, following a dam-for-dam policy that risks domestic instability and ecological uncertainty.

In the Brahmaputra River basin, China and India are locked in a competitive but stagnant relationship. Both are guided by a sense of “entitlement rights” over the shared waters in their territories. Beijing’s hydraulic projects range from the massive 60 GW Great Bend project to the Zangmu and Jiacha dams, and 18 other planned dams in the Yarlung Tsangpo basin. China seeks to master nature as a symbol of global power. 

Beijing is not a signatory to the 1997 United Nations Watercourses Convention. Its hydrological strategy is characterized by unilateral control, non-disclosure, and, at times, the “weaponization” of hydrological data. Even more alarming is that China has not shared hydrological data with India since 2022. This lack of transparency is a form of  “psychological warfare” to maintain leverage over lower riparian states. During the period of heightened border tensions after 2020, China used its upstream coercive leverage to effectively withhold hydrological information, on which India relies to forecast floods.

How has India responded to China’s hydrological interventions in the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra basin? While Prime Minister Narendra Modi is more vocal than his predecessors on transboundary water issues, there has been little progress in formal water-sharing mechanisms with China. Modi called for stronger international cooperation in the Brahmaputra River basin during his 2015 visit to China. He also raised the issue at the latest G-20 summit, but so far it has yielded no tangible results.

The Modi government, in office since 2014, has not advanced the diplomatic framework beyond what previous political regimes established. It has yet to upgrade the existing data dissemination agreements signed by previous political leadership. The Indian government under Modi also remains hesitant to lead the creation of a basin-wide multilateral institution to resolve disputes. 

As a result, China-India hydro-diplomacy remains confined to the hydrological data sharing Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 2002 and renewed in 2008, 2013, and 2018. This MoU expired on June 5, 2025 but has not yet been renewed. Similarly, the expert-level meetings were established in 2006. Beyond these preliminary arrangements, the Indian government has not initiated robust hydrological diplomatic collaboration with China in the last two decades.

India’s primary response to Chinese upstream adventurism is not diplomacy, but structural aggression. By rapidly developing its own mega-hydropower projects in the strategically significant frontier region, such as the 20,000 MW Siang Upper Multipurpose Project (SUMP), and by planning, commissioning, or operationalizing multiple big hydropower dams, New Delhi aims to establish its “prior appropriation” rights over the transboundary river. The idea is that India will capture water resources before China can fully exploit them and assert its legal and strategic claims to their continued flow. 

The government claims that the SUMP would help maintain the river’s natural flow, prevent flooding caused by sudden releases from China’s upstream dams, protect tribal populations from the adverse effects of China’s dams, boost the state’s exchequer, and save the region’s flora and fauna. But such an ambitious hydraulic mission comes at a steep cost: regional stability and the long-term health of riverine ecosystems. 

The tribal communities in Arunachal Pradesh are apprehensive about these projects, which fail to consider the “consent” of affected populations. While the Indigenous communities are concerned about the “resource curse,” they are branded as “enemies to national development,” a narrative allegedly used by the government to silence dissent by suggesting that local resistance only benefits China. The Brahmaputra should not remain a river of mistrust, where the pursuit of national security continues to drown out the voices of those who call the river their lifeline and its banks home.

While China’s dam-building activities continue to threaten downstream regions, the Indian government describes China’s run-of-the-river projects as non-threatening to downstream populations, arguing the dams will not change total flow. Assam’s Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sharma agreed, saying he see no reason for concern. In contrast, Pema Khandu, chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, called Chinese dams “ticking water bombs” and an “existential threat” to people downstream. Therefore, he endorsed the SUMP to protect India’s national energy and sensitive ecosystems, and to ensure local area development. 

These contrasting examples show how different political leaders perceive and portray China’s hydrological interventions in ways that benefit their political interests. The lack of reliable hydrological information enables political leaders to adopt ambiguous positions, which leads to confusion among Indigenous populations and contributes to growing mistrust toward their political representatives. 

Most importantly, it results in recurring stagnation of hydro-diplomacy in the Brahmaputra Basin. The Indian government intentionally maintains diplomatic complacency to intensify its dam-building activities in the contested region and to assert its first-user rights over the Brahmaputra.

The Brahmaputra traverses through a disputed border contested by two nuclear-armed countries engaged in tense border interactions. Therefore, establishing a binding basin-level agreement is no longer just a diplomatic ideal; it is a necessity to protect the rights of Indigenous populations and the integrity of the Himalayan environment. To break the stagnation, the Indian government should move beyond MoUs and expert-level meetings that have yielded little progress in securing the Brahmaputra. 

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For over a decade, the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River has been framed as the next great theater of conflict between India and China. China, as the “upper riparian hegemon,” is building hydraulic dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo, including the staggering 60 GW Great Bend project, which is often portrayed as a direct threat to India’s national security in the Brahmaputra basin. Yet, India’s hydro-diplomacy remains remarkably passive and reluctant to secure the mighty river. Instead of building stronger regional institutions or persuading China to join basin-wide multilateral negotiations to manage shared waters and resolve disputes, New Delhi has turned inward, following a dam-for-dam policy that risks domestic instability and ecological uncertainty.

In the Brahmaputra River basin, China and India are locked in a competitive but stagnant relationship. Both are guided by a sense of “entitlement rights” over the shared waters in their territories. Beijing’s hydraulic projects range from the massive 60 GW Great Bend project to the Zangmu and Jiacha dams, and 18 other planned dams in the Yarlung Tsangpo basin. China seeks to master nature as a symbol of global power. 

Beijing is not a signatory to the 1997 United Nations Watercourses Convention. Its hydrological strategy is characterized by unilateral control, non-disclosure, and, at times, the “weaponization” of hydrological data. Even more alarming is that China has not shared hydrological data with India since 2022. This lack of transparency is a form of  “psychological warfare” to maintain leverage over lower riparian states. During the period of heightened border tensions after 2020, China used its upstream coercive leverage to effectively withhold hydrological information, on which India relies to forecast floods.

How has India responded to China’s hydrological interventions in the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra basin? While Prime Minister Narendra Modi is more vocal than his predecessors on transboundary water issues, there has been little progress in formal water-sharing mechanisms with China. Modi called for stronger international cooperation in the Brahmaputra River basin during his 2015 visit to China. He also raised the issue at the latest G-20 summit, but so far it has yielded no tangible results.

The Modi government, in office since 2014, has not advanced the diplomatic framework beyond what previous political regimes established. It has yet to upgrade the existing data dissemination agreements signed by previous political leadership. The Indian government under Modi also remains hesitant to lead the creation of a basin-wide multilateral institution to resolve disputes. 

As a result, China-India hydro-diplomacy remains confined to the hydrological data sharing Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 2002 and renewed in 2008, 2013, and 2018. This MoU expired on June 5, 2025 but has not yet been renewed. Similarly, the expert-level meetings were established in 2006. Beyond these preliminary arrangements, the Indian government has not initiated robust hydrological diplomatic collaboration with China in the last two decades.

India’s primary response to Chinese upstream adventurism is not diplomacy, but structural aggression. By rapidly developing its own mega-hydropower projects in the strategically significant frontier region, such as the 20,000 MW Siang Upper Multipurpose Project (SUMP), and by planning, commissioning, or operationalizing multiple big hydropower dams, New Delhi aims to establish its “prior appropriation” rights over the transboundary river. The idea is that India will capture water resources before China can fully exploit them and assert its legal and strategic claims to their continued flow. 

The government claims that the SUMP would help maintain the river’s natural flow, prevent flooding caused by sudden releases from China’s upstream dams, protect tribal populations from the adverse effects of China’s dams, boost the state’s exchequer, and save the region’s flora and fauna. But such an ambitious hydraulic mission comes at a steep cost: regional stability and the long-term health of riverine ecosystems. 

The tribal communities in Arunachal Pradesh are apprehensive about these projects, which fail to consider the “consent” of affected populations. While the Indigenous communities are concerned about the “resource curse,” they are branded as “enemies to national development,” a narrative allegedly used by the government to silence dissent by suggesting that local resistance only benefits China. The Brahmaputra should not remain a river of mistrust, where the pursuit of national security continues to drown out the voices of those who call the river their lifeline and its banks home.

While China’s dam-building activities continue to threaten downstream regions, the Indian government describes China’s run-of-the-river projects as non-threatening to downstream populations, arguing the dams will not change total flow. Assam’s Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sharma agreed, saying he see no reason for concern. In contrast, Pema Khandu, chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, called Chinese dams “ticking water bombs” and an “existential threat” to people downstream. Therefore, he endorsed the SUMP to protect India’s national energy and sensitive ecosystems, and to ensure local area development. 

These contrasting examples show how different political leaders perceive and portray China’s hydrological interventions in ways that benefit their political interests. The lack of reliable hydrological information enables political leaders to adopt ambiguous positions, which leads to confusion among Indigenous populations and contributes to growing mistrust toward their political representatives. 

Most importantly, it results in recurring stagnation of hydro-diplomacy in the Brahmaputra Basin. The Indian government intentionally maintains diplomatic complacency to intensify its dam-building activities in the contested region and to assert its first-user rights over the Brahmaputra.

The Brahmaputra traverses through a disputed border contested by two nuclear-armed countries engaged in tense border interactions. Therefore, establishing a binding basin-level agreement is no longer just a diplomatic ideal; it is a necessity to protect the rights of Indigenous populations and the integrity of the Himalayan environment. To break the stagnation, the Indian government should move beyond MoUs and expert-level meetings that have yielded little progress in securing the Brahmaputra. 

Bhaskar Jyoti Deka is an assistant professor of Political Science at Cotton University, Guwahati.

India China water wars

Yarlung Tsangpo dam project

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