After more than two years fighting one of the world’s most powerful armies, Ukraine has enacted a new mobilization law—a move hailed by the West as an urgent reform. Signed into law on April 16, the legislation comes at a time when Ukraine faces a series of growing challenges in its defense against Russia, from shortages of soldiers and ammunition to wavering Western support. In this view, the new law could make it easier for the government to replenish its forces as it prepares for a major Russian offensive this summer.

For Ukrainians, however, the law also represents something else. Subject to more than 4,200 amendments, the law required months of contentious debate in the Ukrainian parliament. Indeed, some of its original provisions—such as planning for how and when the hundreds of thousands of soldiers who have been serving since the war began should be discharged—were ultimately left out for a separate bill. But it also has become a symbol of Ukraine’s imperfect yet still flourishing democracy. More significantly, it has helped define the pivot point at which the country now stands: having weathered the initial emergency of war, Ukraine now needs to restructure its institutions and its society as it adapts to a potentially much longer conflict.

Back in the spring and summer of 2022, in the months after Russia launched its full-scale invasion, Ukrainians’ response to the attack was almost spontaneous. Huge numbers of men enlisted, and despite brutal fighting and constant bombardment, they were able to defeat Russia’s attempt to take Kyiv and even to reclaim significant territory captured by the Russians. With arms and supplies flooding into Ukraine from the United States and the West and immediate fighting to be done, there was not much time to think about building the country’s own defense industries or managing the wartime economy.

Today, the Ukrainians continue to maintain a tough frontline against the Russians and are as determined as ever to defend their country. But as the war becomes protracted, the country also faces major structural demands. The armed forces must be prepared to fight for months or years to come. The government has to keep the civilian economy afloat, even as it sends more of its able-bodied population into battle. And as the leadership in Kyiv awaits a long-delayed aid package from the U.S. Congress, it must learn to do more with less. In practice, that means creating a system in which much of the adult male population of the country—before the war, there were some 10.5 million men between the ages of 18 and 59—serves in the army. It means building, almost from scratch, a defense production capability that allows Ukraine to lessen its dependence on allies. And it means further reorganizing the national economy to ensure there is enough money to pay for the runaway costs of war.

To meet these daunting tasks, the Ukrainian government has spent months pushing the mobilization bill through parliament. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has also taken a series of interim steps to help close the gap in the armed forces, even as members of his administration try to put the economy on a more strategic war footing. But each of these moves requires balancing complex and sometimes contradictory decisions with the need to maintain the country’s social cohesion. Often, there are no perfect answers.

After more than two years of war, Ukraine’s need for soldiers is acute. But it is not just a question of adding more people to the existing forces or making up for the fallen and wounded. In actual numbers, officials have made varying estimates of the country’s needs: in December 2023, army commanders demanded 500,000 new soldiers; more recently, the new commander in chief, General Oleksandr Syrsky, suggested that 150,000 recruits per year might be sufficient, although many regard that figure as too low. Equally pressing, however, may be the issue of maintaining troop quality.

For many of the country’s military leaders, a top priority is providing a fair deal for those who have been risking their lives for two years already, even as millions of other Ukrainians have preserved a relatively normal way of life away from the battlefield. Thus, even as new troops are mobilized, the army is under pressure to release some of its most experienced service personnel. But it is no secret that the vast combat experience that these veterans have cannot be matched by even the best-trained new recruits, creating a dilemma for the army.

Some of these challenges date to well before the current war. In the years leading up to Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine, whose territory had been the major defensive line between the Soviets and the West during the Cold War, had abolished the draft, and its standing army had shrunk to tiny levels. As the 2014 invasion was unfolding, Ukraine’s acting defense minister, with only slight exaggeration, claimed that the country had only 5,000 soldiers fit for combat. Moscow’s aggression became a wake-up call for Ukraine’s military and ushered in major reforms.

By 2022, the armed forces had grown to 300,000, many of whom were volunteers. Today, that figure has ballooned to more than one million people, out of a total population of about 40 million. A large majority began their service at the start of the war: following Russia’s February 2022 invasion, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians enlisted, and a draft of serving-age men began. (The call-up has continued to the present: on an almost weekly basis, most Ukrainians witness someone they know going into service.) The huge influx was crucial to Ukraine’s defense, but it also meant that the army began the war with very little experience or internal cohesion. Its soldiers are predominantly civilians who come from widely disparate social and economic backgrounds and have varying political views and levels of education. There is no such thing as a typical Ukrainian soldier anymore.

Under existing law, there is no formal time limit for military service. Soldiers are supposed to be discharged when martial law ends—which means the end of the war and could be years away. As one officer told me, “Even the most determined [soldier] will consider this to be an eternal contract.” To address the problem, the original draft mobilization bill, when it was introduced in January, proposed to mandate demobilization after 36 months of active duty. But that provision was dropped because of pressure from military leaders, who feared they would lose their most experienced troops.

Coming after two years of intense warfare, the challenge of building a just system for military enlistment has turned into a focal point for larger debates about Ukraine’s democratic foundations and the future of the war. Although the mobilization bill was in itself broadly supported, critics argued that some of its provisions violated the Ukrainian constitution, which cannot be changed under martial law and was written in times when a major land war on Ukrainian soil seemed almost unthinkable. For instance, the constitution guarantees the right of free movement and the right of of education: if you were studying at a university or for a Ph.D., you could avoid the draft, whereas now, if you are of serving age, you may be conscripted. The new enlistment system also requires Ukrainians of serving age to provide personal data, which may violate existing privacy laws.

Ukraine’s political classes are also sensitive to the country’s implicit social contract: the harder the state pushes and the stricter the rules that are enforced, the more chance there is that the Ukrainians will rebel and disobey. Like the Americans, the Ukrainians have a deep-seated suspicion of government intrusion in their lives. Thus, the government must find ways to encourage people to serve instead of forcing them to do so.

This winter, while the mobilization law........

© Foreign Affairs