Nepal’s general election on 5 March is being held at a time when the geopolitical weather is heavy and uncertain. This is not just another round in the country’s familiar cycle of unstable coalitions and revolving-door prime ministers. It is the first nationwide vote after the 2025 Gen Z uprising, which revealed how exasperated the youth of Nepal were with the country’s political class.

It also revealed how deeply Nepal’s domestic politics is entangled in regional power rivalries. Whoever forms the next government will inherit a foreign policy environment far more constrained than any predecessor has faced, and far less forgiving of leaders perceived as pliant in the face of external pressure.

The irony is that this election comes at a moment when Nepal’s two most consequential neighbours formally agree on one thing — the country must have a timely, elected government. Both India and China supported the March polls after the uprising that forced K.P. Sharma Oli out of office, calculating that prolonged uncertainty in Kathmandu would be inimical to their interests.

Yet beneath this surface convergence lies a sharp divergence in what each hopes the election will ultimately deliver. There is a growing recognition inside Nepal that no incoming government can realistically function as an ally of India in the old sense of the term.

India has been historically the most consequential external actor in Nepal, not just because of geography but because of the open border, dense social, cultural and historical ties, and deep economic dependence. New Delhi’s immediate preference is clear. It does not want Oli back. The former prime minister’s standing among young voters collapsed during the uprising, and his party, the CPN-UML, is widely expected to perform poorly.

India’s quieter hope is for........

© National Herald