The Case of Sending Drones to North Korea and Inter-Korean Dialogue

Amid another anti-North Korean moves by Seoul, the administration of Lee Jae Myung decided to make use of the ‘drone case’ to smooth things over – and ran into a tough North Korean response.

New Charges and Links with Intelligence Services in the Drone Case

The principal suspect, a PhD student named O, who personally launched the drones, was listed in military intelligence as a ‘civilian auxiliary’ (essentially an irregular agent). An NIS officer, as it turned out, gave him 5.05 million won. Intelligence, however, insists that it was a private loan because they knew each other from university matters. Despite an internal review, the NIS ‘could not identify a link between the money and the drone flights’.

Moreover, it has been established that O and his accomplices launched drones into North Korea not twice but four times since Lee Jae Myung came to power. The launch dates were: 27 September, 16 November, 22 November, and 4 January, with two of the drones having crashed (in September and January) and another two having come back successfully.

On 6 March, the cases of the three civilian suspects were handed over to the prosecution. It was found that ‘since 2024, they conspired to develop a drone that would be able to bypass the detection by the air defence systems of South and North Korea at low altitudes.’ After that, they conducted eight test flights of drones in the Yeoju area (about 60 kilometers southeast of Seoul) between June and November 2025.

On 31 March, the prosecution received the cases of a National Intelligence Service officer and two servicemen on active duty. The civilian intelligence officer had maintained close relations with the PhD student O for more than ten years and gave him 2.9 million won (about 1,900 US dollars) to cover the costs of making drones. The commander of an army special forces, who had previously attended the same school as the PhD student O, joined him to observe the flights and carry out an analysis of the video footage of North Korea that was shot by the drones in order to assess its value. A second captain from the Defence Ministry’s intelligence department, as it was revealed, took a video recording from the PhD student and analysed its potential use for the military command.

Amid such evident traces, the Minister of Unification, Chung Dong-young, held a briefing on the preliminary results of the investigation. The main advocate of inter-Korean dialogue expressed regret over the ‘reckless drone intrusion’ and tried to separate the incident at issue from the penetration of a UAV into North Korea in the autumn of 2024 during the administration of Yoon Suk Yeol. When asked whether his comments had been agreed upon by the Blue House, Chung replied that it was the ministry’s stance.

On 12 February, Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, issued a press statement saying that ‘the authorities of the Republic of Korea must undertake measures to prevent a provocative encroachment on the sovereignty of the DPRK’. She indicated that the minister’s regret ‘is a reassuring moment’ and a relatively reasonable decision. ‘However, the ROK authorities cannot get away with that – they should take guaranteed measures to prevent such serious violations of the sovereignty of the Republic from being carried out again.’

On 13 February, the Ministry of Unification said that it regards Kim’s statement as ‘the North’s indication of the need for joint inter-Korean efforts to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula and prevent emergency incidents’.

On 6 April, President Lee Jae Myung personally expressed regret over the incident at a cabinet meeting. He stressed that it was a matter of actions by private individuals, not a state operation, and demanded that measures be taken to prevent similar cases in the future.

The same day, the DPRK representative known as the ‘First Sister’ reacted to the president’s statement. She referred to it as ‘reassuring and wise behaviour by an honest and generous person,’ noting that the DPRK government highly appreciates his regret and measures to prevent the incident from recurring.

Afterwards, the head of the presidential administration, Kang Hoon-sik, said that ‘President Lee demonstrated a firm will to restore trust between the two Koreas and stressed the necessity to reduce the degree of military tension.’ The Ministry of Unification added that ‘Kim Yo Jong’s statement shows that the leaders of South and North Korea promptly confirmed their intentions and established contact’ regarding ceasing actions that contribute to the increase of military tension on the Korean peninsula. ‘This is seen as a significant step towards establishing peace and coexistence.’

Such interpretations were shared by other experts who suggested that ‘the speedy response of North Korea to Lee having articulated regret over the drone flights indicates that Pyongyang still considers inter-Korean relations as those of utmost significance, despite its hostile stance towards Seoul’.

Nevertheless, such interpretations of the statements seem to have raised eyebrows in Pyongyang, to put it mildly. On 7 April, Jang Geum-cheol, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK and Director of the Tenth Department of the Foreign Ministry, published a press statement entitled ‘The Nature of the Republic of Korea as a Hostile and Repugnant State Cannot Be Altered.’ She called the analysis of Kim Yo Jong’s statement in the South ‘truly ridiculous.’ Jang Geum-cheol emphasised that ‘amid Seoul’s complicity in the UN Human Rights Council resolution, the nature of the Republic of Korea as a state hostile and repugnant to the DPRK cannot be changed by either the words or the actions of its ruler’.

Analysis of the Situation Around the Drone Launches: Versions and Political Context

Russian historian and journalist Oleg Kiryanov has expressed his scepticism regarding the official version of the South Korean authorities that the drone launches were ‘entirely a private initiative.’ In his opinion, this statement raises legitimate doubts.

The core point resides in the South Korean defence and intelligence officers who allegedly helped the PhD student O and funded his team being state employees. Their activities were aimed against the DPRK. The fact that such operations could have been carried out for a long time with the top leadership of the country being in the dark about them, especially given the scale of the payments, makes one start questioning the official version.

Thus, there are two extremely discouraging scenarios. Either the South Korean intelligence services are in such a turmoil (with it still being present after the recent purges that followed the overthrow of President Yoon Suk Yeol) that majors and captains are able to independently initiate secret operations fraught with armed conflict. Or there was an attempt to use other people’s hands, which also raises serious questions.

As far as the ‘regret’ expressed by President Lee is concerned, in Korea and Japan, there is a significant difference between this particular notion and an apology. Regret is merely an expression of emotion, whereas an apology implies acknowledging one’s own wrongdoing and a willingness to make things right.

When assessing President Lee’s statements, it is important to take the current political and economic situation into account. In June 2026, South Korea will hold local elections, in which the president’s party succumbed to a crushing defeat in 2021, as well as a referendum on constitutional amendments. Despite internal disagreements in the conservative party between supporters and opponents of the former president, the Democrats stand a chance of regaining lost ground. However, there is more to the situation than meets the eye.

First, although President Lee has been in power for less than a year, the Democratic Party has already faced a number of unpleasant corruption scandals. Second, events in the Middle East and South Korea’s reaction to them could lead both to tensions with the United States and to an economic crisis.

Under these circumstances, President Lee needs to bolster his image as a left‑leaning politician and distance himself from negative accusations. Unlike the conservatives, who openly opposed the North, the actions of the Democrats, if we take a look at deeds rather than at words, may seem more hypocritical and vile.

Unfortunately, conducting intelligence against the DPRK through other people’s hands fits perfectly into this negative picture.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences

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