China’s Economics of Denial
China has correctly diagnosed its most pressing economic problems. The Chinese Communist Party has acknowledged that its economy relies too much on investment and exports and that persistently weak household consumption is the core threat to future growth. The leadership also knows that this imbalanced growth model is causing trade friction with developed and emerging economies alike and will continue to do so. They know there is a growing chorus of economists (including many quiet voices in China) raising the alarm that, if Beijing does not make major changes soon, China will face ever-slower growth, cascading trade disputes, and potentially stagnating household income.
But what is puzzling is that the country’s leaders are not acting. Beijing has announced only modest plans to boost household consumption and domestic demand, and its overall economic strategy remains essentially unchanged—focused on expanding investment in manufacturing, especially in advanced technologies and new strategic industries.
Theories abound as to why Beijing has chosen to ignore the warnings. Many speculate that Chinese leader Xi Jinping is not receiving accurate information or that he and his closest allies have abandoned development as a priority in favor of national security goals or a desire to control the commanding heights of global industry. Others argue that Beijing knows what it should do, but political or institutional constraints prevent it from taking decisive action.
In truth, while these factors all play a part in shaping policy, the real explanation is far simpler. The party is sticking to this path because the leadership believes it is working. It sees the same troubling data—including rising external surpluses, weak consumption, slower household income growth, weak credit demand, rising unemployment and underemployment, and persistent deflation—but it has reached wildly different conclusions about what these developments indicate and what Beijing should do in response.
Chinese economic policy is nested within a methodical planning process, which is meant to ensure that short-term pressures do not distract from long-term priorities. The problem is that the long-term strategy is predicated on the belief that control of advanced technologies and industry will trigger a new round of high-speed growth. This economic strategy can best be understood as a Marxism-infused misapplication of neoclassical economic development theory: Beijing is obsessed with control over technology and physical capital and believes that its ultrahigh levels of investment will accelerate productivity gains and wage growth. But a disproportionate focus on manufacturing and technology cannot increase productivity or wages if those investments are decoupled from the needs of the market and trends in aggregate final demand. This is especially true in a country as large as China—already the world’s largest exporter—that cannot rely upon further exports to fuel growth.
STICKING TO THEIR GUNS
China’s worldview treats development as equivalent to capital accumulation and sees productivity as determined by the control and deployment of technology. It posits that the growth of the service sector, higher wages, and higher consumption are the consequences of that physical underlying foundation—they follow naturally in later stages of the development process once the productive industries have flourished. In this conception of economic development, the right strategy is always more investment, more industry, and more technology. The role of the state is to ensure that household savings and industrial profits are recycled through the state-owned banking system or government-guided capital into priority investments rather than frivolous activities, like services or consumption. The resulting structural imbalance that weakens household income growth, the service sector, and public services was thus not an accident; in China’s economic development theory, this is seen as self-discipline that will pay off with more rapid long-term development.
A key corollary to this view is that the government’s macroeconomic management must guide resource allocation proactively through hands-on intervention, not impassively through interest rates and exchange rates. The state can harness the dynamism and ambition of markets to promote efficiency and innovation in defined spaces, but it is the government’s job to identify the correct focal points for investment to ensure that priority sectors grow at maximum speed and then to intervene to ameliorate imbalances when they inevitably arise.
In this conception of........
